12. Operation ZEN

Submitted by jerzy.targalski on

In late December 2001, in one of the special services’ safehouses in Warsaw, there was a meeting of Minister of National Defense Jerzy Szmajdziński, Acting Chief Of UOP Zbigniew Siemiątkowski, WSI Chief [then] Col. [later General] Marek Dukaczewski and Vice-president of the ‘Konsalnet Company’ [Konsalnet = one of the private security company in nowadays Poland] (and former Head of Section 9, Department 1, Security Service MSW) Aleksander Makowski. The subject of the meeting was the mission in "Z", and in particular the role that Aleksander Makowski was to play in that mission.
As Zbigniew Siemiątkowski during the hearing before the Verification Commission, the Minister of National Defense Jerzy Szmajdziński “tried to verify Makowski’s abilities in (…), it was about his operational abilities.” I did not believe in his abilities, that was vetted. (...) Some wanted very much for Makowski to stay (…). He was walking on slippery ground between business and services. We were convinced back then that Makowski’s sources of information should be treated very carefully. The whole matter stared with operational testing by one of the allied services that raised lot of doubts. (...) As the UOP Chief, I had an inner belief that we should proceed very carefully because we were dealing with the most important case from the point of view of the security of our State and our allies (…). I relayed my doubts regarding Makowski to Minister Szmajdziński and the WSI Chief. (...) Also Rudolf Skowroński had business in (…). Our vetting for Makowski, his information and operational abilities was not too good for him. This is why he went with his ideas to the WSI. We assumed that Makowski could be a confabulator and his sources could be inspired.”
The fact that the meeting was held and the general content of the conversation are confirmed also by Minister Szmajdziński and WSI Chief Dukaczewski, though they present the stand of Minister Siemiątkowski differently. According to their accounts, he supposedly agreed that Makowski passes under the military intelligence’s wing and did not warn about the allies’ doubts and unreliability of Makowski’s information. This is why Minister Szmajdziński made the decision to use Aleksander Makowski and ordered Gen. Dukaczewski to take appropriate action.
Dukaczewski ordered the case to be run by Col. Oziembała who allegedly knew Makowski from the time they both served at the post in Rome in the 80-ties. Oziembała ran Makowski as the source called "HAMID" and at the beginning of 2004 transferred the case to Col. Surdyk, with partly unregistered documentation.
The WSI Chief Col. Dukaczewski gave Surdyk the instruction to handle the case, stressing that it was done at the personal order of Minister Jerzy Szmajdziński.
Individual reports are initialed by Dukaczewski, sometimes they are addressed to Szmajdziński. The latter, during the hearing before the Commission, did not question his participation in the decision to use Makowski. He only stressed the uniqueness of the situation in which the military intelligence was, not having any sources on the eve of dispatch of the military units to "Z". Wanting to acquire information, he supposedly did not go into details of the applicable legal procedure. The former Minister of National Defense refused answering the question whether he was familiar with the content of the Ordinance of the Council of Ministers of 1996, whereby special liability was imposed on the Minister of National Defense for operational and investigation work of the WSI.
Makowski’s case was run by the WSI in the scope of two investigations, one of which, the initial investigation in 2001-2004 code-named “HAMID”, turned up after the Verification Commission has been analyzing the case for a month. The case file was not found, there is only the source case, started on May 14, 2002.
A second case – code-named "ZEN" – was started as a problem case only in December 2003 and the first document in the file is dated around that time (it has no signature or any information as to its producer).. The first report signed by the case officer, describing the case, is dated on September 15, 2004. Similar to the "HAMID" file, "ZEN" is incomplete as well: there is no case start sheet, the page numbers have been changed and some documents which come from the initial period of the case were put into the file at the end. The file also has the traces of attempted destruction of documents by covering some information (attempt was made to prevent the identification of Makowski’s personal data as well as the information about his past, including the work for the 1st Department of MSW [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of People’s Republic of Poland and his work in ‘Konsalnet’). Along with those efforts goes the fact that some WSI soldiers and politicians who made the decision that Makowski should be used by the intelligence denied knowing about his place of employment and his ties to Konsalnet).
The records in "HAMID" file give no doubts: Makowski is described as the WSI intelligence source and remunerated for the same. Also the file "Z" contains documentation which shows the fact that Makowski was a source who was to provide information (also from three other sources placed in "Z"). For his services, Makowski collected – starting from 2002, in 17 installments – 31.44 thousand zlotys and 108.62 thousand US Dollars. He delivered at least 75 memos and reports, held 15 registered operational meetings and several trips to "Z" at WSI’s cost. The intelligence soldiers met several times one of the sources indicated by Makowski, once in Poland and twice in "Z". Every time Makowski was also present at the meetings and the soldiers who carried out intelligence tasks stressed before the Commission that he never agreed for independent meetings between the sources and the intelligence. A meeting with the other two sources never had place and it is not clear if they existed at all. Ending this stage of collaboration, Makowski caused the conclusion of an informal agreement with the intelligence, according to which he demanded 40 thousand USDs a month to secure his needs and the needs of the sources he run. This was probably connected with the talks he held with the intelligence since autumn 2005, the purpose of which was to organize a “zone of influence”, “build the in-place post (residential)” and develop “a business network as a cover institution”.
From the materials contained in available written sources and from the hearings of the soldiers who took part in operation “ZEN” as well as from the hearings of politicians responsible for the security of the Polish State, It can be seen that the concept of such cover or zone was to consist in establishment of a commercial company (or a network of companies) which would deliver supplies to the military units in “ZEN”. Those companies were on one hand supposed to form the base for surveillance and intelligence work, on the other hand, to satisfy the financial needs of the circles co-operating with Polish forces in “ZEN” country. Aleksander Makowski was supposed to have share in these activities, and it cannot be ruled out that some share would fall to other Konsalnet owners or even the whole company. Whichever the case, another co-owner and founder of Konsalnet, Wiesław Bednarz, traveled to “ZEN” with Makowski and Minister Szmajdziński as early as in February 2002, i.e. at the very beginning of the operation.
After the elections in 2005, the case of Makowski and his operation of misinformation of the authorities of the Republic of Poland was kept secret from the highest authorities: the President and the Prime Minister. After Radosław Sikorski took the office of the Minister of National Defense, he was informed about the general framework of the operation and at the beginning of 2006, Minister Sikorski was given the details. As Col. Surdyk explained, Radosław Sikorski arrived then to the intelligence’s seat and was acquainted with the whole “ZEN” documentation. The case officer Col. Surdyk, Gen. Dukaczewski and the documentation keeper were present during the reading in order to provide further clarifications. They both confirmed in their explanations before the Commission that Minister Sikorski read the documentation.
Later, the President and the Prime Minister were informed, however, they were presented only the version complaint with the point of view of the “ZEN” source.
In the note dated September 11, 2006, a day before the Polish delegation was to leave for the US, the WSI Chief informed in turn that the Minister Sikorski proposed the President L. Kaczyński to notify the whole case to the allies and take joint actions. Minister Sikorski was said to have supported the whole initiative during his talks in the US. Surdyk stated: I informed Minister Sikorski about the role played by Aleksander Makowski in this case at the beginning of 2006, when an article was published in the press about Mr. Skowroński, where his ties to Makowski in Inter Commerce were mentioned”.
The cases "ZEN" and "HAMID" cause a few basic questions to arise. Firstly, what was it all really about? Secondly, how it could have happened that the authorities of the Republic of Poland, in a matter of key importance for the State security, were deceived by a former, negatively vetted officer of the 1st Department of the MSW of the People’s Republic of Poland, a businessman suspected of swindle, an informer who was negatively assessed by the most important special services of the world for nearly 4 years?
In accordance with the first preserved report concerning the "ZEN" case, dated September 15, 2004, the case’s objective was: “to counteract the threat posed to Poland and her citizens as well as to other entities of international law by the terrorist organizations as well as to attempt to lead to the capture of the main organizers and leaders "X" and "Y". An operation’s objective so outlined surely must have required the highest bona fides of people involved, absolutely certain information and particular efforts aimed at verification of the sources. Meanwhile, in the operation "ZEN" – in the "HAMID" operation too, for that matter – the situation is exactly the opposite. Although Makowski is described in the documentation as a source, he signs the receipts for money and the special instruction as the source or HUMINT source – in fact, as the officers maintain, he was never treated as a source. He was supposed to be, as Minister Szmajdziński put it and M. Dukaczewski and other case officers, such as Col. Surdyk, Col. W. and Col. Z. confirmed, “a bridge agent”, a “contact with the source”, “a contact”. The operational instruction does not contain such categories of collaboration. Disregarding the operational instruction means violating the law, exposing human life and success of the entire operation to an extreme danger. And, as a consequence, brings the risk of misinformation of the State authorities, including the President.
The assessment of the bona fides of Makowski and his sources is thus of key importance to the whole matter. This is because the military intelligence entrusted him with the task of creation of the intelligence guard for the Polish presence in “ZEN” and, with the lapse of time, it was Makowski who, to a gradually greater extent, decided on the undertakings of the Polish intelligence and State in the matters related to "ZEN".
Meanwhile, Makowski has never been vetted as a source. His bona fides has not been screened, he has not been controlled, even his place of employment and his surroundings have not been checked. Even more, his sources in "ZEN" have never been vetted and Makowski himself did not agree to disclose their personal data to the intelligence. The intelligence officers also did not have a change to meet these sources personally, without Makowski’s company. When asked for this unusual procedure, contradictory to the legal norms applicable in operational actions, the people responsible for this excused themselves with various circumstances. Minister Szmajdziński pointed primarily to the need for immediate action due to the approaching date of action in “ZEN”. The WSI Chief emphasized the merits and efficiency that Makowski had in the time of his work for the Security Service. Officers Surdyk, W. and Z. pointed to the orders received from their superiors, including the Ministers of National Defense, who pointed Makowski to them as a source.
These explanations are not credible. It seems even that the operation "Z" was some type of cover for completely different actions, aimed at deriving personal benefits for Makowski and people related to him. This is indicated by the fact that the warnings about Makowski being an unreliable person, a confabulator, a person who conceals his true intentions and aims, were systematically ignored. Special emphasis should be put here on the fact that this opinion about Makowski was known to the Minister of National Defense and the WSI Chief as they had been warned by the UOP Chief, Zbigniew Siemiątkowski. The fact that the UOP Chief pointed both to UOP findings and to the information coming from the allies is of great importance. In this perspective, it becomes of special significance that there were the attempts to repro the operational documentation, both by covering Makowski’s personal data and by describing him as a source which he in fact was not, as a person not subjected to normal operational procedures and thus not delivering the information reliable for the intelligence. It must be also stressed that this fact has been pointed out at least twice by the intelligence officers: Col. Hermel and Col. Szlenk. The former, in his analysis of October 2004, pointed that Makowski’s information is of general nature, they do not find confirmation and, first of all, are consequent, not beforehand.
"In the assessment of the sources’ work we see that the provided information is superficial, which gives the grounds for assumptions that:
- the source makes up the story for a hearsay information, but has no direct access to it, or
- it is delivered through a chain of people, losing this way many important details and ending contorted or incomplete”.
Even a more far-reaching diagnosis was contained by Col. Szlenk and Col. Hermel in the conclusion of the current analysis, put at the end of Case "Z" (vol. IV, pp. 256, 257): They write there that:
“(…) Lack of details and vagueness of the information causes it to be of little value.
2. The source confuses the data of people associated with X, Y, group Z, W, etc.
3. A great majority of information is superficial and pertains to matters, which had already taken place.
4. The presented data are imprecise, impossible to verify or even untrue. The current verifiability rate of the delivered information is drastically low.
In the conclusion it is stated point-blank:
"1. The provided information did not meet the operational results declared by the contact,
2. Our contact has limited abilities to obtain reliable, and thus verifiable information from his alleged human sources,
3. It cannot be ruled out that the contact purposefully plays a game with the WSI in order to gain personal (e.g. financial) benefits."
In spite of such a crushing diagnosis, not only was the case continued, but also huge amounts were spent on keeping the alleged "source" or "contact". First of all, however, there was a conscious misinformation of the State authorities, primarily the President of the Republic of Poland, and the relevant allied institutions. The case files preserved at least three reports addressed to the highest State authorities, where it was stated that the WSI is in possession of information pointing to an opportunity to capture the terrorist leaders from group X. An arrangement with the allies was suggested in order to undertake a joint operation aimed at liquidation of the terrorists, the highest authorities were persuaded to start appropriate international talks, false reports were delivered to other competent domestic services, the Deputy Minister of National Defense in charge of the WSI and to the Prime Minister and the President of the Republic of Poland. On the basis, among others, of the alleged reports of Makowski and his sources, in winter 2005, M. Dukaczewski suggested the State authorities to implement extraordinary measures in the whole country in protection against a terrorist attack. If his had been followed, it would have meant exposing the social peace to considerable threat.
Undoubtedly, however, the most grave consequences derived from the attempt to misinform the President of the Republic of Poland, the highest authorities of the State and the Poland’s allies when, as a result of misinformation, the intelligence started an operation that was aimed at conning the allies out of multi-million award under the pretences of elimination of the terrorists. At the same time, the allies were accused by the intelligence officers of ill will, or even a politically inspired unwillingness to capture the terrorists, because they pointed out the fictionality of the information. We should particularly stress the suggestion contained here, among others, in the report of July 24, 2006, which indicated that the policy of power, pursued by the US, was the reason for unwillingness to capture the terrorists and for the rejection of proposals coming from the Intelligence Directorate of the WSI. All those arguments were a camouflage for the true objectives, which motivated Aleksander Makowski, the true author of the entire operation and actual instigator of the activities of the WSI intelligence.
We do not know all the circumstances and reasons for collaboration of the military intelligence with Aleksander Makowski. Certainly not without importance are the issues raised by the soldiers and politicians in their statements made before the Verification Commission, where they pointed to the confidence the intelligence had in Makowski due to his long-term work in the Security Service. Also the acquaintance of Makowski with Marek Oziembała, who he supposedly met during his stay at the post in Rome in the 80-ties, dated at that time. Oziembała was also Makowski’s first case officer. Also the business experience Makowski had could have some impact on the decisions on Minister Jerzy Szmajdziński. Szmajdziński denies knowing what that experience was, but it is hard to believe; a detailed account of financial relations between Makowski and the inhabitants of "Z" was given to the Commission by the testifying soldiers of the WSI. The financial conflict between Makowski and the UOP intelligence was mentioned by Minister Siemiątkowski, while the settlements made in precious stones were reported by the soldiers heard out in this case by the Commission. These accounts create a picture of large-scale, sometimes illegal operations conducted by Waldemar [supposed to be: Aleksander] Makowski, Skowroński and their domestic and foreign partners with the use of the Polish State machine. The third factor which was probably taken into account were Makowski’s relations and acquaintance with some of the “ZEN” commanders. These close ties are confirmed in his explanations by Minister Szmajdziński who supposedly observed them on site during the visit in “ZEN” in 2002, but also by other soldiers who stayed there in the framework of activities of the WSI intelligence.
This is why, aside from financial matters, we should also take political conditions into account. Such a suggestion is contained in the reports which stressed that the Western allies, due to their “great power” political game were not interested in the liquidation of terrorists and that this was the exact reason – not the lack of Aleksander Makowski’s bona fides – for the lack of confidence in the information from Polish sources. But such premises result also from the stand taken by some soldiers during the hearings, when they stated that they do not see anything wrong in co-operating with groups infiltrated by the US enemies and they did not see it as a threat to the Polish mission.
The cases "ZEN" and "HAMID" thus appear as a specific summary of the negative consequences arising from the fact that the Polish military special services were based on human teams, concepts and patterns of actions inherited from People’s Republic of Poland. Here met almost all pathologies described in this report: services’ reliance on the teams trained in the USSR, use of former Security Service people (organized in the so-called business intelligence agencies, which in fact were teams aspiring to steer Polish services), building in-place posts and conducting intelligence activities based on the network of business enterprises and finally complete disregard of the State authorities and their control over special services as well as readiness to cheat on those people’s own State. The alleged professionalism, effectiveness and indispensability of those services proved to be just the opposite. In the case "ZEN", the services, acting at the orders of a swindler, robbed the Polish state and were ready to expose Polish soldiers and commanders of armed forces to the highest danger and international embarrassment. We need to ask here what was the inspiration for such activities, remembering that it all happened so because for many years the services which grew up on Soviet background were given complete impunity and except for a few months of rules by Jan Olszewski’s cabinet no one has ever tried to force those services to serve the interest of the Polish State and Nation. Looking from this perspective, the liquidation of the WSI and creation of new military special services appears as the only possible solution.
In the light of the cited facts, the conduct of the following people meets the disposition contained in Article 70a.1 and 70a.2.2 of the Act on Provisions Implementing the Act on Military Counter-Intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service and the Act on the service of the officers of Military Counter-Intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service, dated June 9, 2006: Col. Jerzy Surdyk, Col. Dariusz Sobala and Col. Waldemar Żak.
The activities of Andrzej Makowski meet the disposition of Article 70a.2.1 of the aforecited Act.
The WSI Chiefs in the described period were: Brig. Gen. Marek Dukaczewski and Brig. Gen. Jan Żukowski.
Article 5.1 of the Act on the Office of the Minister of National Defense, dated December 14, 1995, contained the regulation stating that the Military Information Services are subordinated directly to that Minister. That regulation was specified in a greater detail in § 1.16 of the Ordinance of the Council of Ministers on the Detailed Scope of Competencies of the Minister of National Defense, dated July 9, 1996. This regulation imposed on the Minister of National Defense the obligation to exercise supervision over the activities of the Military Information Services, including in particular their operational actions and investigations.. Pursuant to the Military Information Services Act of July 9, 2003, the supervision over the activities of those services rested with the Minister of National Defense who appointed and dismissed the WSI Chief. By virtue of Article 9.1 of this Act, the WSI Chief was subordinated to the Minister of Defense directly. The Minister of the National Defense in the described period was Jerzy Szmajdziński.
The facts cited in this chapter bring doubts as to the legality of conduct of the WSI soldiers; thus, the Verification Commission sent to the Supreme Military Prosecutor’s Office a notification of suspected crime, in compliance with Article 304 § 2 of the Code of Penal Procedure.

Conclusion

The Military Information Services was headed by the Chief, to whom all chiefs of individual directorates, offices, units, sections etc. were subordinated. It was the WSI Chief, holding the highest office in the WSI organizational structure, who was responsible for actions of all soldiers, officers and employees of the WSI.
Until 1995, the responsibility for actions of the Military Information Services was not regulated expressis verbis by any Act or even an Ordinance. This could cause a mistaken belief that there was not anyone who, as the supervisor of the service’s actions, together with that service’s Chief, would be jointly and severally responsible with the officers who committed acts incompliant with the legal order in force. By virtue of Article 35.1 of the so-called “Minor Constitution” of 1992, it was the President who was the supreme commander of the Polish Army. The next section provides that it is the President who, in agreement with the Minister of National Defense, appoints and dismissed the Chief of General Staff of the Polish Army, and at the request of the Minister of National Defense appoints and dismisses Deputy Chiefs of General Staff, commanders of individual types of Armed Forces and commanders of military districts. Those provisions mean that at the time of peace the responsibility for activities of the Polish Army rests both with the President and the Minister of National Defense. This signifies their special responsibility for the actions of the WSI.
A similar solution was implemented in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of April 2, 1997. Article 134 of the Constitution states that at the time of peace it is the President of the Republic of Poland who exercises the command over the Armed Forces, through the Minister of National Defense.
In both legal situations, a greater burden of responsibility rests with the President of the Republic of Poland who exercises his prerogatives through the Minister of National Defense.
Only Article 5.1 of the Act on the Office of the Minister of National Defense, dated December 14, 1995, contained the regulation stating precisely that the Military Information Services are subordinated directly to that Minister. Naturally, this does not exclude in any manner the responsibility of subsequent Ministers of National Defense for the WSI actions before the entry of that Act into force, because every Minister is liable for his or her ministry on general terms.
The key regulation is § 1.16 of the Ordinance of the Council of Ministers on the Detailed Scope of Competencies of the Minister of National Defense, dated July 9, 1996. It imposed on the Minister of National Defense the obligation to exercise supervision over the activities of the Military Information Services, including in particular their operational actions and investigations.
A uniformed provision was included later in the Military Information Services Act of July 9, 2003, whereby the supervision over the activities of those services rested with the Minister of National Defense who appointed and dismissed the WSI Chief. Pursuant to Article 9.1 of this Act, the WSI Chief, until the Act of June 9, 2006, was subordinated to the Minister of Defense directly.
This legal situation indicates that the special responsibility for irregularities and omissions pointed out in the report rests with:

  • the President of the Republic of Poland Lech Wałęsa
  • the President of the Republic of Poland Aleksander Kwaśniewski
  • the Chief of General Staff of the Polish Army, Lt. Gen. Tadeusz Wilecki (in the period of subordination of the WSI to the General Staff of the Polish Army)
  • the Minister of National Defense Piotr Kołodziejczyk
  • the Minister of National Defense Janusz Onyszkiewicz
  • the Minister of National Defense Zbigniew Okoński
  • the Minister of National Defense Stanisław Dobrzański
  • the Minister of National Defense Bronisław Komorowski
  • the Minister of National Defense Jerzy Szmajdziński

and the following Chiefs of the WSI:

  • Rear-Adm. Czesław Wawrzyniak
  • Gen. Bolesław Izydorczyk
  • Gen. Konstanty Malejczyk
  • Gen. Kazimierz Głowacki
  • Gen. Marek Dukaczewski

 

Antoni Macierewicz
Chairman of the Verification Commission