5. Surveillance of political environment by the WSI

Submitted by jerzy.targalski on

WSI actively penetrated the political circles, first of all the politicians of the right wing. In spite of manipulating by the WSI the archive documents and falsification of the contents of files of run operational cases, it may be decidedly stated that certain right wing parties were methodically put under surveillance. These were the circles creating or sympathizing with among other Center Agreement, Movement for the Republic of Poland, Movement for Third Republic of Poland and Polish Liberation Party..
The operating actions were organized, oriented to Jarosław and Lech Kaczyński. The objective of these actions was splitting of the Center Agreement, involving its leaders and disintegration of this party. The operation was run from 1990 up to as late as 2001. Already in 1990 Grzegorz Żemek was directed to investigate J. and L. Kaczynski, and particularly intense actions against Centrum Agreement circles were run in 2000-2001, when public TV managed by Robert Kwiatkowski broadcasted the film “Drama in three acts” (WSI officers engaged in surveillance of political party the ‘Porozumienie Centrum’ /’Agreement of the Center’/ at the beginning of the 90-ies, among others Zenon Klamecki, kept the command of the WSI currently informed about their contacts with the authors of the film "Drama in three acts”).

Continuation of practices from the People’s Polish Republic period
The actions relating to these circles prove that the WSI behaved like communist Military Internal Services (WSW), which being so called "political police" in the army, controlled the political views of soldiers and commanding cadre and were fighting their “ideological enemies”.. The activity of this formation was evaluated already at the beginning of the 90-ies by Extraordinary Subcommission for Examination of the Activity of the former Military Internal Services (WSW) of the representative Janusz Okrzesik, After completion of the works in April 1991, this Commission prepared a special Report, in which it indicated, among others, to carrying by Military Internal Services the actions against political opposition. In all the instructions of this service there was a record on fighting hostile political activity.
The tasks of Military Internal Services (WSW) included, among others control of participation of the soldiers in religious practices and listening to Western broadcasting stations and detecting in the army the offences of political character.
WSI acted like Military Police in Polish People’s Republic times

Soldiers being under surveillance
The WSI actions against military associations, postulating the necessity of introducing changes in the army were correlated with the actions against civil persons; there occurred fundamental convergence of operating actions. The actions against the soldiers may be regarded as justified to the extent in which they were carried under statutory frames. The fact that the actions against the soldiers were only a pretext for political parties’ investigation is a characteristic feature of discussed cases. In their active search for information about relations functioning between the Polish Armed Forces officers (e.g. ‘Association of Officers for Changes in the Army’, Association ‘Facta Non Verba’, Association "VIRITIM", the WSI assumed as their operating foundation a thesis that "VIRITIM" is an organization inspired by political circles concentrated around politician representing the government of Jan Olszewski. It leads to the conclusion that the actions of the WSI described herein were aimed at fighting political opponents of the system represented by the WSI. The WSI actions to this extent were carried on supra-ministerial level. After June 4, 1992 the then WSI Chief Bolesław Izydorczyk was regularly sending the findings (including those operational one) relating to military associations, their sympathizers and the former management of the Ministry of Defense, to other governmental authorities. The WSI undertakings were coordinated with the Counter-intelligence Section of the State Security Office (UOP), and the Chief of this department Konstanty Miodowicz applied to the WSI for its assistance in investigation of informal groups acting in the army and their relations with the sections subordinated to Ministry of Internal Affairs.
In handwritten instruction to handle the case dated July 17, 1992 it was ordered "not to establish contact with UOP until the moment of official regulation of cooperation Military Counter-intelligence WSI with UOP". However, it is beyond any doubts, that cooperation between the WSI with Konstanty Miodowicz department was established. It was indicated by the WSI Chief in the letters to the Chief of the National Security Office (BBN) Jerzy Milewski of July 8, 1992 and to Minister of Internal Affairs Andrzej Milczanowski of July 17, 1992.
WSI informed also the Chief Military Prosecutor about the necessity of taking into consideration the fact, that press and radio indicated that the leaflets of the Association "are produced and sent at least with the knowledge of J. PARYS, R. SZEREMIETIEW and R. SIKORSKI".

Political opponent doctrine
There is a wide-ranging convergence in the actions of so called Jan Lesiak (UOP) group with the WSI actions, whereby the military special services have more precisely determined their operating actions and indicated outright whom they perceive as the main opponent for the State structures. This opponent was to be the environment with expressly determined anti-Communist program, both military and civil. According to the WSI, all the circles criticizing the power centers or military special services should be strictly controlled.
These actions were carried from the beginning of system transformations in Poland, and the WSI have worked out a specific doctrine of political opponent, which should be fought, since it is dangerous for State structures. Under the pretext of gathering information on articles appearing in the press, interviews in radio and leaflets critical for the Ministry of National Defense, Polish Armed Forces and the WSI, the information about journalists and politicians was gathered. The object of surveillance were first of all groups, political parties and persons, who demanded carrying de-Communisation and 'lustration' (vetting) in the army, dissolution of Warsaw Pact, accession to NATO etc. Taking issue with the persons disclosing irregularities or remainders of the patronage system of the Polish People’s Republic (called nomenclature) in the army, the WSI acted in favor of keeping communistic influence in the armed forces.
It was regarded that the persons and circles, whose purpose is, among other:
• presentation of the WSI as discredited organization,
• proving that the WSI are related with special services of the former USSR states,
• accuse the WSI of serving in favor of the President and taking issue with the government;
provide information about personal and organizational changes in the WSI should be subject to surveillance
At the beginning of the 90-ies the WSI carried investigation of the circles of officers demanding changes in the Armed Forces, verification of higher commanding cadre, and withdrawal of discredited persons and making the persons liable for political purges from the years of martial law being in force.
Up to now not all of documents were found, and the found files of "Association of Junior Officers. Counter-intelligence Prevention" proved manipulation of the file contents
On March 29, 1991 the Chief of Counter-intelligence Section of Central Institutions at the Ministry of National Defense in internal note to the Deputy Chief of Directorate II of General Staff described the activity of Association in Favor of Transitions in the Army in Warsaw garrison. It contained, among others, the following statements: "Notwithstanding declared lofty purposes, for whose realization the association was established, e.g. promoting patriotism, officer’s honor, the way of recruitment of the members bears the features of conspiracy".
During next months the WSI undertook in-depth operating actions towards these circles. Among others the issue of the authorship of the letters with leaflets sent to military units was explained. The WSI has subject to analysis the leaflet peddled in July 1991 in WAT Military University of Technology, signed by Association ‘Facta’, ‘Non Verba’.

Right-wing parties surveillance
The WSI also carried out operating activities against civil circles. It can be seen from materials being in possession of the Verification Commission that at the beginning of 1990, Col. Henryk Dunal from Directorate II of General Staff instructed Grzegorz Żemek to enter the environment of Kaczynski’s brothers and undertake their investigation. According to these materials the actions undertaken further towards Kaczynski’s brothers and their co-operators have operational character and made an attempt of realization of the task”. The officers related with Żemek were Łada, Żyłowski and Klamecki . This information is important insomuch that the names of the same officers appear at the beginning of the 90-ies in connection with investigation of the ‘Agreement of the Center’ by the WSI. It means that the meetings of the group of officers from the 2nd Directorate of the General Staff carrying the case of Grzegorz Żemek with Maciej Zalewski made part of considerably bigger WSI operation, in connection with Center Agreement surveillance, In summer 1991, Col. Zenon Klamecki initiated a meeting of Lt Col Jerzy Klemba with M. Zaleski. The meeting was held in the cafe at the Grójecka Street. Col. Klemba stated that M. Zalewski had an intention to typify the officers from military special services, who would work in the Office of National Safety. It is reported that two further meetings with M, Zalewski took place soon, first in the Office of National Safety seat, second in the Company "Klif" near Marsa St. After resignation of M. Zalewski from the Office for National Safety these contacts ceased. One of the participants of these meeting, Col. Jerzy Zadora was reported to inform Lt Col Żyłowski about meeting with M. Zalewski. In addition, Col. Zadora stated that about these meeting were informed other higher officers of military special services: "The knowledge of these meeting was not closed in the narrow circle of the 2nd Directorate officers. The interlocutor stated that ‘all chefs knew about them".
According to explanations of Col. Zadora "contacts of the 2nd Directorate officers with persons from ministers, and Mr. Zalewski as such a person, were at that time frequent and natural”. It can be seen from the relation of Col.. Klamecki that he had never met Jaroslaw Kaczyński and Adam Glapiński from the 'Centre Agreement', personally.
It is worth mentioning that Col. Klemba was carrying out intensive business activity from the middle of the 80-ies. In the department under his management the repair services of electronic equipment, in this of radio receivers, were performed, it was also the place in which "Jowisz" TV sets were assembled, and they were two times cheaper compared to prices in shops and the majority of this production was destined to private homes of the chiefs of the 2nd Directorate. At that time, Col. Klemba started to build a house and incurred subsequent credits for this purpose. In order to cover his expenditures he was to establish a commercial company dealing from import of goods from duty-free zones. After leaving the service “he started to move in the then financial circles, having connections with FOZZ ( Foreign Debt Service Fund). One of his acquaintances reported at the beginning of the 90-ies that Klemba "works for Prime Minister [Tadeusz] Mazowiecki and shall be in the team dealing with Polish debt".
More or less at the same time two young WSI officers, Lt. Piotr Polaszczyk and Comdr. K.[name in the files of Verification Commission], established contacts with the circle of civilian politics. In second half 1991 they established contacts with politicians from right wing parties (among others Jan Parys and Jan Olszewski). These contacts might fulfil their role, aiming at determination of attitude of these politicians to any possible changes in the army and in the WSI. The superiors of both officers knew about these meetings. K. submitted reports on meetings with politicians of the right wing to his superior Col. M. Czapliński.
For the first time K. contacted the right wing politicians in autumn 1991, when Lt. Polaszczyk suggested to him participation in the meeting at a social with lawyer Jan Olszewski and doctor Wojciech Włodarczyk. This meeting was a beginning for many other meetings with persons of right political orientation and with church dignitaries. The meeting with J. Parys was held in private flat, but in order to talk with him they went for a walk to park.
Besides J. Parys the following persons participated in the meeting, among others Józef Szaniawski, bishop [of the Roman Catholic Church, and the Chaplain of the Polish Armed Forces] Sławoj Leszek Głódź, Col. Franciszek Sznajder (in K. opinion he was the person who could be the intermediary in establishing contacts with J, Parys), Col. Józef Pawelec (representative to Parliament of the Republic of Poland in the years 1991-1993 and one of the founders of “Viritim” association) and Leszek Moczulski (the meeting with him was organized after election in 1991, in which he was mentioned as a candidate to the position of Minister of National Defense, the initiator of the meeting was Col. Pawelec, and the meeting was held n his house in the place called Nadarzyn [30 kilometers south of Warsaw]).
The object of the conversation were the changes taking place in the country and in the armed forces (including the WSI), the attitude of younger officer cadre to these changes and the atmosphere prevailing among the cadre. K, estimated that contacts of Lt. Polaszczyk with right wing politicians could be inspired by high officers of Military Police command: Col.. Aleksander Lichocki (last chief of Directorate I of Military Police Command) and Col. Marek Wolny (last chief of Section 2 in 3rd Directorate, and earlier the Chief of Section 3 in 1st Directorate I of Military Internal Services command.
According to K. - Lt. Polaszczyk kept at that time frequent contacts with these officers.
In September 1992 K. was called for an inquiry to the officer of the then to Safety Section. Col. Krzysztof Kucharski, to whom he explained and described the details of history of his participation in the meetings with these politicians.

Surveillance of political life in 1992
The WSI noted the cases of sending to military units the letters containing leaflets on enfranchisement of the nomenclature (communist patronage system) in the army and decrepitude of Ministry of National Defense chiefs (J. Onyszkiewicz and B. Komorowski). They wanted to find the authors of the leaflets and organizers of associations presented as acting in the army.
WSI performed among others the analysis of post stamps, run criminal biological examinations of post stamps for presence of saliva of the persons sending the letters, the writing patterns of various typewriters were compared. The copies of documents issued by the servicemen typified as the persons who could participate in the action of sending the letters, were obtained. Also the examples of their handwriting were subject to graphology tests (a decision was made on obtaining the samples of such persons’ handwriting – without their knowledge). A wire-tapping was used for selected numbers. However, none actions were undertaken aimed at explanation of the information presented in the leaflets as regards economic irregularities.
In the memo of June 3, 1992 the Chief of Section of Military Counter-intelligence of Polish Air Forces Col. Andrzej Firewicz wrote that the authors of the leaflets were rather the senior officers from General Staff or from Education Department of the Ministry of National Defense, dissatisfied with their career path in the army, The informants from Military Counter-intelligence indicated that the authors could originate from Pomeranian Military District. A week later Col. Firewicz stated that the letter of the Association of Junior Officers in Favor of Transformations in the Army could “be an attempt of interference of certain political parties into military circles”. The interlocutor of Col. Firewicz indicated that it could be done by such parties as Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN) Polish National Party (PPN), Center Agreement (PC), but "he did not give any hard fact, making a reservation that it is his private estimation, backed however by the declaration of support for Parys and dislike to Komorowski and Onyszkiewicz".
More detailed information was in the possession of the Warsaw WSI Section. The Chief of Capital City WSI Section Lt Col Jerzy Drąg informed that the inspirers of the action of sending the letters were typified in result of operation and that they were expected to be subject to operational control . Another part of this memo proves that the Ministry of National Defense management from the times of J. Olszewski government was surveillanced: “On the grounds of possessed operating data the following persons are named, among others, as the inspirers of political actions in the matter under consideration: Jan Parys, Romuald Szeremietiew, Radosław Sikorski, gen. Marian Sobolewski and other officers of the Polish Army directly related or sympathizing mainly with the Association "VIRITIM", KPN, PPN”
A decision was made on using special undertakings towards typified persons, and their "control of HUMINT source" was organized”. However, there are no reports issued by the WSI informants in the files. We should take notice of the fact that the actions aimed at identifying the organizers were carried by various groups of the WSI, which did not exchange their findings between them.
In that time the WSI monitored also the activity of other civil circles, In "monthly information relating to aspects forming the counter-intelligence situation" for May 1992, Section 4 WSI draw attention to the mass meeting of the Independent Alliance of Małopolska ('Niepodległościowy Sojusz Małopolski'), Fighting Youth Federation ('Federacja Młodzieży Walczącej'), “Solidarność ‘80” and 'Liberty Party' (Partia Wolności) taking place in Krakow on the occasion of the anniversary of 3rd May Constitution passage. During the meeting, the establishment of National Guard was announced among other, “an independent military organization, composed of young people, not having relations with the former Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR)”, The initiator of this undertaking was Krzysztof Kopeć from KPN. WSI received information about the organizational meeting of this formation, which were held on May 15 and 18 in the seat of Fighting Youth Federation. The WSI suspected that the organizers were recruiting volunteers to fights in Yugoslavia (according to the WSI in April 1992. Krzysztof Kopeć and Wojciech Polaczek placed the posters in Krakow, on which they informed about the fights of so called "Legion Polski" (Polish Legion) in the former Yugoslavia and postulated the fights “with the remainders of communism in Poland”), but both activists denied to have run the recruitment posts.
In June the WSI did not hide their disquiet with publishing an article in "Gazeta Krakowska" ('Gazette of Krakow'), which was a briefing for the persons refusing to undergo the military service. The churches in Nowa Huta (close to Krakow) and posts of Krakow anarchistic organizations rendered their assistance in writing applications for military service postponing. One month later an event of distribution of leaflets of "Wolność i Pokój" ('Freedom and Peace') organization was noted in Warsaw.

The Investigation of Bronisław Komorowski

Surveillance of the Mass Media
Most operational cases related to opposition politicians were always run by the same group of the WSI (Military Information Services – MIS) officers. In other words, in the military secret service’s structures there was a specialized group of officers whose task was to collect information about the WSI soldiers’ contacts with the journalists, publishers and politicians’ circles. Those cases were under personal supervision of Col. Lucjan Jaworski, then the Chief of the Third Directorate of the WSI. The group of people who run or approved the actions undertaken in those cases included inter alia: Lt Col Ryszard Lonca, Col. Janusz Bogusz, Col. R. Bocianowski, Col. Krzysztof Kucharski and Maj. Niedziałkowski. The person who was the most engaged in running the cases related to politicians (or carried out those cases directly himself) was Lt Col Ryszard Lonca. The decisions of instigation in cases then started were supposedly taken by the WSI Chief, Gen. Bolesław Izydorczyk.
Under the pretences of cover for specific institutions or people, information was collected that was intended to harm and compromise them. As early as August 11, 1992, the case code-named “WYDAWCA” (PUBLISHER) was instigated. Here the case officer was Lt Col. Ryszard Lonca as well. The main goal was to identify the true authors of press articles of 1992, which contained critical information about the WSI. Determining the information sources of those authors was also included. In particular, the following articles were indicated: “Telepatia w wojskowej dyplomacji (Telepathy in Military Diplomacy)” (“Nowy Świat”, ['New World', daily] of April 24, 1992), “Oficerowie Dwójki odchodzą z pracy (Officers of the 2nd Directorate Leave Their Jobs)” (“Ekspres Wieczorny”, ['Evening Express', daily] of June 20, 1992) and “Wojskowy wywiad PRL (Military Intelligence in People’s Republic of Poland)” (“Honor i Ojczyzna” ['Honor and Fatherland' magazine).
In the opinion of Col. Lonca, those texts slandered the WSI and proved that their authors may have information sources within the WSI.
Col. R. Lonca made an interesting conclusion, stating that by creating a dark picture of the WSI, the authors “demand changes using the slogan of de-communization of the service”. He assessed that the information for “the extreme rightist groups” should be cut off. He ordered operating activities to be undertaken in order, inter alia, to identify “magazines’ editorial teams and political groups which try to obtain restricted information about the WSI with the aim of compromising this service”. His operational interest focused mostly on the circles associated with “MYŚL” (THOUGHT) Foundation and its publication, “Honor i Ojczyzna” as well as on the circles around “VIRITIM”.
Among the people about who the WSI was actively collection information were, inter alia, Janusz Szpotański as well as Janina Łukasik-Mikłasz and Paweł Mikłasz from the “Myśl” ['Thoughts'] Foundation, Józef (sometimes incorrectly named in the files as Jerzy) Szaniawski and Lt. Col. (Reserve) Stanisław Dronicz. The WSI’s sphere of interest extended also to the supporters and members of “VIRITIM” (among them: Czesław Bielecki, Wojciech Bogaczyk, Henryk Czarnecki, Col. (Reserve) Ryszard Dorf, Cpt. Damian Jakubowski, Romuald Szeremietiew [in the future Deputy Minister of Defense] and Piotr Woyciechowski). This interest went beyond the usual framework of counter-intelligence cover of the Polish Army. In the case of Paweł Mikłasz and Janusz Szpotański, the case files preserved the inquires of Unit 4 of the WSI (the so-called E-15) addressed to Section 2 of the Registry and Archive Office of UOP (State Security Office). The indicated reason of inquiry was “before investigation”.. The measures taken in the course of the case were aimed at operational access to those people.
In the course of further actions, the person of Col. Jan Bąk from the15th Directorate of the General Staff was selected as a person, who being associated with Minister J. Parys team could provide information about the WSI. According to the case officers, Col. Bąk, who served in the past in a radio-electronic surveillance unit in the town of Przasnysz, knew about that unit’s participation in the investigation of political opposition circles before 1989, and as a person associated with the “Honor i Ojczyzna” editorial team, could be interested in providing such information to those circles. This information, however, has not been confirmed in the course of the case. Next, the authorship of the articles about the WSI was attributed to Jerzy [correctly: Józef] Szaniawski who, according to the case officers, was associated with J. Parys and had contacts with military circles gathered in “VIRITIM” (among them with the editor-in-chief of “Honor Ojczyzna” Lt. Col. S. Dronicz, Lt. Col. Grudniewski and Col. Mańka). In order to verify this, an active investigation was launched with respect to the editorial team of “Honor i Ojczyzna” magazine. The “WYDAWCA” case files preserved the notes about, the “Myśl” Foundation – its economic profile, organization chart, local branches and accommodation conditions were described; there were also mentions of financial problems, information about the local space plan and the facts that the editorial office was equipped with telephones, an alarm system and hardware, that the secretary had a notepad (this was indicated to be an important piece of information) and that there was some financing from the veterans resident in the UK.
Despite the evident manipulation with the content of “WYDAWCA” file, there is still proof that the WSI conducted covert (inspirational) actions. On one of the notes, Col. J. Bogusz made a hand-written annotation: “On Oct. 3, 1992, I informed the WSI Chief about the interest of Mr. Krzemień, a journalist, in the attaches’ offices. Col. Izydorczyk agreed to the proposed concept of dangling Mr. "K" a WSI officer. The details are to be discussed.”

Case Code-named “SZPAK” [‘STARLING’]
In 1992 - in the framework of Operational Investigation Case (SOR) code-named “SZPAK” [a bird name, Sikorski’s last name is made of ‘sikorka’, a blue tit] – a detailed investigation of the Deputy Minister of National Defense, Radoslaw Sikorski, started as well. The exact date of commencement of SOR “SZPAK” is not known. The adopted reason for the commencement of SOR “SZPAK” was the fact that R. Sikorski was “engaged in political activities of groups which were aimed at weakening the structure and cohesion of the military and erosion of the authority of the Supreme Commander and the MOD leadership. In the perspective of subordination of the Army to the specific political goals, “Szpak” [i.e. Radoslaw Sikorski] is particularly fierce in his attacks at the Military Information Services, questioning their goals and tasks; he wanted to paralyze the WSI activities.”
The SOR “SZPAK” was also assigned to Col. Lonca to run; he was supervised by Col. Lucjan Jaworski and Col. Janusz Bogusz. According to Col. Lonca’s explanations, he was supposedly ordered to run SOR “SZPAK” by the WSI Chief himself, Gen. Izydorczyk, besides Col. Lonca was supposedly only continuing a case that had already been in progress.
In the course of the case, actions were taken to “inspire” the press articles which would show Sikorski in a negative light, in particular in his capacity of the Deputy Minister of National Defense in Jan Olszewski’s cabinet. One of the persons inspired by the WSI, was a journalist of “Gazeta Wyborcza” [biggest daily in Poland, left-wing, post-Communist, anti-vetting], Edward Krzemień. It is possible that in the course of SOR “SZPAK” the WSI themselves could have created the negative image of the figurehead (i.e. Deputy Minister Sikorski) by disclosing and publicizing some discrediting events he had participated in.

Case Code-named “PACZKA” (PARCEL)
At the beginning of March 1993, the case code-named “PACZKA” was started, where the main figurehead was Cpt. Piotr Polaszczyk (the same who in 1991 was establishing contacts with right-wing politicians). At the turn of 1992 and 1993, he started operating in car business, where he co-operated inter alia with 'Polmot Trading' Company.
In the course of this case, the WSI also dealt with the “Pro Civili” Foundation (established with the participation of inter alia Austria’s citizens: Manfred Hollestschek and Anton Kasco), which was to support former state officials and officers. Among those associated with the foundation was also Cpt. P. Polaszczyk whose wife held the function of the Director General of the Foundation. The members of the Foundation’s Council were [sic – so in the original, this lapsus made a lot of comments in part of Polish Press], among others, Janusz Maksymiuk. The Foundation was ultimately taken over by the WSI officers (among them Col. Marek Wolny) and became part of the network of companies, which exploited the Military Technical Academy (WAT).
With the lapse of time, the investigation of “economic activities” of Cpt. P. Polaszczyk ceased to be the fundamental purpose of the case. The case officer became interested mainly in the figurehead’s contacts with political circles, in particular with the politicians from J. Olszewski’s cabinet. Among others, the operational investigation has been conducted with respect to the contacts of Cpt. Polaszczyk with the former minister J. Parys, who at that time was the head of the “Mercury” Hotel in Warsaw and gathered a group of right-wing politicians around him, organizing political meetings at his place. The politician’s meetings in the ”Mercury” Hotel were under operational monitoring (static surveillance). Information was also actively gathered about E. Małecki (former mayor of Warszawa-Praga District and later the Chairman of “Pro Civili” Foundation), Member of Parliament Mariusz Marasek, Witold Nieduszyński (one of the creators of Christian Social Movement), Józef Szaniawski and Paweł Rabiej, the last two being journalists. In the course of further actions, the links of Cpt. Polaszczyk with the right-wing circles were investigated through HUMINT sources (“PACZKA-2” and “PACZKA-3”). At the end of the case, the thread related to Cpt. Polaszczyk’s contacts with right-wing circles and investigation of those circles constituted the dominant thread. The documentation of “PACZKA” case is, however, incomplete as it contains almost exclusively the documents produced in 1995, though, as it has been mentioned, the case was supposedly conducted till February 2000.

Surveillance of the Critics of Post-Communists and Russia
The WSI was also investigated the journalists’ circles in connection with the “Odezwa” (Appeal) of January 1995, where the authors alarmed the public opinion in writing about the political exploitation of Polish Armed Forces and military secret services by the President of the Republic of Poland at that time, Lech Wałęsa, with the purpose of the alleged coup d’etat he had been supposedly preparing for. In order to find the authors of “Odezwa”, the styles of the articles about the WSI, published in the press, and the leaflet of Stowarzyszenie Oficerów Młodszych na Rzecz Przemian w Wojsku (‘Association of Junior Officers for Changes in the Military’), distributed in May 1992, were compared. Lt. Col. Lonca assessed that the style of “Odezwa” [‘Proclamation’] indicated:
- hostility to the ‘Belweder’ [Palace; then site of President Lech Walesa],
- the authors are associated with the right-wing groups, hostile against UOP which was surveilling them,
- they have negative attitude to the post-communist groups, are hostile to Russia,
- negative attitude to the clergy, that they indoctrinate the faithful,
- the authors indicated that they represented the WSI.
On that basis, R. Lonca marked out that the authors of the aforementioned “Odezwa” should be sought in the circles tied to the former Minister Jan Parys. In his memo, Lonca also pointed to specific individuals (“a part of that group, known to us, consists of”), including, next to J. Parys, Col. Władysław correct name Franciszek – Verification Commission’s note] Sznajder from the Central Planning Office (CUP), Józef Szaniawski, Paweł Rabiej and Cpt. Piotr Polaszczyk, the latter characterized with the words “our officer” (it should be reminded here that at the beginning of 1991, P. Polaszczyk established contact with J. Parys, J. Olszewski and L. Kaczyński).
The alleged authors of “Odezwa” were to be verified operationally (also in the context of their contacts with Cpt. Polaszczyk – Lt. Col. Lonca’s memo). The case was given “urgent priority”, such an instruction was signed by Col. R. Bocianowski, and the alleged authors were covered by the operational activities. Aside from the active gathering of information, the active penetration of the authors’ circles was conducted with the use of HUMINT sources, among whom there was a source named “REDAKTOR” (EDITOR) who had direct contact with Józef [sometimes erroneously referred to in the WSI documents as Jerzy] Szaniawski.

Investigation of Bronisław Komorowski
The WSI have also investigated the political circles around Bronisław Komorowski. The pretext for this kind of interference was his contact with Janusz Paluch. However, the military services collected information that decidedly goes beyond the scope of their competence. The pretext for this type of activities supposedly consisted of the prevention of interference of foreign intelligence, but the obtained information could have been used to excerpt pressure on the afore-named people.
In 1993, the WSI counter-intelligence obtained, through a collaborator named “TOMASZEWSKI” [cryptic name for secret collaborator], the information that a French citizen Julien Demol tried to reach people from the state administration (Deputy Minister Bronisław Komorowski, Maciej Rayzacher, Jerzy Milewski) and senior officers of the Polish Armed Forces (Gen. Leon Komornicki, Gen. Zalewski, Gen. Roman Pusiak, Gen. Zenon Bryk). The WSI and the UOP assessed that there were clues pointing to J. Demol’s connections with foreign intelligence. The documents do not give evidence whether the representatives of the administration and the military were warned about the possibility that J. Demol worked for foreign intelligence. This situation was used by the WSI as the pretext to start investigation of Bronisław Komorowski and Maciej Rayzacher. In the course of the operation, the WSI gathered inter alia Rayzacher’s profile and information about Komorowski’s stay in the internment camp in Oleszno. In the course of that investigation Cpt. Piotr Lenart questioned the collaborator “TOMASZEWSKI” inter alia about the circumstances in which he had met Komorowski and about the events from the internment times. Those actions were undertaken even though the collaborator “TOMASZEWSKI” emphasized that he did not want to take part in investigating the politicians. The services were also interested in the financial contacts of Komorowski and Rayzacher with Janusz Paluch, who conducted so-called “para-banking activities”. Komorowski, Rayzacher and Benedyk supposedly invested 260 thousand DEMs in Paluch’s undertaking. Col. Janusz Paluch operated among officers and one of his intermediaries in deposits was Lt. Col. Janusz Rudziński. After Paluch went bankrupt (in the spring 1992), the collaborator “TOMASZEWSKI”, Bronisław Komorowski and Maciej Rayzacher wanted to recover the invested money through the investigation agencies they hired, but those agencies quickly withdrew from the contract, in fear of Paluch’s political connections. It was suggested to Komorowski that the WSI’s counter-intelligence could help in recovering the money as they helped other senior officers of the Polish Armed Forces who had been deceived. “TOMASZEWSKI” maintained that the funds collected unofficially by Paluch could have been used to finance the election office of Lech Wałęsa or a candidate he supported. During the period of his problems with the police, Paluch hid in the flat of Wachowski’s [friend of L. Walesa; former car driver and minister] sister in the town of Bydgoszcz and in November 1994 he offered joint business to “TOMASZEWSKI”.
Only on May 22, 1995, the Chief of the WSI, Gen. Konstanty Malejczyk, notified the Chief of General Staff, Gen. Tadeusz Wilecki, that J. Demol operations posed a threat to the defensive capabilities and the State Treasury of the Republic of Poland. Following this, it was decided to notify the senior commanders about J. Demol’s activities and warn them against keeping contact with him. We do not know anything about the fate of the criminal operations of J. Paluch and the officers of Polish Armed Forces who were associated with him and were identified by the WSI.

Radio Surveillance of the “Drawsko Dinner”
The WSI controlled the activities of senior representatives of the administration to the extent of eavesdropping their conversations. A clear example is the so-called Drawsko Dinner.
On September 30, 1994, the soldiers of the Radioelectronic Unit of the WSI recorded the conversations held by Gen. Tadeusz Wilecki and gen. Konstanty Malejczyk with the UOP Chief Gen. Gromosław Czempiński and the conversation of the Deputy Minister of National Defense Jan Kuriata with Gen. Henryk Mika. The conversations concerned the performed contract of the sale of 62 APCs BWP-2 to Angola. The observers immediately reported the course of those conversations to their superiors.. At the superiors’ order, the tape with the recording was secured and the content was written down, but it did not receive the required secret clause. The Chief of Radioelectronic Unit of the WSI conveyed the tape with the recording to the Deputy Chief of Counter-Intelligence Directorate, who in turn conveyed it to his superior, Comdr. Kazimierz Głowacki. The latter presented the materials to the then chief of MOD, Piotr Kołodziejczyk. The minister returned the document to Comdr. Głowacki, who in undetermined circumstances, lost it.
On June 16, 1995, the Chief of the National Security Office (BBN), Henryk Goryszewski, turned to the Minister of Justice with a request to instigate penal proceedings against persons responsible for eavesdropping the telephone calls made by senior state officials at the military training and proving grounds in Drawsko Pomorskie. In August 1995, the Prosecutor’s Office of the Warsaw Military District refused to instigate the initial proceedings in this case. As the grounds for its decisions, the Prosecutor’s Office stated that the WSI did not violate the law because they conducted open “radio surveillance”, and not “eavesdropping”.

The Matter of Contacts with “NIE” Weekly
Compared to the broad operational activities against the right-wing politicians and the officers who postulated changes in the military, the reaction of the WSI command to the information about leaks to “NIE” weekly was modest. At the beginning of 1992, the Counter-Intelligence Directorate of UOP notified the Chief of Counter-Intelligence Directorate of the WSI, Col. Lt Jaworski, about the contacts some soldiers had with “NIE” [post-Communist, pro-China & pro-Russian] weekly magazine. Those were: Col. J.Cz., Warrant Officer Z.G., Lt. Col. Z.K. from the military communications services command, Lt. Col. M.S., Col. W.R. (member of the editorial teams of military broadcasts in Polskie Radio /'Polish Radio', public/), Maj. (Reserve) C.R. and Lt. Col. L.Z.
The actions taken by the WSI prove that those soldiers were under protection of their superiors. Despite the information indicating the possible leak, no standard action was taken. There were only some simulated actions, but even that limited undertaking was abandoned later.
The manual notes on the documents show that Col. Lt Jaworski ordered to determine the sources of information leak to “NIE”. On the report, the Deputy Chief of the WSI, Comdr. Kazimierz Głowacki, requested that the legal state be verified (whether a soldier’s contact with “NIE”, as described by UOP, is forbidden?), the conveyed facts confirmed and the report on conclusions made. The files also preserved a report for minister Jan Parys, signed by the WSI Chief Czesław Wawrzyniak, about the soldiers’ contacts with “NIE” weekly. The handwritten note at the end of the document shows that the copy No. 1 was destroyed, and the report itself was made against the position taken by the 3rd Directorate. It was probably never presented to the MOD chief. The files are missing the motions for instigation of operational case, there are only pages with inquiry to the Records of the 3rd Directorate of the WSI.
Contrary to the operational cases conducted against the members of the military who postulated the need to conduct the “de-communization”, the WSI took an indulgent and tolerant stand towards the soldiers who had contacts with Jerzy Urban’s weekly, which proves that the actions in this case were simulated.

The WSI Operations against Left-Wing Politicians
A similarly dismissive approach was adopted by the WSI with respect to the signals about possible crimes committed by the post-communists. Although such information about the politicians from these circles was gathered, but in these cases the military services were very abstemious. That information was never used by the WSI to start any operational cases. There were also no documents preserved which would prove that the signals about possible crimes were conveyed to those persons’ superiors or to the prosecutor’s office, to civil special services or to the ministers in charge of a given domain. Contrary to the cases involving right-wing politicians, here the occurrence of an event was only recorded. This could mean that either the military services were directed to investigate and only gather information about one political group, which posed a serious threat to the existing post-communist line-up, or the WSI were in fact an autonomous entity striving for control over social, economic and political reality regardless of underlying ideas.
There is a fact that speaks in favor of the second option, namely the fact that the WSI undertook the operational activities and investigations against SLD politicians as well. According to the information contained in the memo from the meeting with secret collaborator Wojciech M., numerous left-wing politicians were also involved in the illegal trade in arms and fissile materials at the beginning.
The WSI tried to gather materials against the President of the Republic of Poland, Aleksander Kwaśniewski. The Verification Commission found the documents discussing the case of alleged acceptance of a one million USDollars check for Jolanta Kwaśniewska’s Foundation. The operations of the WSI against President Kwaśniewski resulted from the involvement of some WSI officers in the competition of foreign companies on the Polish alcohol market. Lt Col M. Tryliński supported the interests of a French company EURO-AGRO (his brother companies), which tried to take over the profits from production and the sale of products of Zakłady POLMOS in Żyrardów. The competitor of the French company was the American company Philips Millenium Beverage, owned by G. Philips; the representative of that company had ties with UOP. In 1996, the American company took over the distribution of the products of Żyrardów-based POLMOS on the world alcohol market and could have earned great profits on this activity. Obviously there was a conflict between the WSI and UOP, based on their support of the companies, which competed to take over Żyrardów-based POLMOS: EURO-AGRO and Philips Millenium Beverage. The conflict of interest between UOP and WSI was called by the Polish media “the alcohol war”.

The Case of Jerzy Szmajdziński
The asymmetry in the approach to the assessment of intelligence threats related to the activities of the political world is visible also in yet another example.
The WSI received information about the Polish visits of a certain Russian, Valerij Topalov, and his contacts with the MOD, Jerzy Szmajdziński. In the 80-ties, Topalov was the head of 'Komsomol' in the Northern Army Group of the Russian Army and (according to the WSI’s sources) a special service agent, probably in GRU. He stayed, among others, in Świdnica, where he officially occupied himself with youth’s affairs. After his return to the USSR, he supposedly headed the security of the nuclear power plant in Chernobyl. After retirement to the reserve, he established contact with a youth activist from the National People’s Army (of the former East Germany - NAL), Manfred Marko, a graduate from an academy in the USSR and later an employee of the Main Political Directorate in NAL and military special services. They were to set up a company, which would intermediate in medicine trade.
On this occasion, the WSI gathered information about other Russians, among them a certain A. Oskin. It was a general opinion that Topalov and Oskin worked for the Soviet special services. Both Russians often visited the Main Political Directorate of the Polish People’s Armed Forces, where they could review the documents concerning the situation and moods in the Polish Armed Forces. They used those documents in a separate room, which they locked for the time of their work. Their guardian was Col. Tadeusz Rzepecki who also organized similar meetings with Gen. Jaruzelski. The WSI also obtained information that during his stay in Poland around 2000/2001, Topalov paid a visit in the Sejm [Poland’s Lower Chamber of Parliament], where he talked to several MPs about economic undertakings. Oskin stayed in Poland several times as well and supposedly contacted Leszek Miller’s “people” at that time. Oskin’s known contacts included, among others, Jarosław Pachowski, head of Polkomtel Company and Waldemar Świgoń, former Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Poland - PZPR.
On the basis of the collected information, the WSI officer stated that:
1. The Russian are using their contacts in the Republic of Poland to carry out economic undertakings.
2. The economic activities are only the ‘legend’ for intelligence activities, which at their current state can consist of restoration of “old contacts” with people who presently occupy prominent political and administrative positions.”
After subsequent information about Topalov’s Polish contacts, the WSI officer again pointed to the existence of a real intelligence danger: “For the present findings it shows that the Russians, in the past identified as members of KGB staff, use the contacts established in the youth activists circles to conduct business activities. Considering the conclusions from the investigation of Russian intelligence activity, it cannot be ruled out that the business is only a cover for their special services.”
Those conclusions are important in the light of other documents. Namely, the WSI obtained the information that Topalov arrived to Poland at the invitation of Jan Chaładaj, vice-president of the company called ‘Kolmex’. One of the objectives of the Russian’s visit in Poland was to prepare the contracts for the delivery of railway cars to Afghanistan, which was to be carried out by the ‘Kolmex’. In Poland the Russian inquired about the officers he met during his stay in Poland, among them, about Col. Tadeusz Rzepecki. According to the information obtained by the WSI, Topalov was a guest of minister Szmajdziński during the celebration of his 50th birthday. During the party, Minister Szmajdziński supposedly talked to Topalov “face to face” for a dozen minutes. The entry to the Sejm Topalov owned to Chaładaj; later he moved around the building on his own. The WSI also obtained detailed information about Topalov’s business intentions. News reached the WSI about the planned visit of the 'Machinoexport' Company delegation in Poland. The Russians were probably to meet the Mr. Janas, MP: “The subject of the talks will be the matter of business activities in the territory of the Republic of Poland, also with regard to the military. The current project involves the purchase of the ‘ZNTK’ plant in the town Jelenia Góra and production of railway tank cars (about 6 thousand pieces for the Eastern market, also including Afghanistan). The foregoing enterprise is to be carried out with the participation of: Kolmex, Manfred Marko, the ‘ZASTA’ company from Słupsk, for the inclusion of which the MP Sieńko from SLD [post-Communist, strong party in present-day Poland], Deputy Chairman of the Sejm’s Committee of National Defense, strongly opts – Machinoexport”. The WSI obtained the information that “the organizers of the undertaking (Pertek, Ciereszko and Sieńko, MP) are to receive about 5% commission on the value of the concluded contract”.
According to another document, “the undertaking was accepted by the Minister of National Defense who supposedly has personal contact with Valerij Topalov (meeting during the celebration of 50th birthday of J. Szmajdziński)”. The fact that next to that text was a note that read “inf. 100%” proves that the WSI deemed that information as very reliable. In addition, the WSI were aware of the fact that contacts with Topalov create a “serious threat” for Minister Szmajdziński: “It cannot be ruled out that the activity of the Russians in the territory of Poland is unofficially inspired by the Russian special service. This is indicated inter alia by the interest Valerij T. has in military circles. This creates a serious threat both for the Minister of National Defense (possible use against him in propaganda) and for the foreign affairs of the Republic of Poland.”
Despite drawing such far-reaching conclusions from the possessed information, no action was taken in this case to provide effective counter-intelligence guard for the people who, as the WSI pointed out, “occupied prominent political and administrative positions”.
To recapitulate: in the WSI’s assessment, the right-wing circles were considered the extreme part of the Polish political scene. The services suggested that this was the direction from which the threats for the state security should be expected. Creation of such a diagnosis by the WSI resulted in fact from the intention to protect the WSI’s own interests and had no relation whatsoever to the real security of the State and the Polish Army.
The basic goal of such misinformation was that the WSI obtained “the political consent” for more active investigation of right-wing circles that had been deemed “hostile”.. As the reason for commencement of the aforementioned operational cases (“APEL”, “PACZKA”, “SZPAK”, “WYDAWCA”) the critical approach of then oppositionist circles to the WSI, their negative attitude to post-communist groups and Russia and their aversion to the Belweder’s policy were indicated. At the same time, the WSI officers who were trained in GRU or KGB could work in the service would any major obstacles, even more – it was them who headed the service and indicated the directions of its operations. In this context, the leniency that the WSI showed to post-communist circles and to the soldiers who contacted those circles is even more striking. Although such information was gathered, but generally speaking, it did not incline the WSI to start operational cases. The information about crimes was not conveyed to other state authorities either. Thus, a thesis can be proposed with a considerable certainty that the military services were directed to investigate the pro-independence right-wing circles.
In the light of the cited facts, the conduct of the following people meets the disposition contained in Article 70a.1 and 70a.2.2 of the Act on Provisions Implementing the Act on Military Counter-Intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service and the Act on the service of the officers of Military Counter-Intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service, dated June 9, 2006: Brig.Gen. Bolesław Izydorczyk, Col. Zenon Klamecki, Col. Lucjan Jaworski, Col. Ryszard Lonca, Col. Henryk Dunal, Col. Zdzisław Żyłowski, Col. Jerzy Zadora, Col. Marek Czapliński, Col. Aleksander Lichocki, Col. Marek Wolny, Col. Krzysztof Kucharski, Col. Andrzej Firewicz, Col. Janusz Bogusz, Col. Ryszard Bocianowski, Comdr. Kazimierz Głowacki, Lt. Col. Jerzy Klemba, Lt. Col. Mieczysław Tryliński, Maj. Niedziałkowski, Lt. Piotr Polaszczyk.
The WSI Chiefs in the described period were: Rear-Admiral. Czesław Wawrzyniak, Brig. Gen. Bolesław Izydorczyk, Brig. Gen. Konstanty Malejczyk.
Article 5.1 of the Act on the Office of the Minister of National Defense, dated December 14, 1995, contained the regulation stating that the Military Information Services are subordinated directly to that Minister. This regulation was specified in a greater detail in § 1.16 of the Ordinance of the Council of Ministers on the Detailed Scope of Competencies of the Minister of National Defense, dated July 9, 1996. This regulation imposed on the Minister of National Defense the obligation to exercise supervision over the activities of the Military Information Services, including in particular their operational actions and investigations. Pursuant to the Military Information Services Act of July 9, 2003, the supervision over the activities of those services rested with the Minister of National Defense who appointed and dismissed the WSI Chief. By virtue of Article 9.1 of this Act, the WSI Chief was subordinated directly to the Minister of Defense. The Ministers of National Defense in the described period were: Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Piotr Kołodziejczyk, Zbigniew Okoński and Stanisław Dobrzański.
The facts cited in this chapter bring doubts as to the legality of conduct of the WSI soldiers; thus, the Verification Commission sent a notification of suspected crime to the Supreme Military Prosecutor’s Office, in compliance with Article 304 § 2 of the Code of Penal Procedure.