7. Illegal Arms Trade | Jerzy Targalski (1952-2021)

Until 1989, the monopoly for arms trade rested with the ‘Central Engineering Board’ (CZInż) within the Ministry of Foreign Trade and later within the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation. After the Economic Business Act entered into force in 1989, the competencies of CZInż were changed and the commercial activities related to international arms trade were taken up by commercial companies “CENZIN” and “CENREX”.
At the turn of 1991 and 1992, the WSI developed the so-called concept of organization of counter-intelligence protection for arms production and of monitoring of special trade conducted by the Polish companies. It was decided that there was “a provocation threat for the safe arms trade carried out by Polish institutions”. The real purpose was to create a mechanism of illegal arms trade. This was one of the goals for which a special unit was created to handle these issues – ‘Unit 6’ (later: 36) of Armaments Industry Guard, composed of 14 military men. Marek Słoń served in this Unit from the start and the Unit was headed, among others, by the officers deriving from ‘Unit Y’ and trained in the USSR: Eugeniusz Lendzion and Cezary Lipert. The actions of ‘Unit 6 (36)’, the 3rd Directorate, were a in a way to secure interests of the 2nd Directorate (intelligence) of the WSI.

Reasons for Monitoring
As a matter of fact, instead of monitoring, the authors of this concept, K. Malejczyk and K. Głowacki (both were at some point officers of ‘Unit Y’ in the 2nd Directorate), at the consent of Gen. Izydorczyk (participant of a GRU training course), aimed at gaining a share in that market and controlling it through the military special services. The profits from the operation were to constitute “off-budget sources of financing of the activities of military special services”. The main base was to be constituted by companies established by the 2nd Directorate of the General Staff of the People’s Polish Armed Forces or controlled by officers under cover and agents of the 2nd Directorate. This was the nature of the companies selected for the operations, which dealt in arms trade: ‘Cenrex’, ‘Steo’, ‘Falcon’. According to Gen. Malejczyk, this undertaking was a reproduction of similar actions carried out by UOP with respect to the company called “Nat”. One can see here the direct continuity of the concept and actions developed yet in the 80-ties, when the profits from illegal arms trade were one of the sources of financing of the military special services.
The actions, which were expected to bring off-budget profits from arms trade, were, according to the WSI officers, conducted at MOD’s consent. The WSI counter-intelligence claimed that the legal grounds for those actions were constituted in the Directive concerning the operational actions and investigations, issued by the Minister of National Defense J. Onyszkiewicz, dated December 3, 1992. In that Directive, Minister Onyszkiewicz allowed that the counter-intelligence’s operational fund be provided with the funds obtained as a result of operational actions. Minister Onyszkiewicz also decided that the operational fund shall be excluded from the control exerted by other state authorities (e.g. NIK, [‘National Chamber of Controlling’, controlling body in Poland, especially concerned with finance spending of budget money]), which gave the counter-intelligence a privileged position.
As a result of the engagement of civil and military services in the special trade practices, there were may cases of Polish-Polish competition, which led to the exclusion of the rivals from commercial negotiations, while the desire of profits caused that the trade partners included some representatives of terrorist groups.
In order to obtain tangible benefits, the WSI were using their powers and facilitated the process of obtaining of relevant permits for activities in this domain. In order to receive the relevant documents, the WSI officers often used officers under cover or collaborators employed in the relevant units of the state authorities.

The Steo Company
Under the pretext of fulfillment of operational objectives of the 2nd Directorate, concerning the collection of opinions about military and political situation in Latvia and in the Russian Federation as well as about the Latvian-Russian relations, gen. Malejczyk decided to carry out a contract of arms sale to Latvia. To this end, he used the Cenrex company (then headed, among other, by an officer under cover “WIRAKOCZA”, i.e. Col. Jerzy Dembowski) and Steo (set up for the secret collaborator Edward Ochnio aka “TYTUS” [cryptic name for secret collaborator, etc.], who was been used by the ‘Unit Y’ of the 2nd Directorate before). The transaction was to bring the WSI a commission worth about 150-200 thousand US Dollars. These intentions was approved by the then WSI Chief, Gen. Izydorczyk. He informed the Chief of General Staff of Polish Armed Forces, T. Wilecki, about this enterprise. A written consent of the Chief of General Staff of Polish Armed Forces has not been found in the available documentation.
Lt. Col. Jerzy Dembowski (officer under cover aka “WIRAKOCZA” [cryptic name for secret collaborator or undercover officer]) conducted, as the intelligence representative, arms trade operations with Arab terrorists in mid-Eighties and at the end of the Eighties he directed the operations aimed at illegal import of IT technologies to the territory of Soviet states, to be later delivered to the USRR (to Ukraine) and to North Korea. In 1989, at the order of Gen. Władysław Seweryński, Dembowski established the Cenrex company taking over for this purpose the property of the State-owned CZInż.
In 1992, Dembowski, then still a representative of “Cenrex”, sold arms to the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, represented by “Mezner Galion”, i.e. in fact a Syrian terrorist Monzer Al-Kassar. That man was involved in terrorist attacks in which over 400 people died. His name showed up on the occasion of the jumbo-jet explosion over the Scottish town of Lockerby. J. Dembowski met him and at the order of the military intelligence of People’s Republic of Poland conducted negotiations regarding arms trade, when in 1982-1987 he held the function of trade attaché in Tripoli (Libya).
The transactions between Dembowski and Al.-Kassar were finalized in 1992 with the sale of arms to Croatia and Somalia (the latter was then covered by the international embargo on arms and military equipment deliveries, imposed by the Security Council UN). To carry out those transactions, Jerzy Dembowski used the company registered in Panama, “Scorpion Int. Services” S.A. with its seat in Vienna. These activities were of criminal nature and in 2000 charges were brought by the public prosecution. The Regional Public Prosecutor’s Office in Gdańsk charged among others J. Dembowski with issuance of untrue documents with regard to the destination point of the arms and ammunition sold. Instead to Latvia, the arms went an undetermined recipient in Somalia.
These activities and the previous period of operation in arms trade gave Col. K. Malejczyk the grounds for selection of Dembowski in 1992 for the operation of illegal arms trade. It is also important that for protection of this operation Edward Ochnio (“TYTUS”, [cryptic name for secret collaborator]) was used, who has been a collaborator of Unit Y of the 2nd Directorate since the 80-ties.
As early 1991, the WSI had information that the decision-makers in the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation obtained tangible benefits in the course of issue of the permits for arms trade. In this case, the permits were to be issued by Jan Suwiński from that Ministry. The practice’s mechanism, according to the saved internal note, looked as follows: “The submitted documents were photocopied and sent to MSW for verification, which took about 6 months. Suwiński received a specific percentage (up to 50%) of profits for speeding up the decision up. This was handled by Jerzy Dembowski (…). Suwiński was allegedly accepting bribes in return, to the amount of 20 – 50 thousand US Dollars. According to the collaborator Wojciech W., the permit for a company called ‘Net’ (he probably meant NAT, it was established by UOP [civilian security agency in Poland] officers) cost its president Cichocki 20 thousand USDs. Other people who were allegedly involved in these practices were: Leszek Grot, Leszek Gaj, Col. Moraczewski and Andrzej Gluza. An important role was supposedly played also by a high official who in December 1991 was to accept up to 50 thousand USDs for issuing the permit for transporting arms abroad.” None of the aforenamed people have ever been held liable. To the contrary, the WSI tried to conceal the matter and to better organize the illegal arms trade. The only consequence of this affair was that Dembowski left ‘Cenrex’ and started working in Steo and that the burden of illegal arms trade was shifted exactly to ‘Steo’.
In November 1993, Malejczyk asked Głowacki in writing for his assistance in obtaining the concession for Steo. In that letter, Malejczyk informed that “In accordance with the decision of the Minister of National Defense, Mr. Piotr Kołodziejczyk (note No. 078/W/93), the Intelligence Directorate of the Military Information Services carries out a transaction of sale of used military equipment and ammunition to Latvia”. K. Głowacki referred the case to the Chief of ‘Unit 6’ of the 3rd Directorate, E. Lendzion, who ordered M. Słoń: “to urgently take actions aimed at obtaining an export permit. Mr. Spis is aware of this matter. For further details, please contact Col. K. Malejczyk directly ”. When watching over the affairs of ‘Steo’, Col. Słoń stressed to the decision-makers in the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation, that the WSI very much wanted the formalities to taken care of be fast and positively. All permits and concession for Steo were dealt with on the spot (the applications were fulfilled on the day of submission). Despite that the arms were in fact prepared for illegal trade. It was smuggled on the pretext of export of various goods to the East.
In May 1994, the Estonian police intercepted a large number of TT guns, including 2420 pieces from Poland. This situation did not put E. Ochnio and J. Dembowski off and they continued their cooperation with Estonian criminals. Two years later, the Estonian customs officers reveal another case of smuggling arms from Poland – this time it was 1600 TT guns in the containers with pasta belonging to “Danuta” SA from the city of Malbork. J. Dembowski and E. Ochnio knew that those goods were to be received by an Estonian crime group headed by Railo Riis and Rain Raimo. This way, the limitations on export and use of goods were violated as the arms, being subject to strict export restrictions, again left the Polish customs area, and that with the exporters being aware that it was going to be received by unauthorized persons, namely the members of a crime group in Estonia. In spite of the two instances of smuggling operations to Baltic countries with participation of Steo being blown, the operational contact with Steo’s owner was continued as evidenced by the memos from the meetings with E. Ochnio, made by Maj. M. Słoń.
The unsuccessful delivery in 1996 put an end to the criminal activities of PHZ [PHZ (abreviation in Polish) = ‘Establishment for Foreign Commerce’] ‘Steo’ with respect to the trade in arms and ammunition.
When the affair of smuggling arms to Estonia was revealed in 1996, the WSI consciously misinformed the then Prime Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, who was notified, through UOP, that the WSI had no information about any collaboration of E. Ochnio with the military special services. Meanwhile, it was exactly in the framework of this operation that Ochnio, who remained the WSI collaborator the whole time, co-organized the illegal arms trade with the Russian Mafia and Arab terrorist groups. When replying to the Deputy Chief of UOP, Col. Jerzy Nóżka, Comdr. Głowacki omitted the fact of relations between the WSI and the ‘Steo’ owner (Ochnio) and its representative in Latvia, and earlier a director in Cenrex, Lt. Col. Dembowski.
The WSI chiefs did not inform any other state authorities (Prime Minister, President) about the activities in illegal arms trade either, while the profits generated by those companies were to be used as additional source of financing for the WSI activities not disclosed to the authorities.
All transactions performed by ‘Steo’ and ‘Cenrex’ with Latvia consisted of the fact that the arms and ammunition exported from Poland were intended for other recipients than indicated in the applications for permit and the Permits for Export of Arms and Ammunition. Ochnio and Dembowski intentionally gave untrue destination points of the arms to avoid giving the names of states covered by the SC UN embargo.
Despite the engagement of such large efforts and means, many times there was no success in winning valuable commercial contracts, which would be of defense benefit to the country.

The Falcon Company
Another of the WSI’s business undertaking of this kind was the establishment of “Falcon” Sp. z o.o. [Ltd. Co] with its seat in the city of Szczecin. It can be seen from the notes of officer Marek Słoń that the owner of that company was a collaborator acting as a reliable asset (RA) aka “MATUS”, i.e. Col. (Reserve) Witold Wąsikowski. The establishment of that company and its operations involved from the start the illegal participation of the WSI in business activities and their use of state machine for this purpose. In March 1993, Marek Słoń presented to his superiors (E. Lendzion, C. Lipert and K. Głowacki) the following project: “RA Matus would be useful as someone heading a company which would specialize in special equipment transactions in order to perform the task in the field of detection of illegal arms transactions, prevention of possible provocations against Polish manufacturers and traders of special equipment. Furthermore, I suggest concluding with him, a legally valid commercial agreement through a dangle. The grounds for the agreement could consist of a loan to be given to Matus by the HQ, which should provide funds for buying out the controlling block in the company that is to be established with his participation, and in exchange for that loan Matus would obligate to provide data and documents related to each transaction as well as to transfer to the agreed account a certain percent of profits on each commercial operation. The value of the extended loan could be 10 thousand US Dollars. Out of which 2,5 thousand US Dollars in cash and 7,5 thousand US Dollars as non-cash value; ‘HQ support’ in awarding the relevant concessions of MSW and Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation to Matus’ company. However, a receipt for the amount of 10 thousand US Dollars would be received with obligation to refund in case of non-performance of the concluded agreement.” "Falcon" was also to transfer to the WSI a part of the profit on each completed order. The project of the undertaking devised by officer Marek Słoń was accepted by the Deputy Chief of ‘Unit 6’, the 3rd Directorate of the WSI, Lt. Col. Eugeniusz Lendzion, and the Chief of ‘Unit 6’, the 3rd Directorate of the WSI, Lt. Col. Cezary Lipert. The described actions were, as results from the WSI records, performed, with the WSI decisions aiming at taking over the arms trade, inter alia to gain profits. In the scope of operations of “Falcon”, there were instances of use of the state machine to support illegally operating companies. The support of the commercial activities of "Falcon" is shown by the correspondence between the WSI and the Special Trade Department in the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation. On February 14, 1995, Andrzej Spis, Deputy Director of the Special Trade Department in the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation, turned to the WSI with a request for an opinion in awarding “Falcon” a one-off concession for the export of equipment to Peru. On February 23, 1995, the chief of Military Counter-Intelligence, Comdr. Kazimierz Głowacki gave a positive reply, where we can read, among others, that: "We hold the view that the companies which participate in the special trade with the participation of the MOD, need – aside from meeting the statutory formal criteria – give a guarantee of loyalty to the political and defense-related interest of the state. We assess that these criteria are met by "Falcon" Sp. z o.o."
In the case of "Falcon" (and other companies discussed here) the guarantee meant that the companies were owned by the services, i.e. that the company owner de facto confirmed his own reliability.

Money Laundering
The WSI protected its collaborator "WOLFGANG FRANKL" [cryptic name for secret collaborator] and his illegal operations, not only those related to the arms trade, but also with money laundering together with the Italian Mafia. To this end, specific operational actions were taken against the Police. On February 27, 1995, the Chief of ‘Unit 6’, the 3rd Directorate WSI, received a letter from the Head of Organized Economic Crime Section in Regional Police Department in Szczecin, notifying that it planned to take operational actions against Witold Wąsikowski, because the Police obtained information that points to joint actions of the collaborator “WOLFGANG FRANKL” with T. M. from Warsaw, related to money laundering, and possible relation of this operation to the international arms trader Monzer Al Kassar from a reliable source,. The amount of the transaction was supposedly about 100 million USD. The WSI waived the Police information about its collaborator and suggested incompetence of the Organized Economic Crime Section in Regional Police Department in Szczecin. On July 31, 1995, the Chief of ‘Unit 6’, the 3rd Directorate of the WSI, received another letter from the Organized Economic Crime Section in the National Police Department, where, after the analysis of materials from Szczecin, the previous findings about Witold Wąsikowski were confirmed; the letter stated further that: “All relevant information about the course of operation and people involved therein come from the operational technique means used with respect to T. M. in the form of telephone line eavesdropping and as such is credible.” The Police were not able to determine whether the "money laundering" operation was actually put into effected. On August 11, 1995, the Deputy Chief of Counter-Intelligence Directorate of the WSI, Col. Jan Maria Oczkowski, ordered the Chief of Counter-Intelligence in the Pomorze Military District to contact the Organized Economic Crime Section in Regional Police Department in Szczecin in order to arrange the cooperation terms. However, no action against Wąsikowski was taken, and Oczkowski did not demand any. In November 1995, the superior of officer Marek Słoń forbid to document any non-military activities of the collaborator “WOLFGANG FRANKL” [cryptic name for secret collaborator]: I have made a point several times in the past that you should avoid any engagement of the collaborator in the matters not in the scope of interest and competencies of the WSI. Please direct the collaborator “Frankel” to the problems strictly related to the military and exactly such problems should be documented”.
The protection over illegal actions of a WSI collaborator also lead to suggestions to lie to other state authorities. In February 2002, the collaborator “GUSTAW” (= “WOLFGANG FRANKL”) had a meeting with the Chief Director of UOP/ABW Branch Office, Col. Wiesław Kowalski, who headed that post in 2002-2005 (earlier he was a WSI soldier). In connection with that conversation, officer Marek Słoń told the collaborator “GUSTAW” to give UOP only such information as is generally known and available. He also ordered not to reveal, under any circumstances, the nature of contacts with the WSI.
The WSI not only protected their people from the Police and UOP, but also sought assistance in solving problems by way of informal contacts with the justice, in criminal cases etc.
This kind of engagement had place in case of support for Stanisław Wyrożemski (collaborator "MARIA", "MAX", "MAKSYMILIAN” [all - cryptic names for secret collaborators]). Wyrożemski was an employee of the 2nd Directorate of General Staff of the People’s Polish Armed Forces and since 1985 had worked as a resident in the CENZIN representative office in Austria. He also met other officers dealing with special trade there, among them: Stanisław Terlecki, Zbigniew Tarka and Tadeusz Koperwas.
After he left the professional military service, Wyrożemski began to work as go-between in special trade. He ran two companies: "Arespo" and "Kunat”. He was the cause of the conclusion of a commercial transaction between BHZ Bumar-Łabędy and Myanmar (formerly known as Burma). The collaborator "MAKSYMILIAN" [cryptic name for secret collaborator] used that contract to take out over 8 million USDollars from Poland and transfer it to a non-existent company Paladion in Geneva. In this matter, the Prosecutor’s Office in Katowice has been conducting an investigation since 1992, as a result of which Wyrożemski (“MAKSYMILIAN”) was arrested in 1993. The WSI intervened then with the General Prosecutor of the Republic of Poland to have him released from detention. In 1995, the case of 'MAKSYMILIAN" became discontinued. Knowing that it could be resumed, he turned to the WSI for assistance in "earlier achievement of a stand, which he could present in case that the penal proceedings are resumed”.. He kept the WSI informed about his legal situation related to the contract with Myanmar. In December 2002, the District Court for Warszawa-Praga discontinued the proceedings against the collaborator "MAKSYMILIAN" [cryptic name for secret collaborator], who upon positive settlement of the criminal case, terminated his cooperation with the WSI. The analysis of this case shows that a WSI collaborator was willing to help the military special services as long as those services were helpful in the penal proceedings conducted against him.

Terrorists
Many times the result of involvement of both (civil and military) services in the special trade practices was Polish-Polish competition on foreign markets and reaching for support of the Russian side. Meanwhile, the arms trade operations led to establishing contacts with terrorist groups. An example of ties with terrorists is the participation of Al Kasser in the Egyptian transaction. Al Kasser was well known for his international operations and punished for arms trade; he was also the partner of Edmund Ochnio aka "TYTUS" [cryptic name for secret collaborator] and Jerzy Dembowski aka "WIRAKOCZA" [cryptic name for secret collaborator]. The role of Al Kasser in the transaction was concealed and known only to a very limited number of people from Cenrex and the Counter-Intelligence Directorate of the WSI. The line of procedure, adopted by the WSI towards Al.-Kasser, envisaged that the meetings would be held abroad in previously agreed places, and the negotiations would be carried out by authorized entities, covered by the WSI counter-intelligence service. Special caution and concealment of contacts with Al-Kasser resulted, according to the WSI, from the situation assessment and the information that could be associated with terrorist organizations operating in Middle East. It was known that at the request of some governments he was to organize arms deliveries for those organizations. It was also known that before 1989 he was used by the special services of the People’s Republic of Poland as a helper who organized arms deliveries for the PLO from the countries at war with Israel and pursuing anti-American policy. After 1989, contacts with this man were resumed by the 1st Directorate of UOP [civilian security service agency in Poland]. The contact died at the turn of 1993/1994, when Al.-Kasser was detained in Spain in connection with the process of the terrorists who assaulted the ship ‘Achille Laura’.
Nonetheless, Col. Słoń tried to maintain the contacts with Al-Kasser. In the framework of the modernization program for the air protection system NEWA in June 1997, the collaborator "WOLFGANG FRANKL" [cryptic name for secret collaborator] started, at the knowledge and consent of the WSI, talks with Al-Kasser’s group, which was to obtain about 400 million USD from Saudi Arabia to finance the modernization of that system by Egypt’s armed forces. This was probably the reason why Col. Słoń proposed, as early as in March 1989, to notify the Prime Minister’s cabinet and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This proposal was not accepted by his superiors. The Chief of Unit 36, Jerzy Marszalik, wrote, "I assess these proposals as pointless". Instead, the WSI decided to carry out, in concealment from the Polish political authorities, joint operations with Al.-Kasser. The WSI accepted Al-Kasser’s participation in the Egyptian contract, and the instruction prepared in July 1999 by Lt. Col. Słoń for the collaborator "WOLFGANG FRANKL" stated, "please negotiate the participation in the transaction according to Al-Kasser’s proposals (without specifying your own ties that will actually be used). (...) Maximize the price of the provided service by making Al-Kasser aware of the consequences if the participation of your company in the arrangement of the transaction was revealed, consisting in the possible revocation of special trade concession by the Export Control Department.”.. The WSI did not prevent the operations of Al-Kasser in the Republic of Poland, did not warn the politicians and businessmen, to the contrary, they facilitated the arms trade for someone who was suspected of terrorist contacts.
Another example of the WSI operations in arms trade was the operation "H", run by the 2nd Directorate. The objective of that operation was to put Polish agents in the Russian ship-building industry, but in fact it was the other way around; the Russian services placed their man in the Polish ship-building industry, at the same time corrupting the command of the Navy. When the company 'Pertron' (then controlled by WSI Counter-Intelligence) appeared in the case, it dealt in special equipment trade and its financial settlements gave rise to justified doubts, for example, large sums of money were transferred to the account of an Italian company 'Fiatagri', which had no relation to Pertron. The settlements were run through a branch of the Kredyt ('Credit') Bank in port town of Gdynia where the director was Lt. Col. Leszek Fiertek, senior officer of the 2nd Directorate of the WSI (1993-1997 serving as an under cover officer). The branch of Kredyt Bank in Gdynia was created by Adam Kisler, then the director of the branch of Kredyt Bank in Gdańsk (earlier an employee of the Kredyt Bank in Kaliningrad, next an employee of a company Enamor which dealt in special trade and ran its settlements through the Gdynia-based branch of Kredyt Bank, still headed by the aforesaid L. Fiertek). Adam Kisler, former collaborator of the 2nd Directorate of General Staff, was taken over by the WSI Counter-Intelligence after 1991 to conduct the Pertron operation on behalf of the intelligence. Kisler, associated by the WSI with the Russian Mafia, maintained contacts, among others, with Naum Isakovitch Slucki, a FSB [present Russia’s replacement for KGB] agent, and Comm. Adm. (Reserve) Nikolai Kachanovitch, a former Deputy Commander of the Russian Federation’s Baltic Fleet, who dealt in special trade. The transfers of large sums of money between ‘Pertron’ and ‘Fiatagri’ companies were the result of settlements made by the representatives of criminal circles from the former USSR countries. Kisler’s Mafia activities were possible only due to intelligence protection.
In the scope of operational actions run against Pertron, Col. Marek Nowakowski of the WSI could have reproduce the information about an alleged spy in the Navy structures, only to justify the operational interest in Andrzej Fornalski, the president of PHZ [Intl. Commerce Co.] ‘Pertron’.. The interest in that company was to provide some kind of cover against the actions of other services (including UOP) during the performance of the criminal practices consisting in bribing the Navy officers and taking out money from MOD’s budget.
In 2002-2003, the Control Department Team from the MOD, headed by Gen. Józef Flis, controlled all tenders in the Navy. The result of that control was a report, which contained a number of observations regarding irregularities in the performed tenders. The report was classified and never made available to law enforcement institutions, at the consent and approval of the Minister of National Defense, Jerzy Szmajdziński.
The engagement of the WSI officers in operations of companies which dealt in special trade could have helped to transfer the obtained funds out to the party accounts, foundation accounts or abroad.
When analyzing the aforementioned case, information was revealed regarding the abuse of power and failure to fulfil duties in connection with the protection of state secrets by the Commander of the Polish Navy, Adm. Ryszard Łukasik. He did not respect the WSI’s refusals to issue clearance certificates for Comm. Adm. Popek and Comdr.. Kaszubowski. Admiral Łukasik delayed the handing of the clearance certificate document to Comm Adm. Popek and kept him as the Chief of Logistics of the Navy for a long time. Holding this function without a clearance certificate is not possible and Comm Adm. Popek should have been dismissed from that post immediately. However, he was only dismissed 3 years later, after the well-known case of the theft of grenades and ammunition from the warehouses of the Military Port in Gdynia.
The reoccurring violation of law by the owner of ‘Pertron’, Andrzej Fornalski, consisting of bribing Comm Adm. Popek many times (about 200 thousand Polish zlotys) caused no reaction on the part of M. Dukaczewski. He was informed about the bribes with letter No. 00-45 of February 2002, which he did not register in the classified office before May 2005, not to mention taking any actions he was obligated to take as a state officer.
The decisions made by the Navy officers, WSI officers and the Military Policy officers as well as the prosecutors from the Military Prosecutor’s Offices led to the information about actions incompliant with applicable law being blocked. The source of irregularities related to the arms trade conducted by the WSI can be linked with a fact that the concept of organization of the so-called counter-intelligence protection for arms production and of monitoring of special trade did not give any operational results. The intelligence played the initiatory and leading role here, while the counter-intelligence secured its operations so that the civil services or other state authorities did not threaten the intelligence’s monopoly. To recapitulate: most operational actions were a way to conceal the participation of military services in special trade through the companies they created (among them: ‘Steo’, ‘Cenrex’, ‘Falcon’). The companies, which dealt in special trade, together with people who supervised them at the WSI level, in fact, created an organized crime group and supported criminal activities.
In the light of the cited facts, the conduct of the following people meets the disposition contained in Article 70a.1 and 70a.2.2 of the Act on Provisions Implementing the Act on Military Counter-Intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service and the Act on the service of the officers of Military Counter-Intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service, dated June 9, 2006: Brig.Gen. Konstanty Malejczyk, Gen. Bolesław Izydorczyk, Gen. Marek Dukaczewski, Comdr. Kazimierz Głowacki, Col. Jerzy Dembowski, Col. Marek Słoń, Col. Cezary Lipert, Col. Jan Oczkowski, Col. Witold Wąsikowski, Lt. Col. Wiesław Kowalski, Lt. Col. Leszek Fiertek, Adm. Ryszard Łukasik, Adm. Zbigniew Popek.
The activities of Edward Ochnio, Jacek Merkel and Andrzej Spis meet the disposition of Article 70a.2.1 of the aforecited Act.
The WSI Chiefs in the described period were: Brig. Gen. Bolesław Izydorczyk, Brig. Gen. Konstanty Malejczyk, Gen. Marek Dukaczewski, Rear-Adm. Kazimierz Głowacki.
Until 1995, the supervision over the activities of the Military Information Services on the general terms of responsibility for subordinated Ministry rested with the Minister of National Defense. In the described period, this office was held by: Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Piotr Kołodziejczyk, Zbigniew Okoński.
Article 5.1 of the Act on the Office of the Minister of National Defense, dated December 14, 1995, contained the regulation stating that the Military Information Services are subordinated directly to that Minister. That regulation was specified in a greater detail in § 1.16 of the Ordinance of the Council of Ministers on the Detailed Scope of Competencies of the Minister of National Defense, dated July 9, 1996. This regulation imposed on the Minister of National Defense the obligation to exercise supervision over the activities of the Military Information Services, including in particular their operational actions and investigations. Pursuant to the Military Information Services Act of July 9, 2003, the supervision over the activities of those services rested with the Minister of National Defense who appointed and dismissed the WSI Chief. By virtue of Article 9.1 of this Act, the WSI Chief was directly subordinated to the Minister of Defense. The Ministers of National Defense in the described period were: Stanisław Dobrzański, Bronisław Komorowski and Jerzy Szmajdziński.
With respect to some issues described herein, the public prosecution conducts or conducted penal proceedings, however, due to the new circumstances revealed in the course of hearings and the documentation obtained by the Verification Commission, the public prosecution’s interest as to the object and the subject of these cases may be extended or new proceedings may be instigated. Thus, the Verification Commission sent to the Supreme Military Prosecutor’s Office a notification of suspected crime, in compliance with Article 304 § 2 of the Code of Penal Procedure.