8. Irregularities Related to the Protection of the Tender for Wheeled APC.

The WSI actions, focused on profits earned in special trade, did allow the services to react properly to the irregularities related to the conducted tenders for army weaponry. An example of such a situation is the counter-intelligence protection of the tender for APC. Gen. Marek Dukaczewski publicly said that the WSI had no objections to the tender. The WSI Chief convinced that the objections regarding the technological requirements applied not only to the selected bid, but also to other wheeled APCs offered. These statements are contradictory to the contents of preserved documents.
The tender commission was appointed on August 2, 2001, and on August 13th the invitation to bid was sent to the manufacturers of military equipment. The application for the start of the operational procedure regarding the tender for the Wheeled APC [‘Armored Personnel Carrier’] was approved on November 14, 2001. Bids were made by the following companies: Austrian ‘Steyer’, Swiss ‘Mowag’, Finnish ‘Patria Vehicles Oy’.
On November 15-16, 2001, a delegation from the Finnish Company ‘Patria Vehicle Oy’ paid a visit to “Wojskowe Zakłady Mechaniczne” [‘Military Mechanical Plant’] (WZM) in Siemianowice Śląskie. The visit took place at the incentive of WZM, who were interested in cooperation with the Finnish side in implementation and production of the Wheeled APC (WAPC). The purpose of the meeting consisted of consultations about special equipment, the production of which the Polish side tried to win by entering the announced tender. In the course of the visit, the cooperation terms between Patria Vehicles Oy and WZM in Siemianowice Śląskie were agreed.
Since January 2002, the representatives of Patria have intensified their lobbying activities with respect to the management of WZM in Siemianowice Śl. [town Siemianowice in Silesia] inter alia by frequent contacts in Poland, including in the WZM’s headquarters.
Furthermore, in the last quarter of 2002, increased activity of the official and economic Finnish circles towards the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Helsinki was observed with regard to Patria’s bid for the WAPC. The Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Helsinki, in a dispatch sent to Poland, expressed its positive opinion about the Finnish offer. In the Embassy’s assessment, such a large contract would strengthen the improving tendency in bilateral trade turnover and would become an important stimulus for the increase of Finnish investments in the Republic of Poland.
As early as at the beginning of the 90-ties, the WSI, through their representatives in Finland, started talks with SISU [Finish military service]. Later, during the visit of Deputy Minister Janusz Zemke in Finland on March 2-4, 2003, talks were held both in the Patria’s seat and in the Finnish MOD, during which Patria management promised that by the end of 2003, the first vehicle “meeting the criteria set for it by the Polish side” would be ready. The analysis of the materials concerning WAPC Patria shows that this promise had not been kept. The data contained in the case “S” run by the WSI show that the economic side of this tender was treated by the MOD Tender Commission as secondary, even though the financial matters and the offset should be the most important factors having impact on the results of the tender.
According to the Ministry of Economy, the Finnish offer was too weak. This was why the Ministry of Economy suggested the MOD to give up on Patria’s bid by excluding that company from further stages of the tender procedure. In a document addressed to Minister Jerzy Szmajdziński, the Ministry of Economy warned that Patria understands its share in the offset only as compensation for the delivered sub-assemblies and does not want to assume the offset-related liability for delivery of other sub-assemblies that were parts of the vehicle (e.g. engine, gearbox), which the Polish manufacturer would have to import for the APC supplied to the MOD. This situation, in the opinion of the Ministry of Economy, was unfavorable from the point of view of the Polish economy’s interest. The threat was even greater due to the fact that the Tender Commission, which handled the selection of the APC, did not take the offset into account in the purchase attractiveness criterion. According to the Ministry of Economy, it was advisable to give the foreign supplier a condition in the Terms of Reference (TOR) to assume the obligation to fulfil the role of offset co-ordinator and to conclude a comprehensive offset contract. In the opinion of the Ministry of Economy, the lack of such declaration should constitute grounds for exclusion of the Polish company (WZM) from the tender if its strategic partner will be its foreign supplier who did not accept that condition. Despite that, the Minister of National Defense did not see his role in this matter, shifting the responsibility to the Ministry of Economy.
Soon after that, the First Deputy Minister of National Defense, Janusz Zemke, conveyed to the Commander of the Army, Gen. Edward Pietrzyk, a memo written by the Chairman of MOD Tender Commission, Col. Paweł Nowak, which demonstrated the Chairman’s very positive opinion about Patria. A similar opinion was presented by J. Zemke in his letter to Minister Szmajdziński. In the correspondence sent to gen. Pietrzyk and Minister Szmajdziński, J. Zemke stated that the WAPC Patria was the only carrier, which met the requirements, and it should be included in the equipment of the Polish Army.
Considerable doubts as to the profitability of purchase of Patria WAPC were caused by the minor defects, which prevent the fulfillment of the technical and tactical conditions. During the vehicle’s tests conducted on March 1-15, 2003, it sank and its engine was completely destroyed. The companies’ representatives who participated in that event obligated (probably under the pressure of the persons who lobbied for Patria WAPC) not to reveal the occurrence to the mass media. The letter of the Chief of Counter-Intelligence Unit of the Army to the Chief of ‘Unit 36’, 3rd Directorate WSI, devoted to that fact, was dated as late as July 2003, which could mean that the WSI learnt about such an important event, which took place in March, only several months later.
When the tender was still in progress, the defense attaché at the Embassy of the Republic if Poland in Vienna sent information wherefrom it resulted that Patria’s WAPC did not meet the technical requirements contained in the tender documents. That carrier corresponded neither to the tactical and technical premises of the announced tender nor the Polish standard. For this reasons, charges were to be raised against the MOD that the WAPC tender was conducted for the benefit of ‘Patria’. In March 2003, gen. Dukaczewski conveyed those data to the Minister of National Defense and his First Deputy.
Furthermore, in March 2003, the ABW Chief informed the WSI Chief that the ABW obtained a number of pieces of information indicating that there could have been some irregularities in the process of selection of the WAPC from the Finnish company Patria, resulting from imprecise TOR provisions and the decisions made by the MOD Tender Commission. One of the comments related to the structural dimensions of the carrier. The ABW stressed that they do not meet the requirement for air transport as well as the requirement of forward buoyancy at 10 km/h. Due to the fact that the WAPC delivery contract could be signed soon and also due to the need for the ABW to present the opinion on offset, the agency asked the WSI Chief to consider this matter a priority and take a stand with regard to the doubts raised. Gen. Dukaczewski informed the Ministers Szmajdziński and Zemke about that letter, suggesting at the same time that MOD did not provide the ABW with detailed information, because that was an internal matter of the Ministry. Meanwhile, in a reply to the ABW Chief, gen. Dukaczewski wrote that the WSI “did not notice” any irregularities in the tender procedure. At the same time, he assured the ABW that he had kept MOD chiefs informed about all minor defects.
In spite of such unfavorable information, the tender procedure was completed in April 2003 and the contract for delivery of WAPC for the Polish Army was signed with Patria.
The decisive factors were: price (60%), ‘polonisation’ [meant as a possibility of producing parts in Poland’s factories] (25%) and warranty period (15%). Patria’s bid was the least expensive (its value was in Polish zloty: PLN 4.925.248.449 [almost 5 billions PLN, well over 1,5 billion US dollars]), but it contained the smallest participation of Polish plants in the production. The director of WZM in Siemianowice Śl. signed the contract with Patria for delivery of WAPC.
On behalf of the MOD, the contract of purchase of the WAPC for the Polish Army with the director of WZM was signed by the Head of Procurement Department of MOD, Col. Paweł Nowak. The decisive impact on the selection of Patria rested with the Tender Commission (TC MOD), appointed yet in August 2001 by the decision of Minister B. Komorowski. The chairman of the Commission was Col. Paweł Nowak, the deputy chairman – Gen. Krzysztof Karbowski (appointed by Minister Szmajdziński after Gen. Waldemar Skrzypek resigned), the secretary – co-ordinator – Col. Władysław A. Grębowski. Among the Commission members there were also: Col. Tadeusz Pyrcak, Maj. Robert Jamka, Lt. Col. Włodzimierz Kościk, Lt. Col. Zbigniew Tomasik (WSI), Col. Janusz Groskrejc, Lt. Col. Zbigniew Kowalczyk and Cpt. Mariusz Soczyński. The Commission was advised by a group of experts headed by Col. Krzysztof Szymaniak and his deputy Col. Jerzy Zatoński. The experts’ group included also Lt. Col. Andrzej Durka, Lt. Col. Grzegorz Nowak, Col. Jerzy Cymbaluk, Col. Wiesław Korczyc, Mr. Leszek Orłowski, Mr. Tadeusz Kuśnierz and Col. Jan Renc (appointed on October 5, 2001, at the request of Gen. E. Pietrzyk). The observers were Bronisław Komorowski and Zbigniew Zaborowski (from the Sejm’s Committee of National Defense) and the representatives of the Ministry of Economy. Selecting the carrier, before it was tested in detail, caused the members of testing teams and the commission to work under pressure in order to complete the tests positively. In many cases, the MOD representatives who took part in the tests together with the Finnish manufacturer were able to provide a way to remove the minor defects stated during the tests, even though their role should have been limited only to the statement of the existence of those defects. The final record of the delivery and acceptance tests for WAPC ‘Rosomak’ (Wolverine – Polish name of Patria) was changed many times before the ultimate version was ready: taking an unambiguous stand with regard to the actual fulfillment of the requirements contained in the tactical and technical requirements was rather avoided. This could have been caused by the wish to meet the expectations of the decision-makers, responsible for the selection of the carrier from Finland, and by the awareness of possible consequences if the carrier would not be accepted as equipment for the Polish Army. On the basis of the aforementioned final record (approved by gen. E. Pietrzyk), the Statement on the delivery and acceptance tests of the first specimens of WAPC ‘Rosomak’ was prepared and then signed by the Head of Public Procurement Department MOD, Gen. Roman Iwaszkiewicz. The statement showed that the tactical and technical requirements were adjusted to the carrier only after it came into possession of the Polish Army (December 31, 2004). Since the desire to meet those parameters cannot be held against the Polish MOD, the price should have been re-negotiated. Failing to make such a request, with a simultaneous waiver of the obligation that the technical and tactical parameters are met, was an incomprehensible action and exposed Poland to financial losses.
The Trade Union of Engineers and Technicians (Executive Board of the National Section of Military Industry Enterprises) informed the President of the Republic of Poland that the WAPC (AMV) Patria was pronounced the winner of the tender against its failure to meet a number of conditions contained in the tender specification, among them those regarding the full load weight, operation range, speed in water and dimensions. The experts found the price offer to be unreliable. Entrusting such an important product to WZM, in turn, was regarded as a several billion PLN risk, as WZM has neither the required technological condition nor the R&D support section. (In order to meet the delivery dates, the Finnish company would produce also those elements of the WAPC that initially fell to WZM).
All this information reached gen. Dukaczewski, and the irregularities concerning the WAPC were formulated in the final report of the Delivery and Acceptance Commission and were known to the MOD chiefs (the data reached the Chief of the 3rd Directorate WSI, Chief of ‘Unit 36’, 3rd Directorate WSI, and through them, the WSI Chief). In October 2004, Gen. Dukaczewski, in his letter to Minister Zemke, stated that the data in possession of the WSI show that the charges against ROSOMAK carrier were groundless. Earlier, gen. Dukaczewski presented a similar opinion to Minister Szmajdziński. Gen. Dukaczewski has also warned the Minister of National Defense that there will be more information in the media that would be unambiguously critical to the selection of WAPC Patria as the equipment of the Polish Army and would present the negative role of the Ministry chiefs in this matter. This proves that the WSI had HUMINT sources in the mass media and used those sources to protect the interest of the MOD chiefs with regard to the WAPC Rosomak.
In another letter to Minister Zemke, gen. Dukaczewski stated inter alia that:
- the AMV (WAPC) from Patria Vehicles Oy, due to the highest price and the test results, has little chances of winning the tender in Portugal and no chances at all in the Czech Republic,
- issuing a statement for Polish Press Agency (PAP) that MOD made the optimal selection of the carrier is premature,
- an important element in the possible process of implementation of WAPC Rosomak in the Polish Army is, among others, the inability to equip the carrier in accordance with the signed contract with some systems and devices of Polish production.
In a letter dated March 18, 2005, gen. Dukaczewski informed Minister Szmajdziński that it was possible that the WAPC Rosomak was accepted as the equipment of the Polish Army with violation of the Polish law. Only Minister Zemke acquainted himself with the text of that document and took a critical stand to the comments contained therein.
Additional examples proving the unsuitability of WAPC Rosomak for the Polish Army were:
- participation of malfunctioning carrier in the shows in Czech Republic on June 16-19, 2005,;
short circuits in two WAPCs; during the repair two employees of WZM in Siemianowice Śląskie suffered burns in April 2005.
The information provided to the WSI was not used in any manner as they were contained neither in case "S" nor "B". This could mean that the Counter-Intelligence Unit of the Army did not send this data to the 3rd Directorate WSI at all, deciding that there were not of great relevance in such an important undertaking. Meanwhile, the information obtained by the WSI additionally confirmed the data, which showed that the WAPC Patria did not meet the basic tactical and technical parameters. Still, the carrier was the winner of the tender procedure.
By 2006, the Polish Army had several dozens of WAPC, practically useless in battle as they were not equipped. The carriers were not delivered on the agreed dates and in agreed quantities, and the Malfunction Report, signed in October 2006 by the commander of 17th Wielkopolska MdBde [‘Mechanized Brigade’], Brig. Gen. Mirosław Różański, showed that those carriers had many structural defects, that could not be repaired at all.
The WSI, as the authority obligated to provide count-intelligence guard for the Polish Army, were responsible for the WAPC tender procedure, however, the WSI officers practically acquired information only by “official means”.. They did not confirm the data obtained by HUMINT sources and other operational means, nor did they assess or analyze the gathered materials (also those from the ABW). They were satisfied with the information coming from the meetings of MOD Tender Commission and from the conversations they held, mostly with the Commission members. The superiors of those officers did not require them to do anything else. It cannot be ruled out that this was an intentional action.
To recapitulate, the officers, from the chiefs of the WSI Units in the Army to the Chief of the 3rd Directorate WSI, to the chief of Unit 36, to the WSI Chief, did not take any actions which would aim at the neutralization of dangers occurring in the case of WAPC Patria already in the initial stages of this undertaking, i.e. mostly 2002-2003. They were aware of the importance of the existing dangers, yet they did not want to fall into disfavor with the Ministry chiefs who almost at the start of their term of office made the decision to accept WAPC Patria as the equipment of units of the Polish Armed Forces.
The investigation of the Military Police regarding the WAPC tender was supervised by Col. Edward Jaroszuk (chief of the Investigation and Inquiry Section in the Investigation and Inquiry Directorate of the Main Headquarters of the Military Police), who from August 1988 to June 1989 was trained in the KGB school in Moscow (another participant of that KGB training was Col. Eugeniusz Lendzion).
After receiving yet other information from the ABW (including information about the intention to notify the state top officials about the selection of WAPC being incompliant with the tactical and technical requirements and not suitable for the purposes of the Polish Army), gen. Dukaczewski as the WSI Chief started showing concern that he could be held liable for the lack of reaction to the irregularities in the WAPC tender procedure. Therefore, at his order, the ABW was sent a document that was supposed to show, among others, that the WSI started obtaining negative data as well. Despite being provided with the information that the WAPC Patria did not meet the basic technical and tactical parameters, the MOD chiefs were supposedly determined to include the Finnish carrier in the Polish Army’s equipment, and the selection of WAPC Patria could not have been made without the knowledge and consent of the Ministry chiefs. In the report for the Minister of National Defense, gen. Dukaczewski reminded Minister Szmajdziński that he regularly provided the Minister with the opinions which contained doubts and objections regarding the WAPC selection. Nonetheless, the Ministry chiefs disregarded the objections concerning the Finnish WAPC.
Minister Szmajdziński maintained that the implementation of Rosomak would be one of the main successes of the Ministry under his management. At the knowledge and consent of the MOD chiefs, the aforesaid undertaking was carried out by the Minister’s subordinated officers, led by the Directors of Weaponry Policy Department, the Procurement Department and the commander of the Army. They performed the tasks they were given (with respect to WAPC ‘ROSOMAK’) through their own subordinates.
In the light of the cited facts, the conduct of the following people meets the disposition contained in Article 70a.1 and 70a.2.2 of the Act on Provisions Implementing the Act on Military Counter-Intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service and the Act on the service of the officers of Military Counter-Intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service, dated June 9, 2006: Brig.Gen. Marek Dukaczewski.
The WSI Chief in the described period was Brig.Gen. Marek Dukaczewski.
Article 5.1 of the Act on the Office of the Minister of National Defense, dated December 14, 1995, contained the regulation stating that the Military Information Services are subordinated directly to that Minister. That regulation was specified in a greater detail in § 1.16 of the Ordinance of the Council of Ministers on the Detailed Scope of Competencies of the Minister of National Defense, dated July 9, 1996. This regulation imposed on the Minister of National Defense the obligation to exercise supervision over the activities of the Military Information Services, including in particular their operational actions and investigations. Pursuant to the Military Information Services Act of July 9, 2003, the supervision over the activities of those services rested with the Minister of National Defense who appointed and dismissed the WSI Chief. By virtue of Article 9.1 of this Act, the WSI Chief was subordinated to the Minister of Defense directly. The Ministers of the National Defense in the described period were: Bronisław Komorowski, Jerzy Szmajdziński.
From the information in the Verification Commission’s possession it can be seen that so far no penal proceedings have been commenced in this case with respect to the WSI soldiers who failed their duty; also the MOD chiefs have not been held liable as appropriate. Thus, the Verification Commission sent a notification of suspicion of a crime to the Supreme Military Prosecutor’s Office, in compliance with Article 304 § 2 of the Code of Penal Procedure. Furthermore, the materials obtained by the Verification Commission can be useful in the penal proceedings already in progress.