Introduction

Legal basis
The Act of amending the Act – the Regulations Implementing the Military Counter-intelligence Service and the Military Information Service Act and the Duties of the Military Counter-intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service Officers Act (the Journal of Laws of 2007, No. 7, item 49), passed on December 14, 2006, imposed on the President of the Republic of Poland a duty of announcing to the public the Report on the actions of soldiers and employees of the Military Intelligence Service (the WSI) and military organizational entities performing military intelligence and counter-intelligence duties, going beyond the area of such activities and services, as determined by the law, issued by the President of Verification Commission.

The scope of information included in the Report
According to Art. 70a of the Act of December 14, 2006, the Report comprises information about the activity of soldiers and employees of special services (and the persons co-operating with them) concerning:
o disclosure or use of the information making the State secret or;
o omission to notify the prosecution agencies of criminal acts;
o obstruction and disconcerting penal proceedings;
o use of violence and illegal threats;
o exerting illegal affect on decisions made by the public authorities;
o keeping secret cooperation with entrepreneurs and persons acting in public media;
o falsifying information in order to exercise or extend penal proceedings against specific persons;
o taking financial or personal benefits from the above mentioned actions;
o and any other actions going beyond the matters of State defense and safety of the Polish Army.

As set forth in the Act, the Report also includes information about the persons co-operating with soldiers and employees of special military services, who performed the above mentioned actions, and the persons, who induced them to perform such actions or facilitated their commitment.
It was also the Parliament’s will to disclose the information about the persons occupying leading state positions, who knowing about the activities of the military special services going beyond the prevailing regulations of the law, did not undertake any actions aiming at discontinuation of such actions in the Report.

Legal basis of the actions of Military Intelligence Services (the WSI) and their predecessors after 1989.
Military Intelligence Services (the WSI) and their legal predecessors – military organizational entities executing the military intelligence and counter-intelligence tasks constituted and integral part of the Polish Army. The tasks of the Armed Forces were determined in the constitutional regulation prevailing from December 31, 1989 and in the Act of November 21, 1967 on General Duty of Defense of Polish People’s Republic, according to which the Armed Forces safeguarded the sovereignty and independence of the Polish nation, its safety and peace.
As part of the Polish Army, the military special services could act exclusively within the scope of State defense and safety. Amendment to the Constitution of December 29, 1989 imposed on the governmental agencies the order to act exclusively on the grounds of the regulations of the law, and made the observance of the law of the Republic of Poland their fundamental duty.
Statutory legal bases for intelligence and counter-intelligence activity were introduced by the Act of October 25, 1991 on amendment of the Act on General Duty of Defense of the Polish People’s Republic and certain other acts. This Act has strictly determined the obligations of Military Intelligence Services (the WSI), indicating that they include only the tasks relating to identification and counteracting the threats being detrimental to State defense and breach of the State secret relating to defense. This Act used for the first time the name of Military Information Services (the WSI) in relation to military special services. Up to 2003 there was no comprehensive regulations relating to the WSI. The Act of July 9, 2003 on Military Intelligence Service (the WSI) set forth the details of the tasks assigned to these services, restricting them explicitly to counteracting the threats being detrimental to the Armed Forces safety and to interdependence of the State, to its territory and boundaries. The Act on Military Intelligence Services (the WSI) of July 9, 2003 determined allowable forms of operating activity, binding them in each case with realization of statutory tasks of these services.
It is beyond any doubt, that according to the law prevailing after 1989, the intelligence and counter-intelligence services, and then, from December 1992 the Military Information Services, could interfere – in the forms permissible by law – in social and economic life only in such situations, in which it was directly linked with State defense or safety. In the remaining scope such interference was possible in the event in which the law permitted it – only through the actions of special civil services of the State Security Office (‘Urząd Ochrony Państwa’ – UOP), and then Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego (‘Internal Security Agency’).
Every action of military special services going beyond the above mentioned areas, independent from the period in which it took place, made a breach of prevailing regulations of the law and violation of an oath binding the soldiers of Military Information Services (the WSI), which imposed on them a duty to protect the Constitution.

The object of examination and the legal ground of Commission work
The object of the examinations making the basis for this Report, issued by the Verification Commission, were the actions and acts of soldiers and other persons to the extent indicated in Art. 70 a subpar. 1 through 3 of the Act "Regulations Implementing the Military Counter-intelligence Service and the Military Intelligence Service Act and the Duties of the Military Counter-intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service Officers Act". They have been established by the Verification Commission appointed by the President of Republic of Poland and the Prime Minister according to Art. 63 subpar. 1 of the Act and the Prime Minister’s Decree of July 26, 2006 on the course of action of the Verification Commission appointed in connection with liquidation of the Military Information Services (the WSI) (the Journal of Laws No. 135, item 953). The Commission, working based on the Act and Decree of the Prime Minister was collecting and analyzing materials originating from the hearings of the soldiers of the WSI and third persons, and from the archive files and files of pending matters, being at the disposal of the WSI (Military Information Services, SKW (Military Counter-intelligence Service), SWW (Military Intelligence Service), IPN (The Institute of National Remembrance), CAW (Central Military Archives).

Legal regulations relating to hearings
The Verification Commission started its works on August 2, 2006. By September 30, 2006 the needs of the Commissions were fulfilled by the proxy responsible for Military Counter-intelligence Service organization, at present they are fulfilled by the Chief of this organization. As regards access to the WSI source materials, until September 30 the Commission took advantage of the access authorized thanks to the WSI management vested in Deputy Minister of Defense. From September 30th, the access to archive materials is realized through the Minister of National Defense within the scope of the access to the qualified collection of the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) and Central Military Archive (CAW), the Chief of Military Intelligence to Services (as regards the access to the files of the 2nd Directorate of the General Staff of Polish People’s Army and the 2nd Directorate WSI) and Chief of Military Counter-intelligence Services (as regards access to the files of Internal Military Services (WSW) and the 3rd Directorate of Military Information Services (the WSI). Full description of the issues associated with Commission activity shall be provided in the final report from the works of the Commission, in compliance with Art. 70 subpar. 1 and 2 of the Act.

Legal considerations and the value of the hearings of the WSI soldiers
In addition to materials originating from the archived files (operating files, personal files (“teczka”), files of verification proceedings), the Commission has also used the files of clearance proceedings, established on the grounds of oral and written statements of the WSI soldiers and third persons, and from materials produced in result of their hearings before the Commission pursuant to regulations of Art. 67, 68, 69, 76 subpar. 2 and 6 and Art. 79 of the Act. It should be underlined in this point that while the written statements were submitted in compliance with Art. 79 – "One, who (…) stated untruth shall be subject to a penalty of i No. 31/Sztab imprisonment from 6 months to 8 years" – the relations given during the hearings did not fall within such rigor. On the contrary, the legislator released the person heard before the Commission from responsibility, if he/she conceded to the untruth contained in his/her statement. The party submitting the statement did not have an obligation to respond to the questions, either. Third persons (including e.g. the former solders of Military Intelligence Service and the 2nd Directorate of General Staff, and in general all the soldiers who did not apply for employment in new services) did not have an obligation to appear before the commission, and to testify in the matters related to State secret, they had to obtain the consent of Minister of National Defense. These regulations were changed under the amendment to the Act of January 17, 2007, which came into force on February 1, 2007.
The role and importance of hearings is considerable. In many events the information received this way makes a first important signal enabling seeking further sources as regards a given problem. It was so e.g. in the event of the system of training in the Soviet Union and in other the socialistic camp countries, and particularly in the “GWIAZDA” case, managed by the WSI
The same situation is in the event of the case relating to organized group known under the Polish name “Rolowisko” [rather untranslatable, in English would be: a field of fools, from Polish slang: ‘rolować’ meaning approximately ‘cheating’. Translator’s notes are in [brackets]], binding politicians of SLD (Democratic Left Alliance) and higher-rank military men. Though first information on this subject obtained by Commission referred to “Zwałowisko” [a heap or so], but they precisely described the same group of people, mechanisms and subject of activity, which is called “Rolowisko” in the WSI files, discovered at a later date.
This matter would most probably not have been detected for a long period, if it had not been for the information received during the hearings before the Commission. It could not be found in the archives or in the unit competent ratione loci for the case, it was not shown on the list of wildcat ventures, to which the Minister of National Defense obliged the then Chief of the WSI Jan Żukowski. The soldiers notifying of this had only fragmentary knowledge, as they were bound by the prohibition to carry this case. But it was just this knowledge, which enabled the Commission finding the files kept by the unit located more than 300 km away.
A similar situation took place in the matters relating to fuel, connected to the ‘Orlen’ affair [‘Orlen’ = state-controlled oil company in contemporary Poland]. The Verification Commission obtained information from operating officers that field WSI branches were dealing with this affair, but the information gathered by them was blocked at a central level. The WSI Command inhibited the actions at operating level, and it did not communicate the information on this subject to other governmental agencies. The same situation was in the event of politicians’ so-called ‘invigilation’ (or surveillance) and "Pro Civili" Fund affairs, and in result with the affair relating to action of group of the WSI soldiers and international adventurers extracting money to the detriment of the WAT (‘Wojskowa Akademia Techniczna’ - Military University of Technology. Precise indication of the place of search of the files and persons would not be possible without information obtained from the soldiers making statements before the Commission.
Also in the matter of illegal trade in arms, and particularly connection with this activity of some WSI officers, the information received during the hearings played very important role. But it is beyond any doubt that this type of sources was most important for reconstruction of the relations reigning inside the services, for establishing the personal relations and for common crime identification for investigation of phenomena, having material affect on the shape and quality of the WSI activity.

The considerations and value of the sources originating from the WSI archives
The basic sources for Commission examinations are the files of the Military Information, Internal Military Services (WSW), 2nd Directorate of General Staff of Polish People’s Army and Military Information Services (the WSI) – i.e. successive mutations of military organizational structures in the communist period and in the years 1991-2006, dealing formally with the defense of the Armed Forces and widely understood safety of defense-related areas. These files were many times destroyed and taken over, together with their ownership title, by successive teams managing the services. The action of destroying the WSI files, performed in the years 1988-1989 under the leadership of the then chief of the WSI Edmund Buła is well known. The report of 1991, discussing these actions, prepared by the Parliamentary sub commission presided by the representative Janusz Okrzesik, indicated several guilty persons and part of the events accompanying these events. The political restrictions existing at that time prevented the full analysis of this effect. First, the activity of Okrzesik’s sub-commission was limited to the matters relating to the WSI actions, hence they did not relate to the 2nd Directorate of the General Staff. In this way, Okrzesik’s Report became one of the tools facilitating taking over the management of Military Information Services (the WSI), which were created at that time by the officers of the 2nd Directorate of the General Staff.
As for the rest, this Report has never been published and it is not available in unclassified Parliament materials, and the only copy known to the Commission is kept in Parliamentary archives. It is characteristic that this Report does not contain any information, which would be key for the evaluation of archives’ status – which was otherwise confirmed in numerous verbal communications, including this confirmed in the files of “GWIAZDA” case, stating namely that prior to the first scheduled destruction of files, the Chief of WSI General Buła instructed to have them screened and than transferred them to USSR services, i.e. GRU.

Destruction of files and the system of hiding the files after 1989
The specifics of transformations performed in the army after 1989, consisting in maintaining the basic structures and the old cadre of the special forces and in subordinating them to the management of the officers originating from the 2nd Directorate of the Staff General, confirmed that no conclusions were drawn from the image of the situation outlined in Okrzesik’s Report, and particularly the possibility of manipulating the files in the future was not prevented.
As it can be seen from data delivered by the Liquidation Commission to the Deputy Minister of Defense and from the statements made before Verification Commission, the files of former military services or files produced by individual WSI units on an on-going basis, were systematically destroyed and hidden. This is also proved by the report of Parliamentary Commission for Special Services of September 2003, containing among others reports of the to public prosecutor’s office of the crime of falsifying the files (“teczka”) of the operational case “BELFER” [beak understood as a teacher]. Identical practices were stated by the Verification Commission during the analysis of files of among others the 4th Directorate of the WSI, i.e. the later Internal Security Office. It relates particularly to the files of the investigation of right wing politicians and investigations of the Russian human source networks, run by the 2nd and 3rd Directorates.
In turn, as it relates from the report prepared by Wojciech Sawicki from the Liquidation Commission, starting from 1992, the process of establishing of a new system, aimed at hiding material information before the lustration-related [vetting-related, screening-related] legislation coming into force, was initiated. Part of this system was establishment of two quasi-archival sections; section 26 in the Intelligence Directorate and Section 35 in the Counter-Intelligence Directorate, named for hiding their actual functions – “non permanent stores of non-archival data” These sections gathered operational cases of special importance, relating to politicians, business activists and media representatives, updated but not managed on an on-ongoing basis. “Non permanent stores of non-archival data” were the place to which the files were referred prior to their possible transfer to the Institute of Remembrance. The advantage of this structure was the fact that in the case of a question about archives or archive files one could reply that it did not relate to the materials placed in the “stores”, as from the organizational structure point of view “stores” were not the archives, and the files kept there were not archival – it provided the excuse for not revealing them to the organs of the Spokesman for Public Interest and the Institute of National Remembrance. At the same time, it was a place in which the basic aids for keeping the filing system were kept, enabling orientation in the files transferred to the Institute of National Remembrance.
Also after the Act of the Institute of National Remembrance come into effect, the realization of the plan of the files' destruction and hiding was continued. It is proved, among others, by an attempt of destroying the personal data by deleting them with the use of a marker in “Book No. 12”, containing the register of agents from ‘Wybrzeże Gdańskie’ [Three-Cities: Gdańsk-Sopot-Gdynia Region] from the 70’ies and 80’ies. Thanks to the work of the Verification Commission and the Liquidation Commission, over 1000 files hidden in WSI premises were found, which should have been transferred to the Institute of National Remembrance many years ago. In addition, the facts of carrying unregistered cooperation were stated, including storing the labor files and personal files of agents in a way suggesting an intention to hide them (this concerns among others the personal files "M" connected with the “ZEN” case, and stored in separate premises without the knowledge of the responsible officer).
All this makes the examined files far incomplete (it relates first of all to files stored in the command, the resources kept in the agencies and ‘inspectorates’ (inspection /field/ offices) i.e. in field units, which are in much better condition).
In conclusion it should be stated, what follows: the Commission started its works focusing on the identification of irregularities resulting from the actions of the soldiers of former WSI to the extent indicated in the Act of June 9, 2006. The Report presented below refers to the works of the Verification Commission, which are still not completed. The Act of December 14, 2006 on
Amendment to the Act – Regulations Implementing Military Counter-intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service Act, enable the presentation of further publications, together with the appearance of new materials.
The Verification Commission provided the Public Prosecutor’s Office information on committing crimes in the following cases:
- in the case of the Russian penetration of Military Information Services (the WSI) and omission to undertake appropriate actions aiming at the neutralization of the threat;
- in the case of abasement of powers and taking over State assets in order to illegally acquire funds for financing special services;
- in the case of illegal trade in arms, and hiding documents;
- in the case of acting to the detriment of the State Treasury and State safety through preferential treatment of the Company SILTEC in tenders organized for the Polish Armed Forces;
- in the case of establishing a residency, whose agents undertook illegal actions with the participation of former, non verified employees of the [Communist] Security Service (Służba Bezpieczeństwa - SB);
- in the case of irregularities relating to the management of operational funds in the Krakow WSI branch and alienation of operational premises;
- in the case of misleading Polish State authorities by providing false information being of material importance for the Republic of Poland and failure in fulfillment of obligations;
- in the case of irregularities relating to tender for wheeled APC;
- in the case of illegal surveillance of political parties;
- in the case of carrying investigative activity against the interest of defense of the Republic of Poland and its Armed Forces;
- in the case of disclosing, for financial benefit – confidential information by the employees of the Polish ministries and non communication by the WSI the information about State energy threats to appropriate authorities;
- in the case of disclosing the state secret and using illegal threats;

The Report contains 24 documentary annexes, in which the problems referred to above are discussed in more detail.