4. WSI use of the ‘Security Service’ apparatus – case study

The WSI used negatively verified apparatus of communist Security Service (Służba Bezpieczeństwa – SB) for the organization of its non-central structures. An example of such illegal action was establishing in Bielsko-Biała in half 90-ies a secret field residency under the case code-named "O".
This case was run from October 10, 1994 to September 25, 1996. Dynamically developed in the first period (autumn 1994 – spring 1995), it was later inhibited, which probably may be appropriated to the changes in the cadre employed in the WSI.
Two documents remained from this period. The first one (dated November 30, 1995) is a collection of opinions expressed in military circles, and as M. Wolny added, this was realization of the WSI Chief task. Another (dated April 16, 2004 related to business environment invited to "Bal Orła Białego" [‘White Eagle Ball; the white eagle is located on Polish flag] in Vienna. In this information such names as Kuna, Żagiel and Wiatr are mentioned, representing among others the companies BILLA or SLAVIK. The fact of involvement of these persons in the trade in arms with the states of former Yugoslavia was also noted. Information came from Piotr Wawrzyczek (the partner of S. Zasada [former racing car driver, industrialist in automotive industry in Poland]) and it was received indirectly by source code-named "GRAŻYNA". This signalizes the tendency of keeping the activity of established informants’ structure.
The plan initiating the files under code name "O" indicates to the necessity of building a counter-intelligence security system in the area of Bielsko-Biała Province with use of negatively verified former officers of SB [Communist’s Security Service in Poland] and their human sources. This activity was to be carried under cover as guard security Company by the name: "Komandos" [‘Special Service Soldier’, Commando]. The residency was to be composed of three former SB agents, who were expected to re-recruit the former agents and secret SB collaborators in the circles being of interest for the WSI, in Poland and abroad. It was planned to re-establish contacts with former employees placed in journalists’ circles, being officers of governmental administration, acting in business, occupying management positions and persons associated with special services and the army. It was also planned to recruit 8-10 former secret collaborates per one residency member. In addition, the plans assumed that the chief of residency (negatively verified), the former employee of SB shall be provided with recommending document addressed to Police and Border Guard authorities, inducing the chiefs of the local Ministry of Internal Affairs authorities to render their assistance. The remuneration for the residents was to be PLN 4-5 mln (in "old" PLN; [10,000 zlotys = 1 US Dollar]) per month. Col. Marek Wolny and Lt Col Jan Węgierski were appointed as liaison officers for the residency. The contacts of residency with open field procedures of the WSI Counter-intelligence were excluded. It was a procedure enabling conspiracy of actions, causing at the same time that the structure was not subordinated to any supervision, neither content-related, nor financial one.
Three former SB agents were engaged to the actions, which were recruited to cooperation as residents with the following pseudonyms "RYSZARD JAWORSKI", "WŁADYSŁAW KWOCZAK" and "JAN MICHNA"
Most probably they were the former agents from Section III and V of SB from the District Internal Affair Office (RUSW) in Cieszyn [on the border with the Czech Republic]. Detailed relation about personal information sources, carried in the area under their control in the 80-ies were taken from them. A list of over 100 names were issued (though in the files it is incomplete, which is confirmed by the selection of documents included in the files). It can not be excluded that the persons who were not found in the files of the case have later realized undertakings breaching the law to such extent that the persons carrying the matter did not take a risk to document them.
Then, double-track actions were carried. Typified names were checked in the operating records of UOP getting the confirmation, which reminded registration and the possibility of insight into the materials. Certain persons were subject to investigation through carrying interviews with people from their close environment, and the interviews with the persons concerned were undertaken.
On the grounds of documents kept in files "O" it is possible to reproduce the eligibility criteria for the agents. The persons sought by the services:
• had to pass the verification (in case of agents) and
• should have negative attitude to the governments of the Republic of Poland after 1989,
• should be interested in joining newly established services,
• should evaluate the reality before 1989 as organized and see the reason for growth in criminality and various social pathologies in democracy.
Therefore the sought persons should be truly dedicated to communistic state structures, and in view of their placement should be ready to co-operate and at the same time be prone to manipulation.
An example of such approach is the activity of former SB agent aka, "JANUSZ OKRZESIK" [cryptic name for secret collaborator], who before his recruitment had disclosed, that he possessed hidden materials from the case run in the time, when he served in SB (the case had code name "PALESTRA" [= ‘BAR’, understood as a corporation of lawyers], and it may be concluded from the orientation of the functionary that it could be bound with juridical circles from Bielsko-Biała region). He delivered approximately 300 pages of these materials to the WSI. They contained among others the facts discrediting the persons from juridical circles, indicated to secret collaborators in this environment (e.g. prosecutor, judge, and notary). M. Wolny and K. Głowacki were informed about hiding the material and about their contents. Another SB agent aka "WLADYSŁAW KORCZAK" indicated to his sources, which were recruited in order to investigate the structures of NSZZ "Solidarność". The Commission did not yet establish what happened to these materials. From the way of the WSI activity, analyzed so far it may be concluded that they were used either for blackmailing of the persons appearing therein, or as a pretext for their re-investigation and re-recruitment. Meanwhile, it was the WSI's duty to transfer the files of the "PALESTRA" case to the Institute of National Remembrance.
Information gathered by the residency related to:
• Foundation "V", whose secretary is the former employee of the apparatus of Polish United Worker’s Party (PZPR) and SB agent (until the moment of liquidation of these services).
• Russian Company "N" trading in lentex;
• Plant "W" processing the scrap non-iron metals;
• The Company "I", trading in agricultural and food products, non-ferrous metals and offering consultancy services in the field of fire protection.

This makes it possible to explain why the residency activity could not bring any intelligence or counter-intelligence effects. It is difficult to find in the activity of the above-mentioned companies any elements associated with State safety in the sphere of defense. The fundamental objective of this residency action was different, therefore it is no wonder that it was not expressed in the documentation outright. This fact is confirmed by:
1. the tendency in typifying and verification of agents – persons typified for in-depth verifications in the State Security Office (UOP) had neither the competencies related to state safety, particularly in the aspect of armed forces (actor, politician, tradesman), nor the required possibilities (e.g. year of birth 1920);
2. absence of any presumptions which could indicate to running the work in order to secure the State safety;
3. typifying for further development prior to recruitment as collaborator, the persons, whose knowledge or professional career were not bound with statutory WSI tasks:
- economist A.W., he was supposed in the WSI opinion to have knowledge of Art.-B affair and of business relations of politicians’ group – in this about carrying out from Poland the equivalent of 800 billion "old" Polish zlotys (WSI were also interested in political friends of W.)
- lawyer B. involved in cooperation with SB;
- former secret collaborator aka "KRZEMIŃSKI" [cryptic name for secret collaborator], a criminal and smuggler, having established contacts with international criminal groups, trading in drugs;
4. looking for the possibilities of obtaining information from banking environment (such possibilities were deciding in case of typifying for recruitment of former and negatively verified operating agent of SB, Stanisław Bajda), which was explained with the fact that the close co-workers of Bogusław Bagsik were two employees of Section V of SB in Regional Office for Internal Affairs on Cieszyn.
5. accepting these actions by the Chief of Counter-intelligence Services of the WSI Comdr. Kazimierz Głowacki, which may indicated to the fact that scheduled verification of business and juridical circles in Bielsko-Biała Province was carried, with visible interest in getting such knowledge, which would enable blackmailing of selected persons.
The material in the case “O” was produced by the 3rd Directorate WSI, but after its completion it was sent to Safety Section at the WSI. The records of the case run by main specialist of the 3rd Directorate WSI Col. Marek Wolny with consent of the Chief of Counter-intelligence Services WSI Comdr. K. Głowacki was referred to Safety Section, which was aimed at hiding it before the employees of the 3rd Directorate WSI. Carried actions were going beyond the WSI counter-intelligence competencies since they were oriented to region of Bielsko-Biała and were typical of intelligence. The planned activates were executed in strictly selected location and time, which could be connect with the smuggling activity of the “Vienna” businessmen environment. These actions could have twofold dimension: on the one hand they served for investigation status of shielding by special services of certain circles and persons, on the other hand they could be a prelude for planned actions, for which it was necessary for investigation of political and juridical environment. Looking from this perspective, you may admit that we could have here to do with shielding actions associated with planned business activity, for which the region of Bielsko-Biała was of special importance. Such an intention of the authors of this undertaking may be confirmed by the fact, that the WSI residents – with the consent of the services command – made a decision to give to their informants the pseudonyms being the real names of publicly known persons, playing an important role in Bielsko-Biała society (e.g. "JANUSZ OKRZESIK" or "JAN MICHNA", [cryptic names for secret collaborator(s)]). In this place we have to do with masking criminal actions, which in case of instituting a criminal proceeding have to cast suspicions to non guilty persons and to discredit such persons by the same in the public opinion eyes.
The case of "non-public residency O" is a good example of special services pathology in the 90-ies, when depraved and criminal elements were used in order to obtain information able to discredit politicians and be used to control them Such intentions of the authors and organizers of "O" residency are confirmed not only by fact that it did not bring any operating advantages, but that none of identified criminals was held liable. Selection of persons securing flow of information and constituting potential shielding apparatus in case of conflict with law, supports the assumption that establishing such secret branch of Military Counter-intelligence WSI in Bielsko-Biała had nothing to do with military services tasks and assignments.
In the light of the above facts, the performance of the following persons fulfils the instruction in Art. 70a subpar. 1 and 2 p. 2 of the Act of June 9, 2006 Regulations introducing the Act on Military Counter-intelligence Service and Military Intelligence Service: Comdr. Kazimierz Głowacki, Col. Marek Wolny, Lt Col. Jan Węgierski.
In described period the Chief of the WSI was Brig.Gen. Konstanty Malejczyk.
Up to 1995 the supervision of the WSI's activities on the principle of general responsibility of subordinated department was exercised by the Minister of National Defense. In the described period this office was held by: Zbigniew Okoński and Stanisław Dobrzański.
The facts cited in the Chapter hereof raise objections as to legitimacy of the WSI soldiers proceeding, in connection with the above the Verification Commission sent to the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office a notification of suspected commitment of crime pursuant to Art. 304 § 2 of Code of criminal proceeding.