3. Russian penetration: the threats for internal and external safety of the State

The Soviet special services (KGB and GRU) established and fully controlled military special forces of the Polish People’s Republic. It was so in 40-ies and it did not fundamentally change before 1989. In 2nd Directorate of General Staff and in Internal Military Services (the WSW), Soviet services had their permanent representations, in which GRU and KGB residents were placed. Also on the level of the field structures level of the WSW the contacts with GRU officers, who protected individual units of the Soviet army, were established. They had free access to military counter-intelligence and intelligence cadre of Polish People’s Republic and to their operating base, in this to operational documents, computational premises, HUMINT sources and information about other collaborators.

Military Information Services (the WSI) cadre
The WSI were established in October 1991 as result of joining Internal Military Services (the WSW) with 2nd Directorate of the General Staff. Notwithstanding the new name and new management, the WSI maintained the fundamental feature of special services of the countries subordinated to the USSR: their cadre was composed of selected and trusted people, who underwent special training guarantying their loyalty, whereby in the communist period the Soviet services had decisive impact on personnel policy in the 2nd Directorate of the General Staff, in the WSW and in the entire Polish People’s Army. Only the persons indicated by them were anticipated to exercise commanding functions in military special forces of the Polish People’s Republic and in military diplomacy, particularly in the NATO states. It was so called "perspective cadre" i.e. the officers who were expected to take commanding functions in the future. The persons being qualified to this group were directed to GRU or KGB training in the Soviet Union or in any other countries of the communist block.
The analysis of representations submitted before the Verification Commission and selected operational cases confirmed that training in the Soviet Union or in military schools of other countries of this camp had great weight for the services of the persons, who underwent such training. It can be seen from collected information that beginning of Seventies was the time of initiating the action of cyclical training of Polish officers in KGB and GRU schools.
These were master degree studies (full-time or part-time), post-graduate studies (lasting six or nine months) or three-month courses, which were organized in special, closed facilities.. We still do not know the actual number of the graduates and the type of schools they had completed.
For example, only in one school year 1973/74 127 Polish students from special services were staying in the USSR and studying at its universities and academies. The dynamics of changes is confirmed by the fact that, as we may read in the report of the Deputy Military Attaché at the Embassy of Polish People’s Republic in Moscow –
"the number of students trained within one year increased over recent three years almost three times". According to other materials gathered so far by the Commission, from the beginning of 70-es to 1989 at least 800 officers from Poland were studying in the USSR schools.
Classification to training in the USSR was treated as the award for ideological attitude, effects of work and loyalty. The candidates to such training had to fulfill the following eligibility criteria:
• unobjectionable ideological attitude;
• loyalty to the system, confirmed and verified on regular basis;
• predisposition to realize operating tasks;
• unquestioning fulfillment of superiors’ instructions.
• training in the USSR was a precondition for occupying managerial positions in special service of the Polish People’s Republic. Such cadre policy ensured the control and interference level of special services of the People’s Polish Republic with Russian services, expected by the Russians.
On the grounds of the relations between the courses participants it is known that during the courses the details and procedures of operating actions run by the Polish People’s Republic services were revealed. The officers were under permanent surveillance of the Soviet special services. As It can be seen from their relations, the bugs were planted in their dormitories and in lecture halls, and each time the officers were leaving their facilities, they were always accompanied by a "tail" ("ogon" in Polish). It is also probable that the KGB recruited Polish soldiers. During the courses the officers were asked detailed questions relating to operational method used in Poland and the lecturers provided to their students only out of date, book knowledge
The courses organized by the GRU and the KGB for soldiers from the Eastern block countries were oriented to gathering knowledge about their participants, their addictions and habits, to creation of their psychological profiles and to extension of knowledge about composition of the cadres employed by the services.
"Perspective cadre" was directed from Poland also to the Soviet higher military and civil schools and to diplomatic academies kept under strict control of the Soviet special services. The training in the Soviet Union underwent among other WSI chiefs (Rear Admiral Kazimierz Głowacki and Gen. Marek Dukaczewski), successive chiefs of intelligence, in this Col. Waldemar Żak and recent of them, Col. Krzysztof Surdyk. The training in the Soviet Union underwent also the chiefs of the WSI Security Department of the WSI Col. Marek Witkowski (GRU course) and Col. Andrzej Ziętkiewicz (KGB course). Also the officers under cover from Department Y underwent training (later Department 22 of the 2nd Directorate). The persons delegated to training were medium-aged, having command of foreign languages and achieving good results in operating activity. Recent training were carried by the KGB and GRU as late as on the turn of the Eighties and Nineties, when the dissolution of communist bloc was inevitable. According to data possessed by the Verification Commission, the officers sent to the Soviet courses were the officers expected to take managerial positions in the new service in the period following the political changes (together with the agency of the influence).
For certain participants it was already the second such training.
The events of the WSI officers’ training in Russia were noted as late as in 1992 and 1993, 36. The fact that until 2006 several dozen graduates from the Russian training and courses served in the WSI structures confirms the situation that up to that time none fundamental changes were carried in special services of the Republic of Poland.
This situation is illustrated by the specification of functions, which were fulfilled in individual organizational entities of the WSI by some of the officers trained in the Soviet Union.

The Chiefs of Military Information Services (the WSI)
1. Brig. Gen. Dukaczewski Marek [in this list the first are last names of the persons] (2001-2006)
2. Rear Adm. Głowacki Kazimierz (1996-1997)
3. Gen. Izydorczyk Bolesław (1992-1994)

The Deputies of the WSI Chief
1. Col. Januchta Roman (1996-1998)
2. Col. Janus Stefan (1996-1997)
3. Col. Puchta Janusz (1991-1992)

Source Operating Intelligence (Agenturalny Wywiad Operacyjny - AWO)
1. Col. Czyżyk Julian (1975-1988)
2. Lt. Col. Głowicki Marek (1975)
3. Col. Krużel Andrzej (1979-1983)
4. Col. Ludwichowski Stanisław (1975-1977;1980-1982;1990)
5. Col. Mąka Dobrosław (1976; 1977-1980; 1984-1987)
6. Col. Pieniak Janusz (1975; 1976-1981; 1984-1986)
7. Comd. Russjan Jerzy (1987-1990)
8. Lt. Col. Smaza Stefan (1975; 1976-1985; 1986-1990)
9. Col. Staluszka Władysław (1983-1989)
10. Col. Worożbit Zbigniew (1977-1979)
11. Col. Wysocki Marek (1976-1980; 1981-1983)

Department Y (Department 22)
1. Col. Bekier Maciej (no data)
2. Col. Biernat Zygmunt (1983-1984)
3. Lt. Col. Bobek Janusz (no data)
4. Maj. Bolewski Ryszard (no data)
5. Lt. Col. Cibulla Jan (no data)
6. Col. Dunal Henryk (1983-1986)
7. Rear Adm. Głowacki Kazimierz (1983-1986)
8. Lt. Col. Głowicki Marek (1985-1986)
9. Col. Lipert Cezary (1983-1989)
10. Comdr. Lewicki Ryszard (1990)
11. Col. Michalski Grzegorz (1987-1989, the Chief of ‘Unit ‘Y’)
12. Cpt. Romański Kazimierz (no data)
13. Lt. Col. Siwanowicz Ryszard (no data)
14. Col. Sosnowski Ryszard (1983-1987)
15. Col. Surdyk Krzysztof (no data)
16. Lt. Col. Szuba Tadeusz (1983-1984)
17. Col. Witkowski Marek (1985-1988)
18. Col. Worożbit Zbigniew (1987)
19. Col. Żyłowski Zdzisław (1984-1991

Office/Directorate for Studies and Analyses
1. Lt. Col. Adamczyk Krzysztof – specialist (1995-1999; ZSiA – 1999-2004)
2. Col. Arczyński Janusz – senior specialist (1991-1994)
3. Col. Bartkowiak Henryk – chief of section (1993-1996)
4. Col. Bekier Maciej – chief of section (1998-1999, ZSiA 1999-2001)
5.Col. Biernat Zygmunt – deputy chef of Office for Studies and Analyses (1997-1999)
6. Col. Błaszczak Marian – chief of section (1996-1997)
7. Col. Budzik Zdzisław – chief of section (1998-1999, ZSiA 1999-2005)
8. Maj. Doroz Marek – specialist (ZSiA 2002-2004)
9. Comdr. Dziubiński Ryszard – chief specialist (1996-1997)
10. Maj. Ferenz Arkadiusz – senior designer (1996-1999)
11. Col. Gajewski Bonifacy – chief of the office for studies and analyses (1995-1997)
12. Col. Kendziorek Zdzisław – chief of section (1991-1992)
13. Lt. Col. Kłoczewski Marek – senior specialist (1995-1999)
14. Col. Kośla Piotr – chief of section (1991-1994)
15. Maj. Lis Jerzy – officer (1993-1995)
16. Col. Lisiak Marek - chief of section (2002-2003)
17. Col. Mazurkiewicz Artur – deputy chief of directorate (ZSiA 1999-2001)
18. Col. Nowak Marek - senior specialist (1993-1996; ZSiA 2000-2003)
19. Lt. Col. Obolewicz Zbigniew - senior specialist (1996-1999, ZSiA 1999)
20. Lt. Col. Piars Stanisław – specialist (1996-1998; ZSiA 2001-2003)
21. Lt. Comdr. Rygiel Jacek - senior officer (1997)
22. Col. Sabak Zbigniew - chief specialist (ZSiA 2004-2005)
23. Lt. Col. Stocki Jerzy - senior officer (1991-1994)
24. Col. Szubert Jerzy – chief of section (2000-2002)
25. Col. Tratkiewicz Andrzej - deputy chief of section (ZSiA 2004-2005)
26. Col. Twardowski Wiesław – deputy chief of section (1993-1999)
27. Col. Wolak Jan - senior specialist (ZSiA 2001-2002)
28. Col. Woźniak Maciej - chief of section (1996-1999)
29. Col. Wysocki Marek - deputy chief of section (1996-1999)
30. Col. Zawiliński Kazimierz - chief specialist (1995-1996)

2nd Directorate
1. Col. Bazylak Stanisław - chief of section (1999-2003)
2. Col. Boryszczyk Romuald- chief of section (1996-1998)
3. Col. Broda Krzysztof - senior specialist (1997-1999)
4. Col. Bury Władysław - senior officer (1996-2000)
5. Col. Czyżyk Julian - chief of branch (1998-2003)
6. Brig. Gen. Dukaczewski Marek - chief specialist (1992-1997)
7. Col. Gajewski Bonifacy – chief of directorate (1997)
8. Col. Gapys Władysław - deputy chief of directorate (2004-2005)
9. Lt. Col. Głowicki Marek – senior officer (1991-1999)
10. Lt. Col. Goszczycki Tomasz - chief of branch (1998-2000)
11. Lt. Col. Gryss Wojciech - chief of branch (1994-1998)
12. Brig Gen. Izydorczyk Bolesław - chief of intelligence directorate (1991-1992)
13. Lt. Col. Jesionowski Janusz - deputy chief of section – chief of department (1998-1999)
14.. Col. Jurgielewicz Stanisław - senior officer (1991-1995)
15. Comdr. Karczewski Czesław - chief specialist (1997-1998)
16. Col. Kastelik Marian – deputy chief of branch (1996-1999)
17. Lt. Col. Kozłowski Andrzej - senior specialist (1991-1992; 1997)
18. Col. Krajewski Zbigniew - chief of branch (1998-1999)
19. Col. Leśniowski Tadeusz – chief of branch (1993-1997)
20. Col. Lipert Cezary - chief of directorate (1996-1997)
21. Col. Lisiak Marek – chief of section (2003)
22. Col. Ludwichowski Stanisław – chief of branch (1996-1999)
23. Col. Łączyński Wit - chief of section (1992-1995)
24. Col. Łuczkiewicz Robert – chief of branch (1995-1999)
25. Col. Marzęda Włodzimierz - deputy chief of section (1996-1999)
26. Maj. Moskała Jerzy - senior officer (1997)
27. Col. Paciorek Wojciech - deputy chief of section (1995-1999)
28. Col. Paraszczuk Józef - senior officer (1991-1996)
29. Col. Pater Jerzy - chief of branch (1996-1999)
30. Col. Pieniak Janusz - chief specialist (2001-2004)
31. Lt. Col. Przelaskowski Witold – chief of branch (2003-2004)
32. Col. Puchała Zygmunt – chief of directorate (2001)
33. Col. Rosowski Jan – chief of department (1993-1999)
34. Lt. Col. Rudziński Zbigniew – deputy chief of section (1999-2001)
35. Comdr. Russjan Jerzy - chief of branch (1996-1999)
36. Comdr. Rygiel Jacek – deputy chief of branch (1997-1999)
37. Col. Sosnowski Ryszard - chief of section (1992-1995)
38. Col. Staluszka Władysław - chief of branch (1993-1996)
39. Lt. Col. Staniszewski Andrzej – deputy chief of branch (1996-1999)
40. Lt. Col. Stocki Jerzy - senior officer (1994-1995)
41. Col. Surdyk Krzysztof - chief of command (2003-2006)
42. Lt. Col. Szlakowski Wojciech - senior officer of section (1992)
43. Col. Szołucha Michał – deputy chief of command (1998-2000)
44. Col. Szubert Jerzy - senior officer (1996-1998)
45. Col. Ubych Tadeusz – chief of section (1998-1999)
46. Col. Witaszczyk Kazimierz - chief of branch (1997-2002)
47. Col. Worożbit Zbigniew - chief of section (1991-1995)
48. Col. Woźniak Ryszard - chief of branch (1996-1997)
49. Lt. Col. Wysokowicz Marek – chief of branch (1992-1997; 1998-2001)
50. Col. Zadora Jerzy - chief of section (1998-1999)
51. Col. Żyłowski Zdzisław - chief specialist (1991-1992)

3rd Directorate
1. Col. Białek Adam - senior officer (1996-1999)
2. Col. Bocianowski Ryszard - chief of section (1992-1995)
3. Col. Boczek Waldemar - chief of section (2002)
4. Col. Bortnowski Andrzej - senior officer (1991-1993)
5. Col. Broda Krzysztof - deputy chief of the office (1999-2002)
6. Col. Czapliński Marek - chief of section (1996-1999)
7. Col. Kalina Lech - deputy chief of directorate (1993-1995)
8. Col. Koczkowski Mieczysław - senior specialist (1998-2000)
9. Lt. Col. Kowalski Wiesław - senior specialist (1998-2001)
10. Lt. Col. Kuczyński Zygmunt - deputy chief of section (1999-2000)
11. Col. Kulita Mieczysław - chief specialist (1995-1996)
12. Col. Lendzion Eugeniusz - deputy chief of office (2002-2003)
13. Col. Lipert Cezary - chief of section (1993-1994)
14. Col. Lisak Krzysztof - deputy chief of section (1999-2001)
15. Lt. Col. Listowski Jerzy - senior officer (1998-1999)
16. Col. Mikołajczyk Czesław - chief of section (2001-2004)
17. Lt. Col. Nabożny Stanisław - senior specialist (1996-1999)
18. Col. Nowakowski Marek - chief of section (1991-1998)
19. Lt. Col. Packo Wiesław - deputy chief of section (1992-1997)
20. Col. Paraszczuk Józef - senior specialist (1996-1998)
21. Lt. Col. Piars Stanisław - senior specialist (2004)
22. Col. Przepiórka Marian - senior specialist (1997)
23. Lt. Col. Radzewicz Edmund - senior specialist (1997-1998)
24. Col. Rzepecki Jerzy - chief of directorate (1997-1999)
25. Col. Sadowski Romuald - senior specialist (1996-1998)
26. Lt. Col. Szałaciński Zbigniew - deputy chief of section (2005)
27. Lt. Col. Szlakowski Wojciech - senior specialist (2000-2003)
28. Col. Wiluś Jerzy - senior specialist (1994-1995; chief of section 1995-1999)
29. Col. Witkowski Marek - senior specialist (1991-1993)
30. Col. Wołoszyk Maciej - senior specialist (1993-1996)
31. Col. Ziętkiewicz Andrzej - senior specialist (no data)
32. Col. Żyrek Emil - senior officer of section (1981-1990)

Military Information Services (WSI) Training Center
1. Col. Dąbroś Lucjan – deputy commanding officer of the Center, chief of section (2001-2002)
2. Comdr. Karczewski Czesław – head of cycle (1998-2002)
3. Col. Kobacki Jerzy –head of cycle (1996-1998)
4. Lt. Col. Kozłowski Andrzej – senior lecturer (1997-1998)
5. Comdr. Lewicki Ryszard – deputy commanding officer of the center, commanding officer of the center (1992-1996)
6. Lt. Col. Krajewski Tadeusz – lecturer (1990-1996)
7. Col. Pierzak Zbigniew – deputy commanding officer (2000-2005)
8. Col. Przepiórka Marian – head of cycle (1997-1998)
9. Lt. Col. Szlakowski Wojciech – foreign languages lecturer at foreign languages course (1991-1992)
10. Col.Targiński Edward – senior lecturer (1995-1998)

Technical Support Unit
1. Col. Andrzejewski Michał - deputy chief of section (1995-1998)
2. Col. Kożuchowski Andrzej - chief of section (1990-1997)
3. Lt. Col. Kujawa Bogdan - senior officer responsible for organization and human resources (1992)
4. Col. Lorek Kazimierz - chief of section (1995-1995)
5. Col. Pieniak Janusz – head of the unit (1992-1995)
6. Lt. Col. Rak Piotr - chief of section (1994-2000)
7. Col. Winnicki Ryszard – deputy head of unit (1992-1996)
8. Col. Żyrek Emil - chief of section (1996-1999 expert
Center of Teleinformatics Security
1. Col. Kasperek Jan – Director (1999)
2. Col. Mąka Dobrosław - Chief of the Center (2001-2003)
3. Col. Polkowski Krzysztof – Chief of the Center (2004-2006)
4. Col. Rembacz Bogdan –Chief of Department (2000-2001)

Counter-intelligence Section of Air Force
1. Col. Bocianowski Ryszard - chief of section (1990-1997)
2. Col. Bugajny Jacek – deputy chief of department (1992-1997)
3. Lt. Col. Choptowy Kazimierz – deputy chief of department (1994-1997)
4. Lt. Col. Dudys Henryk – specialist (2001-2004)
5. Lt. Col. Karski Tadeusz - chief of department (1992-1997)
6. Lt. Col. Walczak Lech - chief of department (1992-1996)

Counter-intelligence Section of Pomeranian Military District
1. Col. Białek Adam – chief of department (1990-1996)
2. Lt. Col. Cichocki Marek - deputy chief of section (1993-1996)
3. Lt. Col. Domagalski Andrzej - senior officer (1990-1997)
4. Lt Col Kiepas Bogdan - senior officer (1990)
5. Lt Col Kowalik Ryszard – chief of department (1993-2001)
6. Lt Col ppłk Kowalski Wiesław - chief of department (1990-1995)
7. Lt Col Kuwik Stanisław - chief of department (1995-1996)
8. Lt Col Musiałek Tadeusz - chief of section (1995-1997)
9. Lt Col Pasternak Zenon - chief of department (1992-2001)

Counter-intelligence Section of Navy
1. Col. Bałuch Adam - chief of section (1990-1997)
2. Lt. Col. Domagalski Andrzej - chief of department (1997)
3. Lt. Col. Haryszyn Jan - chief of department (1998-2001)
4. Lt. Col. Jarosławski Andrzej - chief of section (1990-1997)
5. Lt. Col. Nawieśniak Jacek - senior officer (1990)
6. Lt. Col. Snarski Krzysztof - chief of department (1996-1998)

Counter-intelligence Section of Silesian Military District
1. Lt. Col. Basiński Paweł - deputy chief of department (1992-1996)
2. Lt. Col. Bisaga Jan - deputy chief of department (1993-1996)
3. Col. Cieślak Ireneusz - chief of department (1990)
4. Lt. Col. Jankowski Wiesław - chief of department (1990-1996)
5. Col. Popławski Jerzy - chief of department (1990-1993)
6. Lt. Col. Szajerka Wiesław – chief of department (1990-1997)
7. Lt. Col. Świder Józef - senior officer (1990-1997)
8. Col. Wojtczak Tadeusz - chief of department (1990-1998)

Counter-intelligence Section of Warsaw Military District
1. Col. Dąbroś Lucjan - chief of department (1992-1997)
2. Col. Gwizdała Władysław - chief of department (1990-1993)
3. Col. Jankowski Jerzy - chief of department (1990-1996)
4. Col. Pierzak Zbigniew- deputy chief of section (1995-2000)
5. Col. Śliwiński Tadeusz - chief of department (1992-1996)
6. Lt. Col. Zawadzki Krzysztof – deputy chief of department (1996-1997)
7. Col. Zieliński Władysław - chief of department (1990)

Counter-intelligence Department of Central Institution of the Ministry of National Defense

1. Col. Dolata Władysław - chief of section (1990)
2. Col. Szostek Józef – senior specialist (1990-1992)
Bureau of Military Attaché’s Offices
1. Col. Biegański Stanisław – chief of the office (1996)
2. Col. Demski Zbigniew - chief of section (1998-2000)
3. Col. Goszczycki Tomasz - deputy chief of section (2001-2004)
4. Col. Klimek Tomasz – deputy chief of the office (1996-1999, 2002-2005)
5. Col. Kolasa Kazimierz - chief of the office (1997-1999)
6. Col. Pelczar Władysław - chief of section (1991-1992)
7. Lt. Col. Szlakowski Wojciech – senior officer (1996-1997)
8. Col. Woźniak Ryszard - chief of section (2003-2004)

Military Attaché’s Offices
1. Col. Henryk Bartkowiak - 1994 attaché in Yugoslavia; 1992 attaché in Syria
2. Col. Bekier Maciej - 1997 attaché in Austria; 2003 attaché in Germany; 2006
Transferred to the Bureau of Military Attaché’s Office
3. Col. Biegański Stanisław - 1977-1980 deputy attaché in the USA; 1987-1990 attaché in West Berlin.
4. Cpt. Bobek Janusz - 1988-1992 attaché in Sweden; 1993-1997 attaché in Russia
5. Col. Bortnowski Andrzej - 1993-1996 attaché in Belarus
6. Col. Boryszczyk Romuald - 1992-1995 attaché in Egypt; 1999 attaché in Croatia
7. Col. Bury Władysław - from 2002 attaché in Yugoslavia
8. Lt. Col. Cibulla Jan – 1989-1992 attaché in France; 1995 attaché in Belgium
9. Col. Cukierski Kazimierz - 1974-1978 deputy attaché in Great Britain; 1990-1993 attaché in Great Britain
10. Col. Czerwonka Władysław - 1975-1978 deputy attaché in Belgium
11. Col. Czyżyk Julian - 1993-1997 deputy attaché in Great Britain; 2003-2006 attaché in Malaysia; 2006 transferred to Bureau of Military Attaché’s Offices
12. Col. Demski Zbigniew - 1993-1996 deputy attaché in Israel; 2000-2003 attaché in Greece
13. Col. Edward Duda - 1982-1986 z-ca attaché in Lebanon
14. Brig Gen. Dukaczewski Marek - 1990-1992 attaché in Norway
15. Comdr. Dziubiński Ryszard - 1984-1988 deputy attaché in Great Britain; 1992-1995 attaché in Denmark; 1997-1999 attaché in Sweden
16. Col. Cempa Eugeniusz - 1999-2002 attaché in France
17. Col. Ferenz Bogdan - 1978-1982 attaché in Sweden; 1990-1992 attaché in Germany
18. Maj. Ferenz Arkadiusz - 1990-1991 deputy attaché in Norway
19. Col. Gajewski Bonifacy - 1974-1978 expert in the Attaché’s Office in West Berlin; 1983-1986 attaché in Switzerland; 1991-1994 attaché in Romania
20. Col. Gapys Władysław - 1979-1981 expert in the Attaché’s Office in Denmark; 1989-1992 attaché in Denmark
21. Comm Adm. Głowacki Kazimierz - 1979-1983 deputy attaché in Canada; 1986-1990 attaché in Great Britain
22. Comdr. Góreczny Ireneusz - 1996-1999 attaché in Great Britain; 2002-2004 attaché in France; 2006 transferred to Bureau of Military Attaché’s Offices
23. Col. Grodzki Paweł - 1991-1994 attaché in Japan
24. Col. Gryz Jerzy – 1979 expert in the Attaché’s Office in Norway; 1982-1986 expert of attaché in Sweden; 1993-1996 attaché in France;
25. Brig Gen. Izydorczyk Bolesław - 1982-1984 deputy attaché in the USA; 1994-1995 attaché the USA; 1995-1997 attaché in Canada
26. Col. Januchta Roman - 2004-2006 attaché in Kazakhstan
27. Col. Janus Andrzej - 1991-1992 and 1994-1997 attaché in Bulgaria
28. Col. Janus Stefan - 1981-1984 deputy attaché in Austria; 1992-1995 attaché in Germany;
1999 attaché in Switzerland
29. Comdr. Karczewski Czesław - 1983-1985 officer of Attaché’s Office in the GDR; 1985-1986 deputy attaché in West Berlin; 1992-1996 attaché in Ukraine; 2004-2006 attaché in Lithuania
30. Col. Kędziorek Zdzisław - 1986-1989 attaché in Switzerland
31. Col. Klimek Tomasz - 1989-1992 attaché in Great Britain; 1999-2002 attaché in Japan
32. Col. Klisowski Zbigniew - 1978-1983 expert in the Attaché’s Office 1998-2002 attaché in Estonia
33. Col. Kobacki Jerzy - 1986-1988 deputy attaché in Italy; 1998-2001 attaché in Italy
34. Col. Kolasa Kazimierz - 1979-1981 attaché in Turkey; 1986-1989 attaché in Turkey; 1999-2000 attaché in Slovakia
35. Col. Kośla Piotr - 1978-1980 expert in the Attaché’s Office in France; 1994-1996 deputy attaché in Russia
36. Lt Col Kozłowski Andrzej - 1993-1996 deputy attaché in Bulgaria
37. Col. Krużel Andrzej - 1976-1979 attaché in Finland; 1993-1997 attaché in Czech Republic
38. Col. Lendzion Eugeniusz - 1997-2000 deputy attaché in Russia; 2003-2004 attaché in Latvia
39. Col. Lesiński Jan - 1974-1977 expert in the Attaché’s Office in Great Britain; 1994-1996 attaché in Japan
40. Col. Leśniowski Tadeusz - 1990-1993 attaché in Austria; 1997-2000 attaché in Romania
41. Brig Gen. Lewandowski Andrzej - from 2004 attaché in Russia
42. Comdr. Lewicki Ryszard - 1973-1976 expert in the Attaché’s Office in Denmark; 1982-1984 attaché in Sweden
43. Col. Lipert Cezary - 1978-1981 expert in West Berlin; 1989-1992 attaché in Switzerland; 1997-2001 attaché in Austria; from 2004 attaché of defense in Czechs
44. Maj. Lis Jerzy - 1995-1998 deputy attaché in Hungary
45. Col. Lisak Marek - 1997-2000 attaché in Hungary; 2003-2004 attaché in Great Britain
46. Col. Łączyński Wit - 1972-1975 expert in Attaché’s Office in Cuba; 1983-1987 attaché in Italy; 1995-1999 attaché in Croatia
47. Col. Marzęda Włodzimierz - 1999-2003 attaché in Lithuania
48. Col. Matuszak Tadeusz - 1986-1988 deputy attaché in Austria; 1994-1997 attaché in Romania
49. Col. Mazurkiewicz Artur - 1986-1989 attaché in Denmark; 1994-1997 attaché in Sweden 2002-2004 attaché in Denmark
50. Col. Mąka Dobrosław - 1980-1983 expert of the Attaché’s Office in France; 1990-1993 attaché in Sweden; from 2003 attaché in Canada (w 2004, 3 months at Ministry of National Defense disposal;
51. Col. Michalski Grzegorz - 1990-1995 attaché in Turkey
52. Brig Gen. Mika Henryk - 1997-1999 attaché in China
53. Brig Gen. Mikrut Czesław - 1997-1999 attaché in India
54. Col. Nowak Marek - 1990 deputy attaché in GDR; 1996-2000 attaché in GDR; 2003-
2004 attaché in the Netherlands
55. Lt Col Obolewicz Zbigniew - 1993-1996 deputy attaché in Czechs
56. Brig Gen. Olesiak Marian - 1997-2000 attaché in Russia
57. Col. Pelczar Władysław - 1983-1987 attaché in Finland; 1993-1997 attaché in Hungary
58. Lt Col Piars Stanisław - 1998-2001 attaché in Hungary; 2003-2004 deputy attaché in Hungary; from 2004 attaché in Hungary
59. Col. Pieniak Janusz - 1981-1984 deputy attaché in Belgium
60. Col. Polkowski Krzysztof - 1996-1999 deputy attaché in the USA; 1999-2003 chief of section IHQ CENTRE GERMANY – NATO Staff Command
61. Col. Puchta Janusz - 1973-1976 deputy attaché in China; 1979-1982 attaché in Egypt;
1987-1990 attaché in China
62. Col. Romański Kazimierz - 1989-1984 attaché in Egypt; 1995-1996 attaché in Latvia
63. Col. Rudnicki Edward - 1972-1974 expert in Attaché’s Office in Norway; 1994-1996 attaché in Yugoslavia
64. Comdr. Russjan Jerzy - 1990-1993 expert in Attaché’s Office in Germany
65. Gen. Sadzonek Władysław - 1999-2000 attaché in Canada
66. Maj. Gen. Słowiński Jerzy - 1995-1999 attaché in Egypt
67. Lt Col Smaza Stefan - 1996-1999 deputy attaché in the Czechs
68. Col. Sobkowski Jan - 1979-1982 attaché in Austria
69. Lt Col Solak Janusz - 1999-2002 deputy attaché in Romania
70. Col. Sosnowski Ryszard - 1977-1979 expert in the Attaché’s Office in France; 1987-1991 attaché in Syria; 1995-1998 attaché in Israel
71. Col. Staluszka Władysław - 1979-1982 expert in Attaché’s Office in the USA; 1989-1992 attaché in Finland; 1997-1999 attaché in Japan
72. Lt Col Stocki Jerzy - 1995 deputy attaché in Romania
73. Col. Surdyk Krzysztof - 1999-2002 attaché in Finland
74. Lt Col Szlakowski Wojciech - 1997-2000 deputy defense attaché in Great Britain; 2002-2003 attaché in Kuwait; 2003-2006 MONS Belgium - NATO
75. Col. Szołucha Michał - 1990-1993 attaché in Germany; 2000-2003 attaché in Austria; candidate to attaché in Germany
76. Col. Szubert Jerzy - 1990-1993 deputy attaché in Great Britain; 2003-2006 attaché in Greece
77. Lt Col Szulik Władysław - 1982-1983 senior. officer in Syria; 1987-1989 attaché in the Netherlands
78. Comdr. Tomaszewicz Ryszard - 1973-1977 expert of Attaché’s Office in Great Britain; 1982-1985 attaché in Egypt; 1992-1995 attaché in Israel
79. Brig Gen. Tyszkiewicz Andrzej - 1995-1998 attaché in Turkey
80. Brig Gen. Ubych Tadeusz - 1992-1995 deputy attaché in Hungary; 2000-2004 attaché in Hungary
81. Col. Witaszczyk Kazimierz - 1993-1996 deputy attaché in Austria; 2002-2003 in military staff in Brussels; 2003-2004 attaché in Belarus
82. Col. Wolak Jan - from 2004 attaché in Kuwait
83. Col. Wołoszyk Jerzy - 1996-2000 attaché in Belarus
84. Col. Worożbit Zbigniew - 1982-1985 attaché in Austria
85. Col. Woźniak Maciej - 1990-1994 deputy attaché in Russia; 2000-2003 attaché in Belorus
86. Col. Woźniak Ryszard - 1997-2000 deputy attaché in the USA; 2004 attaché in Iran; from 2004 attaché in Iraq
87. Lt Col Zabłocki Marek - 1990-1993 attaché in Australia
88. Col. Zadora Jerzy - 1988-1990 deputy attaché in Austria; 1999-2004 attaché in Switzerland
89. Col. Zawiliński Kazimierz - 1984-1987 attaché in Norway; 1996-1998 attaché in Yugoslavia
90. Col. Żyłowski Zdzisław - 1969-1972 expert in the Attaché’s Office in Italy; 1979-1984 deputy attaché in Italy

The above list confirms the thesis that Military Information Services (WSI) were established on the grounds of the cadre selected from the group of officers educated in the Soviet Union. They occupied managerial positions in the WSI, hence they were able to decide about the policy of these services.

Russian penetration: threats for the Polish Armed Forces
In the recent years, in which the Russian Army was based in Poland, GRU and KGB intensively recruited the agents and operationally gathered information about the citizens of the Republic of Poland. In each of the Russian military facilities there were full-time posts for special forces (branches, divisions or KGB and GRU sections), which run operating activity in the circle of Polish Armed Forces officers and Polish civil citizens living in the neighborhood of the facilities occupied by the Soviet Army or Polish Armed Forces units. The main objective of this activity was to create the information base, i.e. so called “frozen net of agents”, which could be activated in the future by the Soviet or post-Soviet services, when no entities of the Russian Army shall be based within the territory of the Republic of Poland. In pursue of these objectives, in the years 1994-1996 GRU and KGB undertook actions aimed at repeated undertaking the contacts with persons, who were recruited earlier or at recruitment of new agents from among the citizens of the Republic of Poland.
We should identify two information channels, on which Russian special services based their activity in Poland.
The first one was based on officers of the Polish Armed Forces, graduates from military high schools and specialist courses in the Soviet Union, while the other was based on contacts renewed in 90-ies.
Another information channels were the contacts with Polish citizens, whom the officers of post-Soviet special forces established in the second half of the 90-ies. The contacts were established in military and civil circles, they were not however entirely new contracts. Their origin should be sought in the period, in which the units of the Soviet Army were based in the Republic of Poland. The officers of KGB and GRU units operating under these corps were “defreezing” the network of the agents recruited years ago or located a new network of agents and intensively gathered all type of information about citizens of the Republic of Poland. These actions were very often run under the cover of commercial or economic activity, and special role was played there by the companies with participation of Russian capital. Part of these companies was oriented to various forms of cooperation with military units and institutions and with companies providing services for the Polish Armed Forces. .In addition to typifying and recruiting activity, run in the military and civil environment, the Russian services were carried in-depth investigation of the process of Polish Armed Forces integration with NATO structures and the WSI areas of activity, particularly their activity on so called “Eastern” direction. An important element of the WSI activity investigation was typifying the former citizens of the USSR by the Russian intelligence, which intended to come to Poland on business-related matters. It was assumed, the persons typified by Russian intelligence may become the objects of the WSI interest in connection with their activity on so called ”Eastern” direction and that due to this the Russian party might gain the possibility of misinforming the WSI.
It can be seen from gathered materials, that the following have arisen active interest of the Russian Federation special services:
• Polish Army cadre keeping in the past business or social relations with the soldiers of the Soviet Army, including the graduates from the courses in the Soviet Union and the graduates from Central Unit of Signal Troops in Legnica from the years 1990-1991;
• Professional soldiers and their families from so called mixed marriages;
• Soldiers and employees of the army, keeping business contacts with citizens of the post-Soviet states being the members of CIS, in this the persons taking part in official contacts within the territory of Poland or third states, e.g. during peace missions of UNO, CFE inspections etc.;
• The persons contemplated to serve or already serving in the NATO structures;
• Persons directed to studies, courses, workshop or conferences in the EU and NATO states; managerial staff of safeguarded military units and institutions;
• The employees of defense industry, in this of the companies co-operating or collaborating with various NATO entities.

The effect of information base extension in Poland was taking up by the Russian services the actions aimed at identifying and neutralizing offensive actions on so called “Eastern” direction, carried by Polish services.

Counter-intelligence omissions: Russian-Polish companies
Reliable information about intensified activity of the Soviet special services was obtained, among others during carrying the case of operating explanation BZ, which was run in 1993-1995 by Counter-intelligence Section of Silesian Military District. It confirmed that in the recent period in which the units of the Soviet Army were based in Poland, i.e. in the years 1993-1994, this activity was intensified. Frequent contacts of Soviet Army representatives with the representatives of Polish governmental administration, which were due to the necessity of delivering assets and real estates to the Polish party, were conducive to intensified actions of the Soviet services.
Such a situation was e.g. in the Gorzowskie Province, in which the Signal Brigade of the Soviet Army was based in Kęszyce and radiotelephone intelligence unit of the Soviet Army in Bukowiec. KGB units were operating under these corps and their employees, having the occasion to establish official business contacts with the representatives of the Polish party gathered information very intensively about the officer cadre of the 17 Mechanized Regiment from Miedzyrzecz, about Provincial Inspectorate of Civil Defense in Gorzów Wielkopolski and about other Polish Armed Forces units, which were based in that region. The investigation carried out at that time by KGB officers was not only limited to military circles, but it also covered self-governmental administration, customs offices and private companies. Parallel to this type of activity, the companies carrying business activity were established in Western Poland on the initiative of Soviet Army officers, e.g. "TE" Sp. z o.o. [Ltd. Co.], which temporarily took out a lease of certain facilities delivered to Poland by the Russian party. The Company "TE" had headquarters in Wrocław and had branches in other states e.g. in Latvia.
In addition to management of the facilities belonging previously to the Soviet Army, the Company was also dealing with oil exportation.
Following the withdrawal of the Soviet Army units from the Gorzowskie Province, intensified contacts of the Soviet Army officers with the citizens of Republic of Poland were noted after 1994, which usually were of apparently commercial or tourist character. Intensification of contacts of the Polish Armed Forces cadre with the Soviet Army officers was also confirmed in the problematic case Military Intelligence Section of Silesian Military District and Military Intelligence Section of Pomeranian Military District, under code name "B". The information obtained under this case indicated, among others, that the officers of Silesian Military District (among others Col. A. K,. – Chief of Signal Troops of the Silesian Military District, Lt Col A.J, - commander of the 10 regiment of Silesian Military District command) maintained contacts with officers of the Soviet Army, who were previously staying in Poland. Such meetings with the Soviet Army officers were organized by Col. A.K. in his villa in Walim. The contacts of Col. A.K, and A.J. with Soviet officers resulted also from the fact that both of them studied at the USSR high schools and on this account they were known to many officers of the Soviet Army, who decided to renew this acquaintance in half of the 90-ies. Also Lt. Col. J.D. and Col. S.P. from Silesian Military District maintained contacts with Soviet Army officers. According to the information obtained in this matter, they maintained familiar contacts with the former commander of the Soviet Army unit based in Wrocław and the former employee of the Military Mission at the North Group of the Soviet Army in Poland. They also maintained close relations with the Company "A", operating in Wrocław, established in middle of the 90-ies by a citizen of the Russian Federation, who was the owner of the restaurant "AR", in which the meetings with the officer cadre of Wrocław garrison of the Polish Armed Forces were held.. In the meetings in "AR's" restaurant, organized by the Russians, the representatives of sports club "S", commanding cadre of Wrocław garrison and many other persons representing military and politician circles participated. The "meetings" in this restaurant were organized in a trusted circle, with participation of women from escort agencies and at the costs of the restaurants’ owners. According to the opinion of the employees managing this case, during these "meetings" so called "pressure" materials were gathered against the participants.
The employees carrying the case code-named "BK" drew attention to the fact that many such contacts were established by the former officers of the Soviet Army under the cover of business activity, what was defined as follows: "A material threat from the part of Eastern special services is trade expansions of the persons originating from CIS countries to the territories in which the units of the Northern Group of the Soviet Army were based in the past. It relates mostly to Wrocław and Strzegom garrisons. We estimate that among the persons dealing with trade activity, the majority were professional soldiers, civil employees of these units, who under the cover of the business activity may also execute the tasks of investigation character.
In addition to individual business activity organized in Poland after 1990, several thousand companies with participation of Russian capital were established. For example, only on the territory of Poznan, 35 such companies were incorporated in the years 1990-1998, and few of them were incorporated by the officers of the Russian Army. Most of these companies were established in these cities and town of the western Poland, in which the Soviet garrisons were based.
In Warsaw, three exceptionally attractive plots of land located in the city center are still managed by the Soviet companies. One of these companies is Avtoexport, whose representative in Poland is the Company ‘Abexim’, having been servicing the WSI vehicles up to the autumn 2006.

Counter-intelligence omissions: espionage tolerating
Problematic cases "B", "BK" and "BZ", being de facto the analysis of espionage threats, were completed in 2001 and 2002, making entirely no use of the gathered information. Correct diagnosing of the threats relating to the safety of the Polish Armed Forces and Polish armaments industry was not followed by any further actions, and failure in finding a solution for described problems of the WSI cadres themselves, in which most officers keeping managerial positions underwent training in the USSR academies, should be regarded as giving origin to this status.
Like in other cases of this type, also in the event of control of the problematic case "B" files, the traces of removing documents are visible. This is confirmed by:
• changed pagination, from which It can be seen that files contained 234 cards at the minimum (presently 76).
• there is no annotation stating when the missing documentation was removed and by whom; between the memo dated November 30, 2000 (cards 59-64) and information of November 30, 2001 (cards 65-70) there are none other documents. Upon analyzing the documents collected in the files you can not regard as true the thesis that for so many months none actions, which should be confirmed with documents, were performed.
A real discredit for the WSI – in the aspect of the threats as discussed above – was case "Z" carried from 1996. It was taken up after the signals attesting to establishment of foreign intelligence residency in Poland. The object of the case was establishing the character of informal contacts of the command of one of the military units with A.B., born in Poland and a citizen of the German Federal Republic.
This most probably former STASI co-worker is the owner of three companies; two seated in Berlin, and third in Poland dealing with forwarding business, through the intermediary of which he runs business in Poland and in the countries of the former USSR. Most of the employees of one of his Berlin companies are former National People’s Army officers, STASI employees and the graduates from Russian military schools (including the participants of KGB and GRU courses).
Through the intermediary of S.K. (the former employee of Security Service, from 1992 the policeman of Criminal Section of ‘Poviat’ (County) Police Headquarters, the owner of safeguard agency "CT" and M.M. (warrant officer of the Polish Army reserve) A.B. established contact with the cadre of the military unit.. The meetings were held under the cover story of official contacts, whose purpose was making use by him of military facilities: mess and shooting range.
A.B. very quickly established familiar relations with the military unit cadre, and wishing to make them dependent on him he was very open-handed in granting loans against confirmation of their receipt, covered the costs of their visits in escort agencies, being his property and often invited them to his villa for drinking bouts with the participation of prostitutes. Those meetings were documented with use of cameras and video, and A.B. carried these materials abroad.
A.B. was also often invited to events with participation of officers. E.g. during the event organized by Col. M. G. and Major M.R. in the district of so called "generals’ villas" A.B. together with his wife F.Z. were parading in [German] Bundeswehr uniforms during, as it was noted in the files "ordinary drinking bout", in the presence of completely drunk officers of the Polish Armed Forces.
A.B. has also organized a trip to a shooting competition in National People’s Army facility in Germany, in which the cadre of the military unit represented by Col. G., Lt Col W. and Major P., W. Officer S. from the Military Police (Żandarmeria Wojskowa – ŻW) participated without consent of their superiors, accompanied by sub-inspector of police T. The organizer insisted that they should come in their field uniforms, which was then documented on photos. The Chief of the Staff of Military Unit recognized in one of the participants of the event the lecturer of German Group from Military Academy in Moscow in 1986. The above maintains close contacts with H. J.C., the friend of A.B, and STASI officer and with M.P. the officer of the Soviet Army and the agent of special services.
The person of A.B. passes as suspected in the case of robbery of a large quantity of fuel from the Military Unit. As it can be seen from the files, another friend of his was to be implicated in the robbery – Lt Col G.Ł, transport engineer, deputy commander of the Military Unit. He was also the accused in the case of fuel robbery from another military unit.
When establishing new contacts, A.B. always focused his attention on prospectus persons, occupying managerial positions in the structures of military units and other military institutions, or on such whom could fulfil such function in the near future. Another criterion of equal value in making acquaintance by him was participation in the courses in the USSR, which made a natural recruitment base.
The soldiers, with whom A.B. maintained contacts were, among others.:
• Lt Col A.G. (Chief of Military Unit Staff, graduate from KGB course in Moscow),
• Lt Col G. Ł.. (transport engineer, deputy commander of the Military Unit),
• Lt Col Z.G. (Chief of Training Department of the Military Unit 1),
• Maj. M.R. (commander of the Military Unit),
• Maj. R.O. (chief of training, deputy commander of the Military Unit), On similar principle A.B. established contacts with Military Police cadre: Col. M.G. (at present deputy of District Commander of Military Police (ŻW), graduate from KGB course, earlier chief of the Military Intelligence Department, deputy chief of Military Police Branch, deputy chief of Military Police had close contacts with KGB during the period, in which the Russian Army based in Poland, friend of another student from Moscow – K.W. (WSI officer),
• Lt Col J.W. (deputy of District Command Chief of ŻW),
• Senior Staff Warrant Officer W.S. (commander of ŻW, previous Military Internal Services, close co-worker of Captain M.N – officer of Military Counter-intelligence Department and A.B. friend),
• Lt Col W. S. (commander of ŻW Section),
• Lt Col W.R. (commander of ŻW Section)
and with ‘Poviat’ (County)Police Commanders:
• Younger Inspector E. K.
• Younger Inspector Z. T.
and officers from the Border Guard and soldiers from GROM (‘THUNDER’) Unit – among others with A.M. (in 1996 and 1999 A. B. was invited to GROM exercises).
A.B. functioning in the circle of the Polish Armed Forces cadre was a great threat for guarded entities. He obtained information about defense and data of personal character, in these exact characteristics of the persons being of interest for him (disposition, addictions, customs, views, and sexual preferences). Due to gathered information he could easily control the persons being of interest for him through blackmail, financial dependence or through taking advantage of very familiar contacts.
A.B. statement, that he had a partner in Ethiopia, with whom he run business in that part of the globe was interesting in the context of suspected cooperation with foreign intelligence. He disclosed also that he had acquaintances dispersed all over the world (Lebanon, Libya, Nicaragua) and that these were the persons met by him at the courses in the USSR. A.B. also runs business with the company “A.I. S.I.” in Berlin, whose representatives are suspected of illegal trade and smuggling of strategic elements. The representative of this Company for Moscow is a person named Ałganow. The cover of this illegal activity is among others a Night Club M., whose owner is A.B. As It can be seen from the reports of Border Guard, this club is guarded, among others by former soldiers of SPECNAZ and KGB. In addition to the above Club, A.B. owes a villa (the buildings are adjacent), in which he often arranges events with participation of servicemen and prostitutes. At present this building is adapted for the needs of hotel and dormitory base for managerial staff and lecturers of one of the higher schools. A friend of A.B. colonel of National People’s Army, living in Berlin and being a real property broker of unknown name is reported to act as an agent in this transaction. It is without any doubts that the investment adjacent to escort agency may facilitate to A. B the access to staff working in this high school and its recruitment.
It can be seen from the obtained information, that he confirmed keeping contacts with Minister of Justice Grzegorz Kurczuk. He stated that he visited the Chancellery of President A. Kwaśniewski, and he also referred to his acquaintances in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw. In spite of this, those institution have never been inquired in this matter in order to fix any dates and establish the persons meeting with A.B. in their territory. It does not result from the files, either that counter-intelligence of the WSI warned the representatives of the Republic of Poland authorities of the threats resulting from acquaintance with former STASI co-worker, suspected presently of acting in favor of intelligence of some of the former USSR states.
The actions undertaken in this matter are characterized by inefficacy – from the lowest level of the WSI through the Minister of National Defense. For 11 years of carrying the case none operational advantages were obtained. On the contrary, it seems that all the actions were intentionally carried in such way “not to disturb” the suspected person. A.B. acted entirely unfettered, extending every year the circle of people dependent on him. It was never established for whom he worked, who received the information from him, how many people he managed to recruit. For the first 6 years of this procedure, the officers of the Counter-intelligence Department at the WSI did not even check who was officially running the escort agency, in which all his interest intersected on behalf of A.B.
In order to assess this matter the fact that tests of state-of-the-art military technologies were tested on Military Unit territory during A.B. activity, is not unimportant. It is also worth repeating in this place that during the recent period of the Soviet Army units stay in Poland (1992-1993), acting in the area in which the Signal Brigade of the Soviet Army and Radioelectronic intelligence units were based in this region, the KGB also intensively collected information about the officer cadre of the military units. These two elements, fundamental for estimation of the matter, are not even mentioned in the files.
The successes of A. B. (actually a man having only elementary education, earlier a digger operator) does not confirm any of his extraordinary or exceptional abilities, but they are rather the effect of the preparations made by the KGB almost 15 years ago and a lack of appropriate counteractions on the Polish counter-intelligence part. The thing is that already several years ago the entire cadre of Military Unit was investigated, including the cadre safeguarding the Military Counter-intelligence Section in the Military Internal Services. It was not incidental that A.B,. typified two KGB trainees from Moscow: Lt Col A.G. – Chief of the Staff of Military Unit and Col. M.G. – deputy commander of Military Police (ŻW) district, who remained in close relations with the chief and officers of local KGB Department as his informants
It can be seen from documents gathered in the files, that the case was managed from the level of the WSI Headquarters by Lt Col Krzysztof Kłosiński (Chief of the 3rd Directorate WSI), Col. Marek Słoń (chief of Section 32 of the 3rd Directorate WSI) and Col. Zenon Klamecki (deputy chief of the 3rd Directorate), and the case was also known to Gen. Marek Dukaczewski.
Having analyzed the actions undertaken in the described case, it should be stated that the responsibility for improper carrying out of "K" procedure at the level of the WSI Command should be borne by the following persons:
1. Gen. Marek Dukaczewski, Chief of the WSI
2. Lt Col Krzysztof Kłosiński, Chief of the 3rd Directorate WSI
3. Col. Zenon Klamecki, Deputy Chief of the 3rd Directorate WSI
4. Col. Marek Słoń, Chief of Section 32 of the 3rd Directorate WSI
5. Col. Waldemar Dzięgielewski, Chief of Military Counter-intelligence Directorate WSI

Operational case “GWIAZDA” (‘STAR’): origins and facts
The WSI have never undertaken a comprehensive operational investigation of officers and soldiers, who underwent training in the USSR and favored them in their service and in the Polish Army. Gen. Konstanty Malejczyk states that "the WSI analyses the contacts of officers trained formerly in the USSR, since it is always possible that they may be recruited now. But so far no such event was noted” is not a truth
Only certain former trainees were handed specially prepared questionnaires, but their detailed filling out was not exacted. Some persons who received them gave only general or laconic responses, often hiding behind oblivion. The general character of response decreases any operational value. Also during carried verification proceedings resulting from the Act on restricted information, no reference was made to the records of these points in the questionnaire on public safety, which concern international contacts and training abroad.
The graduates from the training courses were not subject to any comprehensive polygraph tests, which could serve as confirmation of their loyalty and bona fides. No systematic polygraph tests were run in order to explain any possible relations of the persons trained in the Soviet Union with special services of the East. No active operating actions were undertaken in order to establish whether such persons give a warranty of keeping secrecy. None active investigation actions were undertaken, either, in order to verify their honesty and loyalty and to find possible symptoms of intelligence-related threat.
Only in the second half of the 90-ies a decision was made on initiating problematic control under code name "GWIAZDA". Undertaking the problem was a reason for which some persons trained by the KGB and GRU decided to quit the service. The cadre, who remained in the services hindered conducting investigations of the issue. No response was given to the set of questions relating to training asked to the officer, hiding behind the oblivion or lapse of time or filling in laconic "no" in reply to questions requiring more extensive presentation of their subject.
The "GWIAZDA" procedure (relating to shielding and verification of the WSI officers trained at the academies and specialist courses of KGB and GRU in the former USSR) was formally initiated on January 14, 1998 and approved by the Chief of Safety Section Col. Andrzej Ziętkiewicz, participant of the course in KGB Higher School completed in June 1983. A similar situation occurred in the past. In the files of the case, single documents from the middle of the 90-ies remained, from which It can be seen that the WSI gathered information about officers studying in the USSR. In a memo dated December 1995 Col. T. Koczkowski aptly pointed out the indications resulting from improper human resources policy towards the former trainees of GRU/KGB and developed an action plan aimed at the neutralization of the threats resulting from this fact. The assumptions presented by Col. T. Koczkowski were approved by Col. Stefan Janus – a participant of GRU course completed in August 1987. He instructed Col. Mieczysław Kulita, a participant of the course in KGB Higher School, completed in March 1983 to exercise the supervision of carrying the matter under consideration. From then, the proceeding was under control of the persons to whom it could be detrimental, eliminate them from service in the Polish Armed Forces or even commit for trial. It is no wonder that none actions were made in order to bring the matter to a close.
The files of the case include e.g. the information that "Safety Section I of the WSI is in possession of information evidencing that certain persons were the object of interest of the Soviet special forces". There is no information, however, that any actions have been made under “GWIAZDA” procedure in order to deepen or verify this information.
Only on January 14, 1998 the Chief of Safety Section of the WSI Inspectorate in a "Memo relating to threats and relations between special services of People’s Polish Republic and the USSR" indicated that there is a need to carry operating and shielding actions aimed at establishing whether the cadre related with the East guarantees keeping the secrecy. WIS did not possess exact information about the number of officers, who underwent such training. The Safety Section of the WSI understated these figures and did not indicate all the participants of the courses, known to them.
It was estimated in the special services centers and in military academies of the USSR and other socialistic camp countries ca 300 officers of Military Internal Services (WSW) and the 2nd Directorate of the Staff General were trained, who served in the WSI at the moment of establishment of these services. In 1998 over half of them were in service (i.e. 153 persons) and most of them (ca 75%) occupied prominent and managerial positions.

The "GWIAZDA" case: procedure bona fides
It should be underlined that various figures are cited in the "GWIAZDA" case, in the WSI materials from 1998, only 153 officers are mentioned, while in one of the earlier documents it is stated that in 1980-1992 ca 800 officers from military services of Polish People’s Republic were studying in high schools, and ca 3 thousand soldiers graduated from various courses and training. The files do not contain full and uniform list of the participants of such training, and new names appear in subsequent versions..
It is characteristic that the name of General Marek Dukaczewski, who underwent a course in Moscow in 1989, was placed on the trainees list issued only in October 2005, though the information about his training is contained in his personal files, kept currently at the National Remembrance Institute. In a computer database of the WSI, made by default a comprehensive source of knowledge about every WSI soldier, there is no information concerning the professional career of general Dukaczewski prior to 1990. This circumstance allows for advancing a thesis about the intentional manipulation of previously developed materials in the "GWIAZDA" case. Absence of comprehensive list of Polish Armed Forces soldiers trained in the Soviet block countries means that a fundamental document, which should make a starting point for making any shielding actions, was not issued for several years. Maybe the works undertaken under the "GWIAZDA" case were only apparent.
This analysis is confirmed by the information that Verification Commission received from the soldiers giving evidence before the Commission that the "GWIAZDA" case "was run very unreliably" and this was "collecting and not content-related conduct of this case"; as it was enough to "select the persons and carry an operational investigation against them under counter-intelligence shielding files (TOK) or operational case".
Improper management of both procedures of the "GWIAZDA" case was not an ordinary omission, but the effect of actions of subsequent chiefs of individual WSI units. In the years 1990-2006 the persons trained in the USSR were located practically in all WSI units, mainly on managerial posts in: the WSI command, the 2nd Directorate, the 3rd Directorate, Internal Safety Office, Department ‘Y’ (later Department 22), military attaché’s offices, Department 24, Department ‘Y’ of Technical Infrastructure Center, Teleinformatics Safety Center and many others important organizational units of the WSI. The officers trained in the Soviet academies have also been delegated as officers under cover (OPP) – to serve outside the WSI in state-owned firms and institutions in Poland and aboard. By virtue of occupied positions, the persons trained in the USSR, in the years 1989-2005, had access to WSI information that was secret intelligence and counter-intelligence, in this, information originating from international exchange. This constituted a threat for the state and had negative bearing on the bona fides of military special services for NATO. However, the WSI treated any critics of this status quo as an attack to State safety. At the beginning of the 90-ies raising such issue in the public was even a reason of initiating operational investigation of politicians, newspapers and even foundations..

The "GWIAZDA" case : consequences
The effect of such state of affairs was insulation of the Polish safety services in NATO, which was expressed, among others in rejecting by Germany the candidature of Col. C.L., former soldier of ‘Department Y’ and participant of GRU course in 1985, for the service in Attaché’s Office in Cologne (instead of this he was entrusted a function of Deputy Chief of the 2nd Directorate of the WSI in 1994-1997; then attaché in Vienna in the years 1997-2000 and Deputy Chief of the WSI responsible for operational affairs in the years 2001-2004, lately has fulfilled the duties of attaché in Prague).
As it can be seen from the report of April 20, 1998 the information about threats resulting from persons serving in the WSI who were trained by GRU and KGB was communicated to the then Minister of National Defense Janusz Onyszkiewicz.
When M. Dukaczewski was the Chief of the WSI (2002-2005), running the "GWIAZDA" procedure was discontinued, even in this restricted dimension. The schedule of operating activities was only issued on October 12, 2005. The case, resumed at the turn of 2005/2006, was still carried in very narrow scope; neither appropriate forces nor sufficient funds were destined for this purpose, which remained at counter-intelligence disposition. In consequence, at the beginning of 2006 there were still 38 officers identified as graduates from Russian special courses, who served in the WSI. Only then was the action of checking the incoming and outgoing calls in their phones initiated, but this time these actions were once again paralyzed - of 8 applications for telephone billings, four numbers of stationery phone and 1 number of mobile phone were established, in other cases none actions were undertaken, explaining it by the impossibility to establish a phone number.
The case "GWIAZDA" was the only attempt of the WSI of facing the issue of infiltration by the Russian services of Polish special services after 1989. In view of the method of carrying the case, GWIAZDA procedure did not bring any measurable effects.
The analysis performed by the Verification Commission confirms that WSI knowingly tolerated and conduced hiding connections of their soldiers and officers with communist and Soviet services:
1. The verification procedure, which using the provisions of the Act on Secrecy could cause not granting safety certificates to these persons, as not giving the warranty of credibility, has never been developed and deployed in the WSI.
It would be the simplest way of clearing the services from these people, but undertaken actions were just the opposite. The Verification Commission found numerous cases of giving instructions to the officers under cover not to confess to the fact of work in favor of communist special forces.
An example of such performance is the action undertaken in the case of collaborator "R", a diplomat with long experience, in this in the Embassy in Minsk, whom the WSI officers had instructed that he might confirm falsehoods in p. 11 of the Personal Safety Questionnaire (this point relates to secret cooperation with special services of Polish People’s Republic).
Such an instruction was given by::
• On June 10, 1999 by Col. Józef Wąsik – the following persons put their signatures on documents as persons approving the action: Cpt. Wojciech Resiak and Maj. Krzysztof Rola. The direct decision relating to this action was made by the then Chief of ZWW (Union of Struggle for Liberation)
• On February 18, 2005 Lt Col Bogusław Świątek and Col. Kazimierz Kolasa – document bears the signature of Col. Grzegorz Sobecki.

2. Another example of hiding the truth about the stay at courses in the USSR is the action of Lt Col Ryszard Piwoński, officer of Military Counter-intelligence, who being delegated in 1999 to work in the Chancellery of Prime Minister, undertook the trial to "clear" his personal files from the elements discreditable for him. He applied to the active officer of the division to change the text of Ministry of National Defense decision on transferring him to the reserve in such a way that it would not result from it that he was the officer of Military Internal Services (WSW). He also asked to return the certificate of finishing the KGB course in Moscow (written in Cyrillic alphabet) kept in his personal files to him. After obtaining a negative reply from active officer, Lt Col Piwoński stated that "in this situation he shall attain his goal in another way".
After retirement (military pension) he was reported to take a managerial position in the human resources department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
3. A commonly known effect of failure in undertaking any actions in the described matter was enabling carrying intelligence activity to Lt Col Czesław Wojtkun, the ex-chief of Military Internal Services counter-intelligence (then WSI) in Łódź. In February 1986 he finished the KGB course and in all probability he was already at that time recruited by the Soviet services. He was sentenced to degradation and four years of imprisonment for delivering the documents of Polish intelligence to the Russians.
A thesis was also advanced that Lt Col Wotjkun was disclosed out of revenge by KGB agents, with whom he had common dealings and whom he stole of one billion of "old" Polish zlotys, withdrawing such amount from a banking account. It is a fact, that even at the beginning of the 90-ies, KGB agents visited him in the counter-intelligence offices. The feature characteristic for the situation prevailing in the WSI is the fact that the investigation and arrest of Wojtkun was possible due to the action of the State Security Office (UOP) and not the WSI actions, which did not undertake any activity in this matter.
4. A similar situation may be observed in counter-intelligence matters aimed, from a formal point of view, at counteracting the Russian penetration. For example the case "K" was established in order to develop a recruitment situation towards the officer of the Russian Federation, but in result of scandalous conduct of the case, an in result its none effects, all the actions were directed to the figurehead, a senior officer of military counter-intelligence, in order to hide the real state of the affair. However, no clues of the matter, among others involvement in the matter of KGB officer and Cpt. J.S., the participant of the course in Moscow in the years 1985-86, were undertaken. It was never explained whether this entire matter was not a result of KGB provocation and whether Cpt. J.S. was not the collaborator of foreign services. The entire procedure was oriented only to secondary issues
Procedure "S" was established against the officer of the Polish Armed Forces, Lt Col J. J. (“S”) and was conducted by military counter-intelligence, aiming at investigation of his possible activity in favor of Russian intelligence. The key issues in this matter was lack of information flow between Military Intelligence Directorate (ZWW) and military intelligence, resulting first of all from protection of not precisely determined interest of Intelligence. The realization of planned operating actions was ceased, which could bring counter-intelligence advantages. The "S" investigation was carried superficially, the clues of the matter were not continued. In 1980-1983 "S" stayed in the Academy in Kiev. It can be seen from obtained information that during this stay he informed one of the lecturers, co-operating most probably with the KGB about the student environment. "S" also declared his readiness to serve in the former Soviet Army. He kept social and commercial contacts with a Russian woman, who had been for several years in close relations with Polish officers studying in the USSR. In September 1989 r. "S" started studies at the Commanding and Staff Academy of State Air Defense Forces in Tver. It is not known, who the inspirer of his return to Moscow 10 years later for annual studies was, but in the same year shielding actions against J. J. were undertaken. It was done by ZWW officer Maj. Jan Szczęsny, formerly trained in the USSR.
After returning from studies in Moscow, "S" became the acting Chief of Staff I of Rocket Brigade of Air Defense in August 1999. During the procedure, the following facts were established, among other, confirming the justified suspect ions of "S" contacts with foreign intelligence:
• between 1992 (stay of "S" in Tver), and 1999 (stay in Moscow) two attempts of establishing contact with "S" by persons having relations with Russian special forces were made;
• "S" was hiding his contacts, including the contacts with citizens of the Russian Federation;
• "S" demonstrated special initiative in establishing contacts with the cadre of NATO states;
• "S" solicited contacts with Air Defense Army and the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces staff in order to promote his person in Air Defense Army and General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces command;
• during run verifying proceeding "S" did not disclose contact with foreigners;
• during his stay abroad "S" realized telephone connections with the Russian Federation;
• without his superiors’ consent "S" invited military attaché of the Embassy of France in Warsaw for military exercises;
• "S" was keeping contacts with unknown man visiting him in his military unit;
• "S" had negative result of polygraph test – a strong reaction to questions relating to his cooperation with foreign special services, in spite of this no securing actions have been undertaken;
• in February 2002 "S" went to the Baltic Coast under the pretext of inspection in rocket commands ; he did not inform his closest circle about it, he took two heavy suitcases and his service laptop, from which he sent correspondence, whose content and addressee were not established; the actual stay of the figurehead at the Coast has never been established, either;
• the trial of handing money to "S" in the form of a bribe was stated, to the order of Russian special forces (payment to the account was to be effected after his retirement).

In spite of so much expressed signals, the thesis that "S" is a collaborator of foreign services was consistently rejected and the procedure was conducted in a way, which simply shielded his suspected actions. Probably in 2005 his case was placed in the archives. In the same year "S" quit the service and was employed in Bank Gospodarki Żywnościowej (‘Bank for Sustenance Economy’).
The case under code name "K" relates to cooperation of Col. Marian Kastelik (graduate of GRU course in the USSR), recalled by way of punishment from post in Norway for alcohol abuse with lieutenant colonel of the Soviet military intelligence Kozyrev and disclosing the information which could be detrimental for the Republic of Poland to him. During his stay on the post in Democratic Republic of Korea Col. Kastelik disclosed the data of the WSI officer under cover and the scope of the activity carried by him in the Russian Federation. He did not either inform the Command of the attempt of recruitment by intelligence services of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Russia of the officers subordinated to him – Lt. Col. J. and Lt. K.
During his stay on above mentioned post Col. Kastelik:
• contrary to Command instruction remained in very friendly contacts with employees of the Russian Federation Embassy, including GRU soldiers (Kozyrev) and had numerous intimate contacts with Russian women dangled to him by GRU;
• during his entire stay he bought deficit objects for the Embassy of the Russian Federation (because of the embargo), and leaving the post he instructed his successors to continue these actions;
• he was running correspondence through the intermediary of Americans between Lt Col J. and a former employee (women) of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Pyongyang, neglecting the official communication channel;
• he acquainted Gen. K.O. with GRU residents in Korea (Kozyrev and his chief Smirnoff). As It can be seen from the files of the case, Gen. K.O. provided to Russian Federation diplomats, in this GRU and KGB officers, information he received by virtue of his position, including also information obtained from the chiefs of other missions;
• many times he spent the time in the Polish Embassy in Moscow in the company of a Russian women dangled to him by Kozyrev;
• he participated in the scandal relating to the purchase and service of computer hardware for the Embassy of the Polish Republic in Pyongyang through a Russian Company, which enabled insight to the computer data by the service technician – a Russian citizen.

The case against Col. Marian Kastelik was established no earlier than a year after his coming back from the post. No individual cases were carried out, which would investigate the events of contacts of other WSI officers on the Mission in Korea with the Russians, no action was undertaken, either, which could lead either documenting the contacts of Col. Kastelik with representative of Russian special forces after this return to Poland.
In spite of admitting that Col. Kastelik "does not guarantee by his behavior the honesty and loyalty, he is unreliable as intelligence officer and may make a threat for the safety of operating tasks realized by the Institution for safety of the Republic of Poland", the only action that was suggested was transferring above mentioned person to reserve.
The following persons, knowing the case as described above, did not undertake any action relevant to the scale of the involved threat:
1. Lt Col Ryszard Niedziałkowski (conducting the case)
2. Col. Janusz Bogusz
3. Col. Andrzej Ziętkiewicz (participant of course in the USSR)
4. Col. Stanisław Mańczyński
5. Col. Marek Witkowski
Another example of lack of appropriate reaction to the connections of the WSI officers with Eastern special services was the case of operating shielding (SOZ) under code name "P", in which the figurehead was Comdr. Piotr Gawliczek from Division 2 of the 2nd Directorate (earlier the officer of ‘Division Y’ and expert of Attaché’s Office in Norway). In the course of conducting the case, the figurehead did not avow his acquaintance with GRU officer, which was established in 80-ies in the Brigade of Soviet Army, which was based in Świnoujście. As it was established, GRU officer, appearing in the role of the interpreter of this unit, was performing in fact investigation and intelligence tasks. At the beginning of the 90-ies he considerably intensified his activity in the environment of the Polish Armed Forces and among civil persons from the circle of the Military Navy in Świnoujście and Polish Armed Forces Units in the region of Western Pomerania. In the following years, the officer of GRU has come many times to Poland under the cover story of commercial activity, re-establishing his contacts with Polish citizens, whom he met earlier. His actions in Poland after 1994 were aimed at penetrating the officer cadre and the closest environment of military units due to his contacts established during earlier stay in Poland.. In spite of serious and unexplained suspicions Gen. M. Dukaczewski made a decision on directing Comdr. Gawliczek to work in the analytical unit of the WSI, in which his access to confidential information was extended (and in 1999 he was promoted to the position of Chief of Command of Studies and Analyses (ZSiA).
The files of this case include an internal note of Maj. Jan Żukowski to Col. Tadeusz Rusak, in which the first states that though it could not be excluded that above mentioned rear admiral undertook cooperation with GRU, no actions should be initiated against him, since "it would impinge negatively on bona fides of Polish military special services before alliances from NATO".
The conclusion which resulted from above described case was not used for planning and organizing the operating work of the WSI, the result of which was the WSI abandonment of deepening its knowledge about the activity of special services of the former USSR states in Poland, particularly in the areas, in which the Soviet Army was based in the past. Because of this the conviction that the cooperation through the network of agents with the USSR services was tolerated, if not approved, became established.

Russian penetration: resume
The above analysis of selected operational cases indicates that the WSI were incapable to carry effective counter-intelligence work to that extent. During the entire period of their existence they did not detain even one Russian spy. All success in this field was the result of civil services actions. Event the representatives of the WSI themselves disputed the bona fides of this services. In one of "GWIAZDA" documents it was stated: "I state with full responsibility that these services are not reliable, which is mainly due to their cadre, involved in unexplained contacts with the East".
In turn, in an internal note dated March 24, 1999 it was indicated that the graduates from KGB and GRU courses "made a natural recruitment base for Eastern special services". According to another document, military counter-intelligence and intelligence obtained many interesting information” on this subject, but they did not bring any effects. It was aptly noted that one of the reasons of this situation "was and is the WSI infiltration by special services of the East, for whom the officers trained in the East could make a recruitment and information basis”.. The assessment of the WSI operating actions both in intelligence and anti-espionage area, must be negative. For several recent years the military special services have not been in condition to build any operating structure, which could carry intelligence reconnaissance and provide counter-intelligence security, unexposed to the Soviet infiltration.
It should be also considered that the main actions undertaken in the case under code-name "GWIAZDA" were both apparent and ineffective by default, or they were doomed to failure because they were supervised by the officers trained by GRU and KGB. It should be taken into consideration in that place, that the pragmatics resulting from the regulations on registration of procedures in special services records, provided a guarantee that each interest in this subject or appearance of any additional information or suspect ions must be co-ordinated – which is equal to referring them to the unit, which conducted the case "GWIAZDA".
In the light of the above cited facts, the proceeding of the following persons fulfils the instruction contained in Art. 70a subpar. 2 of the Act of June 9, 2006 Regulations Implementing the Military Counter-intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service Act and of the Act on Duties of the Officers of Military Intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service: Brig Gen. Jan Żukowski, Gen. Marek Dukaczewski, Col. Marek Słoń, Col. Zenon Klamecki, Col. Andrzej Ziętkiewicz, Col. Stanisław Mańczyński, Col. Marek Witkowski, Col. Waldemar Dzięgielewski, Col. Mieczysław Kulita, Col. Kazimierz Kolasa, Col. Grzegorz Sobecki, Col. Stefan Janus, Col. Józef Wąsik, Col. Marian Kastelik, Col. Janusz Bogusz, Lt Col Krzysztof Kłosiński, Lt Col Jerzy Rzepecki, Comdr. Piotr Gawliczek, Lt Col Bogusław Świątek, Lt Col Czesław Wojtkun, Lt Col Ryszard Piwoński, Lt Col Ryszard Niedziałkowski, Lt Col Paweł Selwet, Lt Col Krzysztof Gardian, Lt Col Andrzej Goczał, Lt Col Janusz Łuszcz, Maj. Grzegorz Wilczewski, Maj. Piotr Jaskólski, Maj. Marek Kwasek, Maj. Jacek Popławski, Maj. Marek Orzeł, Maj. Maciej Antczak, Maj. Krzysztof Rola, Cpt. Wojciech Resiak.
In the light of Art. 70a subpar. 3 of the Act cited in the introduction, the persons occupying lead governmental positions, which learnt about the actions inconsistent with the law and did not undertake any actions aimed at ceasing such actions was the Minister of National Defense Janusz Onyszkiewicz. In the above-described period the Chief of the WSI was Brig. Gen. Marek Dukaczewski. In Art. 5 subpar, 1 of the Act of December 14, 1994 on the Office of Minister of National Defense a regulation is contained, that Military Information Services (WSI) were subordinated directly to the above Minister. More precise information on this regulation was brought by § 1 p. 16 of the Decree of Council of Minister of July 9, 1995 on detailed scope of Minister of National Defense activity. It imposed on the Minister of National Defense a duty of exercising supervision of Military Information Services (WSI) activity, particularly of their operational and investigation activity. According to the Act of July 9, 2003 on Military Information Services (WSI), the supervision of activity of these services was a duty of Minister of National Defense, who appointed persons to this position and dismissed WSI Chief.
Pursuant to Art. 9 subpar. 1 of this Act the chief of the WSI was directly subordinated to Minister of National Defense. The Ministers of National Defense in that period were: Stanisław Dobrzański, Bronisław Komorowski and Jerzy Szmajdziński.
The facts cited in this Chapter give rise to objections as to the lawfulness of the WSI soldiers’ proceeding, in connection with the above the Verification Commission submitted a notice of suspect ion of committing a crime to the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office pursuant to Art. 304 § 2 of the code of criminal proceeding.